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Abstract 
This thesis analysis the impact of private road transport under emission trading using two different 
Computable General Equilibrium models. A static multi-region model with special emphasis on the 
European Union, addresses the welfare impact of road transport under the European Emission Trading 
System. Including terms-of-trade effects, this model does not account for congestion which is the main 
externality of road transport. Furthermore, technological details of electricity generation which are an 
important factor in evaluating climate policies are not included. Therefore, the second model is a static 
Small Open Economy model of the German economy including congestion effects and detailed 
technological characteristics of electricity generation. The results of both models highlight the 
important role of already existing taxes on transport fuels for the evaluation of carbon mitigation 
measures in road transportation. 
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 1 Introduction 
Global warming has become one of the most serious environmental problems for current and future 
generations. In consequence, countries agreed to stabilize “…greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system” (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 2) and signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Following this agreement, industrial countries 
implemented the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by an 
average of 5.2% as compared to 1990 within the period 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 1998).  
The main greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide (CO2) which is mainly produced by the combustion of 
fossil fuels in the electricity and transport sectors. In 2007, energy industries were responsible for 32% 
of the total emissions in the European Union (EU), followed by the transport sector emitting 19.5% 
(Eurostat, 2009a). With more than 90% road transport is the main polluter in the transport sector 
followed by aviation (ECMT, 2007). 
In the line of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU started regulating CO2 emissions of electricity generation, 
energy-intensive production, and refineries implementing the world largest emission trading system in 
2005 (EC, 2003). The European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is a classical cap and trade 
system setting an upper bound on total emissions and allowing the trade of emission allowances. The 
design of the EU ETS allows including further sectors and greenhouse gases in the future 
development. Aviation will be included into the EU ETS from 2012 onwards (EC, 2008a). In contrast, 
concerning private road transport the EU has released mandatory carbon efficiency standards for new 
cars from 2012 onwards (EC, 2009c).  
From an economic point of view, mandatory standards are suboptimal since they do not allow equal 
marginal abatement cost of carbon across the economy, i.e. do not implement carbon reduction at 
lowest cost. Thus, the central question of this thesis is whether the inclusion of road transport into the 
EU ETS lowers the cost of carbon regulation in Europe. The question is numerically analyzed using 
two different computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.   
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background of 
carbon regulation in a first and second-best setting and under environmental tax reform concerns. 
Furthermore, the complications of regulating road transport, namely multiple externalities of different 
dimensions and the large number of polluters, are analyzed and possible strategies of carbon 
regulations are derived. This chapter also provides the basic arguments in favor and against the 
inclusion of road transport into the EU ETS. Chapter 3 provides the methodological background of 
computable general equilibrium modeling. Special emphasis lies on the integration of technological 
details into the CGE modeling framework. Furthermore, a review of the environmental-energy and 
transport related CGE literature is given. Chapter 4 employs a multi-region CGE with a detailed 
representation of the EU 27 countries analyzing the effects of transport under the EU ETS, a European 
fuel tax increase, and the total exemption of transport from carbon regulation. The results indicate that 
the most preferable strategy is exempting transport from regulation. The analysis in this chapter is 
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unique in the sense that the question is investigated on a detailed European member state level. 
Chapter 5 presents a small open economy model with a detailed representation of electricity 
generation technologies and private transport. Against the background that congestion is the most 
important externality of transport, different time periods and road types are introduced to include the 
impact of travel flow changes. Again, the results show that exempting transport from carbon 
regulation is favorable to its inclusion into emission trading or increases in fuel taxes. Moreover, using 
the income of carbon regulation to increase subsidies on public transport shows large positive effects 
in two directions: the cost of carbon regulation decrease and the congestion externality is partly 
decreased. The analysis in this chapter is unique in bringing together a detailed representation of 
electricity generation and private transport. Moreover, the details of the private transport 
representation including different road types based on empirical data have not been investigated for 
Germany, yet. Chapter 6 summarizes the results, concludes, and suggests future research topics.  
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2 Regulation of Road Transport Carbon Emissions 
This section analyzes approaches on how to regulate carbon emissions with a focus on the transport 
sector. First, the theory of environmental regulation in a first and second-best setting and the effects of 
environmental tax reforms are examined. Second, the special needs of regulation in road transport are 
reviewed and different approaches to carbon emission regulation of road transport are analyzed.  
 
2.1 Regulating externalities 
2.1.1 Regulation in a first-best world 
Internalization of external effects requires choosing an appropriate target level of the externality and 
an adequate regulation instrument. Having implemented the instrument, it needs to be enforced and 
monitored.  
Theoretically, the optimal target level equates the marginal external cost to the marginally benefit (see 
e.g. Baumol and Oates 1988). In the case of greenhouse gas regulation, the target level in terms of 
emissions for a certain time period is predetermined by international climate agreements: The Kyoto 
Protocol commits participating countries to reduce average yearly emissions for the period from 2008 
to 2012 by a certain percentage as compared to the emission level of the year 1990. Accordingly, the 
EU15 has to mitigate CO2 emissions by 8 %. In consequence, the EU has released the Burden Sharing 
(EC, 2002) and more recently the Effort Sharing Agreement (EC, 2009a) which regulate the member 
states’ mitigation requirements in a way to reach the overall European target. Therefore, the target 
level of emissions is taken as given in the following analysis.1  
A variety of policy instruments for the regulation of GHG exist. These can be classified into three 
main categories: public spending, market-based instruments, and command and control policies.2 The 
performance of instruments is compared in terms of costs and environmental effectiveness, dynamic 
efficiency, implementation and monitoring costs, and political feasibility. Cost efficiency is given (i.e. 
the environmental target is reached at lowest costs) if the marginal abatement costs equalize across 
pollution sources (see e.g. Perman et al., 2003). Environmental effectiveness measures the distance 
between the target pollution level and the level induced by the instruments. Dynamic efficiency 
evaluates the incentives to invest in research, development, and adaptation of new technologies.3   
                                                     
1
 In 2009 the EU committed to reduce emission by 20% below the 1990 level in the period 2012 to 2020 (EC, 2009b). While 
the burden sharing relates to t EU 15 countries, the new reduction commitment and the effort sharing agreement also includes 
new member states, i.e. relates to EU 27. In the case that the negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate agreement will be 
successful, the EU announced to reduce 30 % of its emission in this period. 
2
 Additionally, there exist informational policies like e.g. energy efficiency labelling or educational programs. Since the 
effectiveness of such measures can hardly be controlled, they should be seen as important additional policies to overcome 
transaction costs in the form of information costs on the final demand side.  
3
 A general statement about the dynamic efficiency of different instruments is not possible. Downing and White (1986) show 
that the innovation incentives are independent from governments’ reaction to adaptation of new technologies. However, 
adaptation depends on the reaction of other market participants, i.e. if they also adapt the technology. The study of Downing 
and White (1986) only examines the adaptation stage of technological progress. In subsequent analysis the problem is 
examined in terms of game theoretic analysis and considerations about research and development. Jaffe et al. (2002a, b) 
provide a survey.    
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Public spending policies could take place in the form of direct mitigation actions of the government or 
in the form of subsidies. In the case of GHG, direct mitigation actions hardly exist. Subsidies can take 
place in production or final demand sectors. A prominent example on the production side is the 
support of electricity generation technologies from renewable energy sources (EC, 2008b); subsidies 
for environmental friendly public transport are a demand side example. The fundamental problem of 
public spending policies is the refinancing issue since the increase in the spending has to be rebalanced 
by additional taxes. 
Command and control policies are obligations which are introduced in the production process. 
Possible measures are to constrain the upper emission level of every production site or firm, to dictate 
technologies which may be used, or to put quotas on input commodities. These policies generally can 
be shown to be highly ecologically efficient but lack cost effectiveness. 
Economists favor the use of market-based instruments. Two classes exist: Pigouvian taxes (Pigou, 
1920) and tradable permits (Dales, 1968). Pigouvian taxes implement taxes on polluting commodities 
equal to the social marginal cost. The idea of tradable permits builds on the work of Coase (1960) who 
noted that externalities are caused by lacking property rights. Consequently, property rights are 
established by allocating pollution rights (i.e. the permits) to agents and allowing the trade of these 
rights. Mitigation of pollution is achieved by either allocating only a limited number of permits, i.e. 
setting an upper bound on pollution, or by open market policy, i.e. governments buy permits on the 
market and hence avoid pollution. Both instruments are cost efficient in the sense of equating marginal 
abatement costs across polluters (Montgomery, 1972). If the social marginal costs are correctly 
estimated and the overall pollution target is optimally determined, the permit price will be equal to the 
Pigouvian tax and both instruments achieve the same environmental target. However, under a given 
target level of pollution, as is the case for GHG, the Pigouvian tax requires estimating the correct tax 
rate in order to implement the imposed environmental target. Therefore, the aggregated marginal cost 
curve needs to be determined. Thus, Cropper and Oates (1992) see the major advantage of an emission 
trading system in gaining direct control over the emission quantity.  
However, tradable rights systems raise the question of the initial allocation of permits. Two extreme 
possibilities exist: The government can use grandfathering, i.e. allocate permits to installations for 
free, or sell or auction permits. Montgomery (1972) proves that the initial distribution of permits does 
not affect post-trading allocation and efficiency of the instrument. However, economists favor 
auctioning of permits for at least two reasons. First, auctioning permits implements the polluter-pays 
principle, i.e. polluting firms have to pay for emissions. Second, auctioning reveals a permit price at 
the beginning of the trading scheme which improves liquidity of the permit market. Nevertheless, 
grandfathering is an important option especially in the first establishment of trading schemes since this 
improves the political acceptance of the system (Tietenberg, 2006).  
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2.1.2 Regulation in a second-best world 
The basic theory of environmental regulation as described in the last section builds on a first-best 
framework which is characterized by the absence of other distortions. Obviously, this assumption is 
unrealistic since economies are full of distortions mainly due to governments’ needs to finance the 
provision of public goods and non-convexities in the form of imperfect competition (Hahn, 1984; 
Liski and Montero, 2008). The theory of second-best states that if one set of efficiency conditions is 
violated, it is not necessarily optimal to achieve the remaining ones (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). 
Thus, deviation from the basic assumptions may lead to optimal carbon taxes which are no longer 
uniform across the economy, i.e. deviation from the Pigouvian tax.4 
Generally, governments need to raise taxes in order to finance the provision of public goods. As long 
as taxes do not correct for market failures, they are necessarily distortionary in the sense that raising 
one dollar of public revenues causes a loss in welfare greater than one dollar. The cost of raising one 
additional unit of government revenues is known as the marginal cost of public fund consisting of the 
direct tax burden plus the associated welfare cost by distorting prices in the economy (Browning, 
1976). The direct burden is the cost of raising one unit of revenue. The excess welfare costs are 
referred to as excess burden of taxation. The theory of optimal taxation analyzes the optimal tax 
structure under the need of raising public revenues by imposing taxes, i.e. in the absence of non-
distortionary lump-sum taxation (see Auerbach and Hines, 2002 for a survey). In a world without 
externalities, optimal indirect taxes on commodity consumption rates are characterized by the Ramsey 
or inverse elasticity rule: the more inelastic the commodity demand, the higher will be the tax rate 
(Ramsey, 1927; Boiteaux, 1956). Furthermore, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971 a,b) show that taxes on 
intermediate inputs are non-optimal as long as production exhibits constant returns to scale.  
The presence of externalities alters these results. Sandamo (1975) shows that in the presence of 
externalities optimal tax rates are the weighted average of the optimal tax and the Pigouvian tax rate. 
The optimal tax schedule exhibits a property known as additivity property: in the presence of 
externalities the optimal commodity tax rate in final consumption is the weighted average of the 
optimal Ramsey tax and the Pigou tax equal to the marginal social cost caused by the consumption of 
the commodity. Weights depend on the government’s budget need. In the case where corrective 
taxation is able to fully finance the budget, the Ramsey component of the optimal tax becomes zero.  
With increasing revenue raising requirement, the Ramsey tax component becomes more and more 
important and the Pigou tax term vanishes. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) extend the result for 
the more general case of interdependent demand functions and endogenous labor supply decisions. 
Sandamo (1993) addresses distributional concerns considering consumers who differ in their 
preferences and income and shows that weighted average property of optimal taxes still holds. 
However, distributional considerations additionally influence the weighting factors: If the share of 
high income consumers’ consumption for a commodity is high, the Ramsey tax component increases. 
                                                     
4
 In the ongoing, Pigouvian taxes are discussed. Due to the inverse relation of environmental taxes and tradable rights 
schemes differentiated taxes offer arguments for exemptions of sectors from carbon regulation or rebate systems. 
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Similarly, if a high valuation of environmental quality is concentrated among high income consumers, 
the Pigouvian tax component tends to be higher.  
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) show that in the presence of externalities it is also optimal to tax dirty 
intermediate commodities at the Pigouvian tax rate corrected for the marginal cost of public fund, i.e. 
with increasing excess burden of taxation the dirty intermediate input tax vanishes.  
 
2.1.3 Environmental tax reforms  
The optimal taxation approach faces two main criticisms: First, it assumes the existence of a welfare 
function which generally does not exist (Arrow, 1950). Second, it assumes that policy makers newly 
design tax systems. However, generally they do not create new tax systems but are confronted with 
altering existing schemes, i.e. with tax reforms Feldstein (1976). In the light of environmental 
regulation, governments impose environmental regulation on top of a pre-existing tax schedule. This 
raises two questions: First, if environmental regulation raises revenues, how to spend the income 
optimally? Second, what are the interactions of pre-existing taxes and the additional corrective tax 
measures? Consequently, the occurring effects are known as revenue recycling and tax interaction or 
intermediate effect (Parry, 1995; Goulder, 1995). 
Generally, the revenue recycling effect is analyzed under the assumption that the provision of public 
goods is constant in order to separate the question of environmental regulation from the topic of the 
optimal size and composition of public spending.5 The double dividend hypothesis states that using the 
additional government income to lower pre-existing distortionary taxation provides an additional 
welfare gain beside the improvement of environmental quality (Pearce, 1991). Consequently, the gross 
costs of environmental regulation, which are defined as the welfare loss of regulation without the 
benefit of improved environmental quality, decrease. In order to maximize the double dividend the 
lowered tax should be preferably broad based. Accordingly, the literature most often considers cutting 
labor taxes. As a consequence, the double dividend hypothesis is often stated in terms of 
unemployment: using the income of environmental regulation lowering existing labor taxes stipulates 
labor demand and subsequently reduces involuntary unemployment (e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij, 
1994; Bovenberg, 1999). A survey of empirical evidences on the double dividend hypothesis is given 
by Galeotti and Carraro (1996) and Bosquet (2000) which show that it holds in the short and medium 
term but is uncertain in the long run. 
 Tax interaction has two direct aspects. First, raising the price of a commodity by environmental 
taxation reduces commodity demand as long as the commodity is a normal good. This happens 
naturally, since the aim of environmental regulation is to reduce the social cost associated with 
commodity consumption. If the commodity is already taxed, a loss in the income of the pre-existing 
tax results. This is known as tax base erosion effect. The tax base erosion effect counteracts the 
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 Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) investigate both issues in a single framework. 
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revenue recycling effect since it lowers tax income and, accordingly, the amount to be recycled in a 
welfare enhancing way. 
Environmental taxes also directly interact with the pre-existing tax schedule. For illustrative purpose, 
assume that the regulator imposes an economy wide tax on carbon at the marginal rate of social cost 
and abstract from the marginal cost of public fund. If the pre-existing tax scheme is optimal in the 
sense that all commodities are taxed at their Ramsey tax rate in final consumption and intermediate 
inputs are untaxed, the uniform carbon tax rate will be optimal since it implements an additional Pigou 
tax term equal for all consumers and sectors. Now assume that the initial tax schedule is non-optimal, 
for concreteness, taxes on final consumption are above the Ramsey tax. Imposing the uniform carbon 
tax raises input prices of all sectors and consumers by the same amount. Consequently, taxes on final 
consumption are also too high after the introduction of carbon regulation. By lowering the carbon tax 
on final consumption the regulator can reduce the cost of carbon regulation since the after-regulation 
tax schedule is closer to the optimal tax scheme, i.e. the distortionary effect of taxation is reduced. The 
essential point is that a tax rate above the Ramsey tax already implies corrective taxation of the 
externality. Consequently, the reduction of the carbon tax in final consumption leads to effective 
carbon tax rates effectively closer to uniform across the economy.  
Figure 1 illustrates the tax interaction effect. The demand curve is given by the straight line FC. 
Supply is assumed to be price inelastic and is given by the line AC. The welfare costs of tax 
introduction are the area under the demand function net of production costs. Accordingly, the 
introduction of a fuel tax tF is associated with welfare costs equal to the triangle BCE. Adding the 
carbon tax tC results in an additional welfare loss equal to the triangle DEF and the rectangle ABDE. 
The triangle DEF is equal to the area under the marginal abatement cost curve for carbon. On the one 
hand, the rectangle ABDE represents the tax base erosion effect as the loss income of taxation. On the 
other, it also represents the loss in consumer surplus due to the pre-existing fuel tax. 
A lower carbon tax on some commodities translates into (partial) exemption in emission trading 
schemes. In contrast to Pigou taxes, trading schemes set an upper bound on total quantity of emissions. 
Accordingly, the question about which sector should carry the additional abatement burden resulting 
from the exemption arises. Theoretical results on this issue do not exist.  
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Figure 1: Tax interaction effects 
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Böhringer and Rutherford (2002a) numerically analyze optimal differentiation of carbon taxes. They 
maximize welfare under the equilibrium conditions of a CGE model.6 The government imposes 
environmental regulation in the form of a 20% reduction requirement by choosing carbon taxes 
differentiated by commodity and sectors and final consumption. The results show that it is optimal to 
differentiate carbon taxes across sectors and final consumers. Due to high energy taxes in final 
consumption it becomes optimal to exempt consumers from carbon regulation moving the reduction 
burden to industries (mainly electricity generation).7 The results are decomposed into the effects of 
energy and non-energy taxes. While the tax interaction with non-energy taxes only justifies a small 
differentiation of the environmental levy, the exemption of the household sector is caused by pre-
existing energy taxes mainly mineral oil taxes (IEA, 2007).8  
    
2.2   Regulation of road transportation 
2.2.1 Externalities of road transportation 
Three classes of external cost related to road transportation can be distinguished: i) cost resulting from 
actual driving, ii) external cost arising when vehicles are not in motion such as parking externalities, 
and iii) cost occurring from the presence of infrastructure such as visual annoyance (Verhoef et al. 
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 This is an MPEC problem (Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints) (Luo, Pang, and Ralph, 1996) since the 
objective function is optimized under a set of complementarity conditions which characterize the equilibrium. An 
introduction into the use of MPECs for the investigation of optimal taxation problems is given in Light (1999).    
7
 In the study carbon taxes are constraint to be positive, i.e. subsidies for carbon are ruled out.  
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1997). In the ongoing, I concentrate on the first category. External cost of actual driving are further 
subdivided into intrasectional cost that road users impose on each other and social cost which are 
imposed on the rest of the society (Mayeres et al., 1996).  
Social cost come in two different forms: pollution damages and noise (Bickel et al., 2005).9,10 
Pollution cost can occur either on a local or on a global level. On a local level pollutants like carbon 
monoxide, nitro oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon, and heavy metals cause health damages in the form of mortality or 
morbidity and environmental damages in the form of negative bio-system impacts (Bickel and 
Friedrich, 2005).11 On a global level, pollutants add to global warming. Most important in this class 
are carbon dioxide emissions. However, nitrogen dioxide and troposphere ozone also exhibit a positive 
radiative forcing effect. Furthermore, SO2 and NOx lead to the creation of aerosols that have a negative 
impact on the Earth’s energy balance (IPPC, 2007).12  
Intrasectional external costs are congestion effects and increases in private resource cost. Congestion 
occurs since average speed is negatively related to the traffic flow (measured in personal car 
equivalent per hour; PCE/h). Consequently, each additional road vehicles increase the time cost of 
traffic users since the travel flow raises (e.g. Walters, 1961; Vickery, 1963). Furthermore, monetary 
vehicle operating costs per kilometer depend on the speed level (Mayeres, 1993). Since users only care 
about their own cost and not about the effect on the speed-flow relationship, congestion implies 
external cost.  
Marginal accident costs relate to both classes, intersectional and social. Additional vehicles raise the 
likelihood of medical and material cost (Button, 1990). Link (2005) subdivides external accident costs 
into production loss due to accidents, the cost of medical treatment and rehabilitation if provided by 
the public health system, cost of associated police and rescue services not covered by transport users, 
and public material damage as not covered by insurances. Accordingly, the precise definition of the 
external accident cost varies between countries depending on the insurance system, especially 
regarding the payment of medical services. 
Table 1 depicts the dependency of different externalities on trip characteristics. Even though it only 
includes qualitative rankings it will prove useful in the discussion of regulation approaches.  
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 The authors also analyzed other motive of carbon tax differentiation. Other arguments of differentiation come in form of 
carbon leakage (Hoel, 1996) and terms-of-trade effects (Krutilla, 1991)  
9
 Noise is sometime also regarded as intrasectional externality in the form of annoyance of other traffic participants. 
Additionally, in the case of heavy vehicles, social cost in the form of road damage occur which cause road repair and 
increased vehicle operating cost of other traffic participants (Newbery, 1988).   
10
 Parry et al. (2007) also mention the external cost of oil dependency in the form of military and geo-political cost imposed 
on the society and the vulnerability to oil price volatility and market power in the oil market.  
11
 For a detailed description of the impacts of the single pollutants see Bickel and Friedrich (2005, Table 1.1 p. 3). Most 
pollutants have a direct effect. However, NOx and VOC also have secondary effects in increasing troposphere ozone 
concentration. The oxidation products of  SO2 lead to the acid rain problem.     
12
 While the level of scientific understanding of radiative of carbon dioxide is high, the role of ozone and aerosols is still at 
medium and low level respectively. For an assessment of the level of scientific understanding and radiative impacts see IPPC 
(2007, pp. 32 ff.).   
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Table 1: External cost of road transportation and trip characteristics 
 Mileage Time of driving Area of driving Vehicle used 
Accidents + 0 0 - 
Congestion + + + - 
Global pollution + - - + 
Local pollution + - 0 + 
Noise + 0 + + 
Source: Verhoefen et al. (1995, 1997) extended by the distinction between global and local pollution.  
Legend: + high dependence, 0 moderate dependence, - low dependence. 
 
In general, all external cost categories show a high correlation with vehicle kilometers (VKM) 
travelled. While congestion is nearly independent of the car used, it is highly dependent on the spatial 
and time dimension. Pollution strongly correlates with the car technology determining fuel efficiency 
and consequently fuel use. By definition, global pollution does not depend on the area of driving while 
local pollution does. The noise externality correlates to all trip characteristics. Safety may depend to 
some extend on the area and time of driving but is mainly determined by mileage. 
Table 2 shows the total external cost of road transportation for France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom in 2005 as derived by the UNITE Project (UNIfication of accounts and marginal costs for 
Transport Efficiency). The general lesson is that congestion cost, which are differentiated by pure time 
and resource cost, are the greatest externality imposed by road transport. Beside external accident cost, 
the externality generated by global pollution, i.e. global warming shows the lowest value. Differences 
in the external accident costs are difficult to compare across countries, since they depend on the high 
accident rate and difference in the insurance system (Link, 2005). The ranking between local pollution 
and noise externalities is non-homogenous among countries. However, the general point is clear: 
Congestions is the main concern of regulation in the transport sector. Adopting a partial transport 
sector view, global warming motives are of minor concern. 
 
Table 2: External cost of road transport in 2005 [Million €1998] 
 France Germany United Kingdom 
Accident 1 818 17 324 1 716 
Congestion (time) 18 803 20 484 23 981 
Congestion (fuel) 1 778 1 102 264 
Global pollution 2 700 4 555 2 741 
Local pollution 9 394 7 030 3 952 
Noise 4 747 7 825 7 592 
Source: France: Jeger et al. (2001, p. 53); Germany: Link et al. (2001, p. 157); United Kingdom: Tweddel et al. (2001, p. 92) 
 
2.2.2 Regulation in the road transport sector 
Regulation of private road transport is complicated due to five major reasons (Verhoef et al., 1997): 
First, the number of externalities is large and they additionally correlate. Second, externalities differ 
with respect to the time and spatial dimensions. Third, the number of externality generators is large 
and, in addition, mobile. Fourth, generally demand is derive and, consequently, quite inelastic Fifth, 
equity aspects are highly relevant.  
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Naturally, this translates into a number of general questions regarding the regulation of road 
transportation. Does one single instrument exist which is able to internalize all externalities or is it 
better to follow the Tinbergen rule, i.e. one instrument for each policy target. And following the 
Tinbergen rule, what are the interactions with newly imposed carbon regulation? What to regulate? 
Essentially, road transportation needs three complementary components: networks, cars, and fuel. 
Consequently, there are three options where regulative measures could be imposed. However, the 
number of traffic users is high and mobile, implying large implementation and monitoring cost and, 
the number of suppliers of cars and fuels (and networks if privately supplied) is lower: Who to 
regulate? After making these basic decisions: How could an optimal regulation be designed? Finally, 
from a political perspective one has to ask whether the optimal strategy is politically feasible. 
Naturally, these decisions are highly interdependent.  
 
2.2.2.1 Optimal regulation 
Reducing vehicle kilometers is the only way to address all externalities within a single framework. 
Parry and Small (2005) derive the optimal fuel tax rate in an analytical model including local and 
global pollution, accidents, congestion feedbacks, and endogenous feedbacks of cars’ fuel efficiency. 
They show that the optimal fuel tax consists of three terms: the Ramsey tax, a modified Pigouvian tax, 
and congestion feedback.  
In line with earlier results, the modified Pigouvian tax is equal to the marginal external cost divided by 
the marginal cost of public funds. The marginal external cost are the sum of the global pollution 
damage, that is directly related to fuel consumption, and marginal local pollution, accident, and 
congestion cost. Since the latter are determined by kilometers driven, they only indirectly correlate 
with fuel consumption via the cars’ fuel efficiency. Consequently, the kilometer-dependent component 
of the quasi Pigouvian tax is negatively related to the price elasticity of fuel demand since a high 
elasticity implies a high reaction in form of less driving. However, the remarkable point compared to 
earlier studies (e.g. Newbery, 1990) is that fuel efficiency is endogenous. Thus, there is a positive 
relation of the kilometers driven component to the fuel price elasticity of energy efficiency. To put it 
differently, people have two alternatives to react on higher fuel taxes:13 driving less or buying more 
efficient cars. Driving less reduces fuel consumption and kilometers driven. Consequently, the 
kilometers driven externality component is reduced. Buying more fuel efficient cars reduces fuel 
consumption but does not affect kilometers driven. Therefore, the kilometer-dependent externalities 
are not reduced and the modified Pigouvian tax increases inducing less driving. In short, calculating 
the optimal modified Pigouvian tax rate, kilometer-dependent externalities enter with a weighting 
factor determined by the ratio of the fuel price elasticity of fuel efficiency and fuel demand. Empirical 
work suggests a value of around 0.5 (Parry and Small, 2005).14 Neglecting endogenous fuel efficiency 
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 Schäfer and Jacoby (2005) estimate a fuel efficiency elasticity of -0.126 using the MARKAL model. According to Graham 
and Glaister (2002) the short run price elasticity of fuel demand is between -0.2 and -0.5.  
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implicitly assumes that both elasticities are equal resulting in a ratio of one. Consequently the 
modified Pigouvian tax rate is overestimated. 
The congestion feedback term in Parry and Small (2005) increases the optimal fuel tax since labor 
supply is endogenous and taxed. Transport is modeled as a consumption commodity. Reduced 
congestion lowers the price of transportation relative to leisure. Consequently, people substitute 
transportation for leisure which is welfare improving since labor is taxed (also see Parry and Bento 
2001).  
Calibrating the model to the US and the UK, Parry and Small (2005) show that gasoline taxes in the 
US should be increased while in the UK taxes are more than twice as high than the optimal tax. A 
single fuel tax has the problem that kilometer-dependent externalities are only indirectly included via 
fuel efficiency. Furthermore, fuel taxes do not change the pattern of driving time and location. 
In contrast, imposing road pricing measures allows addressing the spatial and time dimension of 
externalities but only indirectly addresses fuel efficiency of cars (Newberry, 2004). Thus, it is more 
promising to regulate single externalities with different instruments and accounting for interactions. 
For congestion the possibility of road pricing schemes, kilometer-dependent taxes, or infrastructure 
policy exist. Such instruments also address other kilometer-dependent externalities. Emissions of cars 
can be regulated by technology standards, fuel quality regulation, or fuel taxation. Newberry (2004) 
calculates the optimal tax rates on fuels and equivalent road user charges for the United Kingdom. 
Policy options to reduce carbon emissions including taxes of private transport are discussed in the next 
section. 
 
2.2.2.2 Options to regulate carbon emissions in the transport sector 
Three main options to reduce carbon emissions of private cars are considered: regulating fuel 
composition, fuel efficiency regulation of cars, and increasing fuel taxes. Further options that require 
different regulation approaches are changing driving behavior and imposing speed limits. 
Furthermore, subsidies on public transport can reduce private road transport by inducing transport 
mode switches altering relative prices. 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Fuel composition regulation and fuel switching 
In general, a regulation of the transport fuel composition cannot change the direct emissions of private 
transportation since the energy value of fuels is determined by the carbon content combusted.15 One 
liter of gasoline (diesel) contains 0.640 kg C/l (0.734 kg C/l) with a net calorific value of 32.44 MJ/l 
(35.87 MJ/l) (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2005). Assuming 99% of carbon oxidized and 
multiplying with the ratio of molar weights of CO2 and carbon (~44/12) yields average CO2 emission 
of 2.30 kg CO2/l (gasoline) and 2.66 kg CO2/l (diesel). 
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 To be more precise: the energy content is determined by the carbon content and its oxidation state. However, changing the 
oxidation state would require a different composition of hydrocarbons which is not possible without altering combustion 
technologies (e.g. Archer, 2007). 
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The only way of to reduce total carbon emissions per liter combusted fuel is blending with biofuels 
which are regarded as carbon neutral since the carbon content is absorbed from the atmosphere. 
While biofuel blending regulation is able to reduce the net emissions of cars and, additionally, has the 
advantage of reducing economies’ oil dependency, three major problems arise. First, blending is 
restricted in the short run since changing the fuel composition requires adjustments in combustion 
technologies, i.e. car technologies (Schallaböck et al., 2006). Second, the production of biofuels causes 
interactions with food markets due to the changed use of agriculture areas and the use of food crops 
for energy production. The second point may be overcome by using second generation biofuels based 
on cellulose (UN, 2007). Third, increased biofuel production causes nitrogen dioxide emissions of 
fertilization. Consequently including the whole lifecycle, biofuels are not carbon neutral (Crutzen et 
al., 2008). Nevertheless, the EU aims to increase the biofuel share in transportation above ten percent 
(EC, 2008b). 
Another option on the fuel level is switching to alternative energy sources. The main opportunities are 
natural gas, hydrogen, or electric cars. A problem arising for all new fuels is the dependency on a 
service station network (Achtnicht et al., 2008). The problem can be addressed by using bivalent cars 
and extending fuel station networks. Natural gas vehicles are already market mature while hydrogen 
cars are not competitive today. Furthermore, hydrogen cars are only improving environmental quality 
if the fuel is produced using renewable electricity generation, since hydrogen production is energy-
intensive (Sandoval, 2008). Electric cars are critical in terms of battery performance, limiting driving 
range, and cost (Duvall, 2004).  Karplus et al. (2009) show that even under very strict climate policies, 
the adaptation of hybrid electric cars, that are additionally able to run on conventional fuels, requires 
further research in battery design to lower costs. As in the case of hydrogen cars, carbon emission 
reduction depends on electricity generation technologies.      
 
2.2.2.2.2 Fuel efficiency regulation 
Fuel efficiency improvements can be achieved by altering car design and improving combustion and 
gearbox technologies. Altering car design takes place by either aerodynamic resistance improvements 
for new designs or reducing the weight of automobiles. Weights can be reduced using light-weight 
interiors or, more costly, using more aluminum in the autobody (Schäfer and Jacoby, 2006). 
Combustion engines can be improved by various technological measures improving energy efficiency. 
Schallaböck et al. (2006) estimate the technical potential to improve energy efficiency of gasoline 
(diesel) cars from currently around 15% (18%) to 21% (24%) in the near term. In the long term, 
further enhancements are possible to around 26% (30%). The main options are the introduction of 
start-stop systems, hybrid cars, and downsizing. Start-stop systems, which stop the motor at zero speed 
and start again without using the starter, are already observed on the market. Also, hybrid cars which 
store dragging energy in batteries and use it for acceleration are on the market, yet. Downsizing is the 
possibility to decrease fuel consumption by scaling down the cubic capacity of cars. For most cars the 
most fuel efficient speed does not coincide with the average speed driven. Consequently, fuel 
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efficiency is improved by adjusting the cubic capacity such that the most fuel efficient speed coincides 
with the average driving patterns. Although downsizing is regarded as one of the most promising 
options to decrease fuel consumption, it conflicts with consumer preferences since the motor 
performance is also scaled down.      
Successfully improving fuel efficiency by regulatory measures depends on the right incentives for 
technology adoption at the demand side and technology innovation at the supply side. Consequently, 
the question is who and how to regulate. On the supply side, technological standards (possibility 
tradable) concerning the carbon efficiency can be imposed. Besides increasing fuel prices, carbon-
dependent motor vehicle or sales taxes can be imposed on the demand side in order to alter relative 
prices in favor of environmentally friendly technologies. 
Recently, the EU has released mandatory carbon efficiency standards for new cars from 2012 onwards 
(EC, 2009c).16 Manufactures average specific emission of newly sold cars may not exceed 130 CO2 
g/km. This corresponds to an average fuel efficiency of around 5.7 l gasoline/100 km and 4.9 l 
diesel/100 km. Emission targets for single cars are weight dependent, i.e. heavier cars are allowed to 
emit more CO2. Elmer and Fischer (2009) show that the weight dependency of emission standards 
leads to inefficiencies. Exceeding the specific emission target causes fines: 5, 15, and 25 € for the first 
three excess grams, respectively, and 95 € for each additional gram.17 The directive implements 
additional innovation incentives: given the use of environmental friendly innovations, manufacturers’ 
specific targets are reduced by up to 7 g CO2/km. The European approach allows pooling of 
manufacturers, i.e. manufacturers are allowed to jointly fulfill their average specific emission targets. 
Therefore, it imposes some flexibility of carbon mitigation but full flexibility using tradable permits is 
not achieved. 
A tradable permit approach would require specifying the unit of rights. This could be either specific 
emission rights in g CO2/km or emissions over the whole lifetime cycle of the car (t CO2). The former, 
has the disadvantage that trading is restricted to automobile manufacturers. The latter option, which 
has been termed midstream trading, requires estimating lifetime emissions of a sold automobile. This 
could be done bases on a representative driving cycle e.g. European Driving Cycle. Choosing the 
lifetime emissions of cars has the advantage that it is consistent with the unit of carbon accounting in 
the EU ETS. Accordingly, permit trading between automobile manufactures and EU ETS sectors can 
be implemented. Albrecht (2000, 2001) proposes such an open midstream approach for the regulation 
of private road transport emissions. 
However, open midstream trading has some disadvantages. Generally, driving cycles are only an 
approximate estimate of the real lifetime emissions which leads to uncertainties about reaching the 
overall target. But such uncertainties are a general problem of fuel efficiency regulation since the ex 
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which is characterized by only partly including newly sold cars (2012: 65%; 2013: 74%; 2014: 80%; 100% from 2015 
onwards).  
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ante determination of carbon mitigation depends on the reactions of drivers. For example, fuel 
efficiency improvements are considered to exhibit a rebound effect, i.e. an increase in kilometers 
driven due to lower fuel cost, which partly offsets the carbon mitigation effect. Furthermore, increased 
mileage increases other externalities like congestion and accidents (Fischer et al., 2007). A second 
concern regarding open midstream trading arises from the design of the EU ETS: time inconsistency. 
Currently, the EU ETS is divided into four year periods. Selling a car in one period it is unclear to 
which period the required emission permits belong to due to the longer lifecycle of cars. The problem 
is weakened by the extension of the EU ETS period to 8 years from 2013 onwards (EC, 2009b). A 
general unsolved concern of fuel efficiency regulation at the supply side in the case that car prices 
increase is the eventual delay of new car purchases due to decreased scrapping.  
Additionally to the European directive, Germany has adopted CO2 dependent motor vehicle taxes 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2009). Every car initially registered after the July 1st, 2009 has to pay a yearly 
tax of 2 € for every gram above 120 g CO2/km. The threshold level is decreased in 2012 (2014) to 110 
(95) g CO2/km. Such an instrument additionally increases adoption incentives on the demand side.      
 
2.2.2.2.3 Pricing transport fuels 
Due to the one-to-one connection of fuel use and carbon emissions, fuel price regulation approaches 
are the most direct measure to regulate carbon emissions of the private transportation sector. It is 
possible to either use taxes or include emissions into the EU ETS. 
Taxes can either uniformly increase or can be differentiated by fuels. The latter approach is more 
sophisticated since differentiation can be oriented towards the carbon content of fuels. As a price 
oriented measure, taxes hardly implement given reduction targets since future driving patterns are 
uncertain (Raux, 2004). Furthermore even if the target could be reached for sure, due to the low own-
price elasticity of fuel demand, taxes have to be very high (Graham and Glaister, 2002; Sterner, 2007). 
This contrasts the high consumers’ sensitivity to fuel price increases leaving political feasibility in 
doubt (Raux and Marlot, 2005). Political feasibility is further restricted by equity aspects. Due to the 
high share of fuel spending in low income groups, a tax on fuels is regressive (West, 2004). Fuel tax 
rates across Europe are already at a high level. Sterner (2007) reports an average tax rate of 80% on 
gasoline for West-Europe in 2007. The already high tax level restricts further tax increases due to the 
high responsiveness of the public opinion to fuel taxes (Hammar et al., 2004). 
Implementing emission trading has the advantage of reaching the carbon target for sure and allowing 
equalization of marginal abatement cost, i.e. implementing cost efficiency. Beside the midstream 
option, two further options exist to include road transportation into the EU ETS (e.g. Ellerman et al., 
2006; Stronzig et al., 2002): downstream and upstream trading.  
In downstream trading the polluters, i.e. drivers, are obliged to hold emission allowances for every ton 
of CO2 emitted. Due to the large number of polluters such a system is expected to incur high 
transaction and information cost. Raux and Marlot (2005) argue that an electronic system for permit 
sales and purchases can minimize transaction costs if the system is compatible with automatic teller 
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machines already existing at service stations. Information costs can be overcome by market 
intermediaries like banks or service station operators. Even though the possibility of downstream 
trading exists, it has never been regarded as a valid option for private transportation. 
In upstream trading, the suppliers of fuels are required to hold emission allowances. For every sold 
liter of fuel the resulting carbon emissions can be calculated and have to be deposited with permits. 
Since the number of upstream fuel suppliers is far below the number of vehicle users, transaction costs 
decrease. This argument is of particular importance for the EU ETS: Refineries are already part of the 
EU ETS. Consequently, administrative costs are lowered since monitoring mechanisms already exist 
and only need to be extended. Furthermore, refinery operators have experience in permit trading since 
the beginning of the EU ETS in 2005. Therefore, information costs are lower, too.  
Under prefect competition up- and downstream trading lead to equivalent results. Dobes (1999) 
remarks that the equivalence breaks down if the fuel market is characterized by imperfect competition. 
This is a serious point which has to be considered if upstream trading should be implemented.  
 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter laid out the theory of environmental regulation in a first and second-best setting and the 
effects of environmental tax reforms. Both, environmental theory in a first and second-best setting, 
state that it is optimal to impose Pigou taxes uniform across sectors and commodity since cost 
efficiency is achieved by the equalization of marginal abatement costs. Consequently, they provide the 
theoretical argument for the implementation of unrestricted emission allowances trade across the 
economy. Following this argumentation, the emissions of road transport should be regulated by 
integrating road transport into the EU ETS most favorably using an upstream approach. Since 
refineries are already part of the EU ETS and since the number of refinery operators is far smaller than 
the number of road transport users, such an approach incurs lower information, transaction, and 
monitoring costs. 
However, the theory of environmental tax reforms claims that the structure of the pre-existing tax 
system is important. If initial taxes on some commodities are too high, lower carbon taxes or 
exemption from emission trading decrease the cost of regulation since the after-regulation tax schedule 
is closer to the optimal one. Observing high excise taxes on transport fuels across Europe, it can be 
argued that the exemption of road transport from further carbon is optimal. On the other hand, the 
existence of other externalities justifies high taxes on road transport. Congestion is the major concern 
in the regulation of road transport followed by local pollution, accidents and noise. In the 
consequence, the effect of an additional increase of fuel taxes crucially depends on the pre-existing 
tax. If the tax is too high in the sense that it already includes a carbon tax component, a further 
increase in the fuel tax will lower welfare.  
 17 
3 Methodological Background 
This chapter describes the methodological background of computable general equilibrium modeling. I 
start by reviewing the basic theory of general equilibrium. Afterwards, the CGE format and its 
representation as mixed complementarity problem are introduced; functional forms and empirical 
specification are discussed. Finally, the inclusion of technological details is described. 
 
3.1 Theoretical basics of applied general equilibrium models 
Consider an economy with L commodities (indexed by l) which are traded at a single positive price pl. 
J producers (indexed by j Є J:={1…J}) are characterized by technologies, represented by the set of 
feasible production plans Yj which are part of the commodity space ℝL. The set of feasible production 
plans is assumed to be strictly convex, compact and includes the possibility of inaction (0 Є Yj).18 
Producers are assumed to behave profit maximizing. Furthermore, markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive, i.e. every agent takes the price vector as given. Consequently, observing the price vector 
p every producer chooses his production plan yj such that his profit is maximized and the production 
plan is feasible: 
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The H households (indexed by h Є H:={1…H}) are characterized by a utility function which 
associates nonnegative consumption plans xh with utility levels Uh(xh). Utility functions are assumed to 
be strictly quasiconvex, continuous, and nonsatiated.19 Each consumer receives income from two 
sources: First, he is initially endowed with a positive commodity vector ωh being sold at the market 
price and second, he owns nonnegative shares γhj of firm j for which he receives dividends γhjΠj. 
Profits are fully distributed to households, i.e. the shares of firm j sum to one over all households. 
Households are assumed to maximize utility under the constraint that consumption plans are feasible, 
i.e. are within the budget set: 
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 These assumptions imply a well-defined, nonempty, continuous point-valued supply function. The assumption of strict 
convexity can be relaxed to weak convexity. However, the supply function generally becomes set-valued, i.e. results in a 
supply correspondence (e.g. Starr, 1997).     
19
 These assumptions ensure that the associated demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and single 
valued. As in the production case, relaxing the strict quasiconvexity assumption leads to a demand correspondence (e.g. Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995).  
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A general competitive equilibrium is then defined as production plans yj* and consumption plans xh* 
and a price vector p* such that given the equilibrium price vector the programs (1) and (2) are fulfilled. 
Furthermore, markets are either cleared or in excess supply: 
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Equation (3) is commonly referred to as market clearing or material balance equation. It relates to the 
concept of the excess demand function, which is defined as: 
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Under the above formulated assumptions, the excess demand function is a continuous, single valued 
function of prices. Furthermore, it is homogenous of degree zero in prices. Thus, the absolute value of 
prices does not affect outcomes. Therefore, it is possible to normalize prices by choosing a numéraire 
commodity for which the price is fixed to some arbitrary number (normally one). In addition, strict 
Walras’ law holds, i.e. the value of excess demand is equal to zero:  
 
 ( )p z p 0⋅ =  (5) 
 
As long as the assumption of satiated preferences is satisfied, the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics holds which states that every equilibrium is Pareto efficient.         
The existence of the equilibrium under the given assumption has been proven by Arrow and Debreu 
(1954). Consequently, the described model format is often denoted as Arrow-Debreu format. 
Alternative names are Walras’ or competitive general equilibrium model. An extensive discussion of 
the underlying assumptions and the existence proof is given in Debreu (1959) and Arrow and Hahn 
(1971). 
 
3.2 Computable general equilibrium modeling 
From a policy analysis point of view, the described economy is seen as a controlled system (Munk, 
2009). Decision makers – generally governments – impose policies using instrument variables to 
influence the value of goal variables in a desired way. For example, the goal of governments is to 
reduce greenhouse gases in order to mitigate the consequences of global warming. As described in the 
last chapter, various policy instruments exist, among them carbon taxes or emission trading schemes. 
Possible choices of a goal variable are consumer welfare or total abatement cost. Applied general 
equilibrium (AGE) models simulate the controlled system based on the Arrow-Debreu framework. 
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This involves setting up a parameterized model, i.e. choosing functional forms for production and 
utility functions and determining the mathematical format. Parameters of these functions are 
determined based on empirical data in order to obtain a fully specified model. The model is then used 
to carry out comparative static exercises by quantifying the effect of a change of the instrument 
variables on the goal variables. Since closed form solutions for higher dimensional models generally 
do not exist, this involves solving the model using numerical methods. 
 
3.2.1 Mathematical format 
CGE models are AGE models adopting additional assumptions and a special mathematical format 
(Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997)20. The commodity vector is divided into goods (index by i,j Є J) and 
factors (index by f Є F). Factors are characterized by the fact that they are provided solely by 
households. Furthermore, production functions are characterized by constant returns to scale. 
Additionally, it is assumed that every firm produces one specific good, i.e. only firm j produces 
commodity j.21 Let F(xij,xfj) be the production function of firm j with xij as intermediate input i Є J and 
factor inputs xfj and C(p,yj) the associated cost function. Since the production is homogenous of degree 
one, the cost function also exhibits constant returns (e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Consequently, the 
profits optimization problem can be stated using the unit cost function c(p): 
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The first order condition yields:22 
 
 ( )j j jp c p               y 0       j J     ≤ ⊥ ≥ ∀ ∈  (7) 
 
These conditions are known as zero profit conditions since the complementarity implies that the price 
of commodity j is equal to the unit cost – the firm makes zero profits – and the corresponding 
production level yj is positive or costs exceed the price and the production level drops to zero since the 
firm otherwise would make losses. 
Let Uh(xih,xfh) be the consumer h’s utility function with consumption xih of commodity i and xfh of 
factor f. Additionally, let Mh be the income of the consumer defined as: 
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 Another approach is to use the Negishi format which formulates AGE models as welfare optimization problems based on 
the Negishi theorem (1960). 
21
 This assumption is only for the ease of notation since it allows using the set J for firms and goods. The extension to multi-
product firms is straightforward but requires introducing an additional set for goods.     
22
 The symbol ⊥  is used to express complementarity. In full notation the conditions reads as 
( ) ( )( )j j j j jp c p          c p - p y 0       j J   ≤ = ∀ ∈  
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The Walrasian demand functions are defined in means of the utility optimization problem: 
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where the assumption of non-satiated preferences is used to impose strict equality on budget 
constraints.  
Walras’ law implies complementarity between market clearing conditions and associated prices. Using 
Shepard’s lemma the market clearing equations become: 
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These complementarities express the fact that either the market clearing condition holds with strict 
equality (i.e. the commodity is scarce) and the respective price is positive, or supply exceeds demand 
and the corresponding price drops to zero.  
The equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (10) specify a square system of equations which can be solved 
for the unknown prices, production, and income levels. Furthermore, the system imposes 
complementarity between equilibrium conditions and variables. In mathematical programming such 
programs are known as mixed complementarity problems (MCP) which are generally defined as (e.g. 
Cottle et al.,1992; Rutherford, 1995):23 
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In the case of CGE models, r is defined as the vector of prices, incomes, and production levels and f(r) 
are the equilibrium conditions. In contrast to welfare optimization formulations, which do not 
represent dual variables (i.e. prices) explicitly in the formulation, the MCP format has the advantage of 
the representation of these variables and, consequently, allows restrictions on dual variables. Put 
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 For a survey of the use of MCP in economics and engineering applications see Ferris and Pang (1997).  
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differently, the MCP overcomes the integrability restriction of optimization formulations (Mathiesen, 
1977, 1985).    
 
3.2.2 Functional forms 
The underlying assumptions restrict the choice of functional forms to the class of linear homogenous 
ones. Most applied studies employ the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function (Arrow et 
al., 1961):24 
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with Фj > 0 being called the efficiency parameter, δkj Є ]0,1[ are distribution parameters, and ρj > -1 is 
the substitution parameter which determines the constant substitution elasticity σj. The CES function 
includes the Leontief (σj = 0) and Cobb-Douglas functions (σj = 1) as special cases (e.g. Chiang and 
Wainwright, 2005). However, the CES function imposes equal substitution elasticities between all 
inputs. In order to overcome the problem of equal substitutability of all inputs, nested CES functions 
(Strotz, 1957) are used which can be depicted in the form of a nesting tree.25 Figure 2 shows an 
arbitrary nesting tree for four inputs and a two level production function of firm j. Both nests 
(aggregates, composites) at level 1 (i.e. N11 and N12) are single level CES functions as given in (12) 
with the respective substitution elasticities combining the commodities. At level zero, these 
composites are combined with the elasticity σ0. A discussion about nested CES functions, their 
properties, and derivation of elasticities is given in Keller (1980, 1976).   
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 More flexible functional forms within this class are the Translog (Christensen et al., 1971), Generalized Leontief (Diewert, 
1971), or Normalized Quadratic (Diewert and Wales, 1987) function. Perroni and Rutherford (1998) compare the 
performance of flexible function forms in AGE modeling. They find that these function often fail to preserve desired global 
curvature properties which causes computational difficulties.    
25
 In the ongoing, I discuss separable nested CES functions. Even though non-separable CES function are more flexible 
(Perroni and Rutherford, 1995), they are rarely used in applied work since especially in large application with extensive 
nesting empirical specification becomes complicated.   
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Figure 2: Nesting tree 
yj
N11 N12
σ0
x1j x4jx3jx2j
σ11 σ12
 
 
3.2.3 Empirical specification 
The implementation of CGE models involves choosing functional parameters based on empirical data. 
The most preferable approach would be to estimate all parameters of the model based on 
macroeconomic data on prices and quantities. However, this approach is usually impossible for two 
reasons. First, CGE models are large systems of equations. Thus, system estimation procedures have 
to be employed. However, error terms in the system are not independently distributed which leads to 
likelihood functions which are generally not well defined. Second, with a growing number of sectors 
and consumers the number of parameters to be estimated increases rapidly. In consequence, the 
number of independent parameters to be estimated exceeds the number of data points (Mansur and 
Whalley, 1984; Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Modelers react to the situation by involving a procedure 
referred to as calibration and borrowing estimates from the literature (usually elasticities). 
Calibration assumes that the economy under consideration is in equilibrium – the benchmark 
equilibrium. Data for a specific year usually are given in the form of a Social Account Matrix (SAM) 
(Pyatt and Round, 1985). A SAM is a square matrix which includes data on production and income 
generation of different sectors and institutions like governments and households; columns represent 
input vectors, rows refer to income generation. The assumption of an underlying equilibrium implies 
that earnings and spendings add up to zero. Thus, a SAM has to be balanced. A general starting point 
for the construction of a SAM are national input-output tables. These have to be combined with 
additional data such as taxes, trade, consumer income, and physical data.  
Under the equilibrium assumption, the CES function can be transformed into the calibrated share form 
(Rutherford, 2002):      
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Benchmark parameters are denoted by upper bars and θkj is the share of input k’s cost in the total cost 
of firm j. The calibrated share form has the advantage of avoiding calibrating the efficiency 
parameters. Given a balanced SAM, all cost share parameters can be calibrated. Often SAMs do not 
report prices and quantities separately but the product of them, i.e. are given in monetary units. In this 
case, it is common to assume that all prices are equal to one. The assumption does not affect the 
conclusions from the model results since the benchmark equilibrium is compared to the equilibrium 
outcome resulting from a change of an instrument variable – the counterfactual equilibrium outcome. 
Thus, relative changes to the benchmark equilibrium are relevant for the interpretation of the results 
and the choice of prices is arbitrary as long as the cost shares are correctly specified.  
The curvature of functions is determined by the substitution elasticity. These elasticities have to be 
taken from additional econometric estimates. However, estimates of substitution elasticities are rare. 
The lack of empirical estimates suggests including additional estimates of price and income elasticities 
into the procedure. However, partial equilibrium elasticities often do not interact very well with 
general equilibrium elasticities. Bergmann (2005) concludes that substitution elasticities are generally 
“guesstimates”. Therefore, sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to substitution elasticities is 
needed. 
Correctness of the calibration procedure is validated in form of a replication check, i.e. without any 
change in the instrument variables the model reproduces the benchmark equilibrium as given by the 
SAM. 
 
3.2.4 Computational implementation 
Solving CGE models naturally involves numerical algorithms. This puts restrictions on the use of 
models along two dimensions. First, computational performance restricts model size. Second, besides 
specification of the models, modelers must also be able to implement efficient solution algorithms.26 
Since computer performance has rapidly increased during the last decades, dimensionality is rarely 
considered nowadays. Concerning the implementation of solution algorithms, modelers greatly benefit 
from modern mathematical programming applications like the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) (Brooke et al., 2008). GAMS allows the modeler to write down the model equations and the 
software provides standardized solution procedures in the form of solvers. All models in this thesis are 
formulated as MCPs and are solved using the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995; Ferris and 
Munson 2000). Models are implemented using the Mathematical Programming System for General 
Equilibrium (MPSGE) developed by Thomas Rutherford (1999). MPSGE is a meta language 
implemented on top of the GAMS system. The modeler provides a description of (nested CES) cost 
and expenditure functions together with benchmark data and substitution elasticity in tabular form. 
MPSGE evaluates functions and the corresponding Jacobian matrix and implements the model in 
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 See Scarf (1984) and Todd (1984) for a survey of earlier solution algorithms. 
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MCP format. After generation of the model’s equations it is solved using the PATH solver.27 Beside 
the advantage of avoiding the error prone explicit programming of nested CES function, MPSGE has 
the benefit of automatically deriving demand functions as partial derivatives of provided functions 
(Shepard’s lemma).  
 
3.3 Technological details 
3.3.1 The bottom-up/top-down discussion 
Applied general equilibrium models have the advantage of capturing price interdependencies of 
economic sectors by a comprehensive assessment of the circular flow of commodities and incomes. 
However, especially in energy policy analysis, CGE models are often criticized for the lack of detailed 
representation of technological details of the energy system. In this discussion, AGE models are often 
termed top-down models since they adopt a view on the whole economy from the top and neglect 
details of single sector representations. In contrast, bottom-up models adopted a technological rich 
engineering view of single sectors but approximate macroeconomic changes in a rough manner, i.e. do 
not capture macroeconomic feedbacks (Hourcade et al., 2006). Usually bottom-up models characterize 
sectors in terms of different production technologies represented by Leontief technologies. A change 
on relative input prices then leads to a switch from one technology to another. Such models are 
implemented as linear programs. Prominent examples of bottom-up models of the energy system are 
the MARKet ALlocation (MARKAL) (Loulou et al., 2004) or the Prospective Outlook on Long-term 
Energy Systems (POLES) (Criqui et al., 1999) model.  
 
Figure 3: Top-down versus bottom-up technology representation 
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 Alternatively the MILES Solver (Rutherford, 1993) can be used.  
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The discussion about technology representation is best explained in terms of Figure 3 which depicts 
production function using capital K and labor L as inputs. From a bottom-up view, the sector is best 
characterized in terms of three distinct technologies represented by dashed lines. The parameter 
specification of the technologies’ cost functions is derived using engineering data. Under a given 
demand for the output, the firm seeks to minimize production cost by choosing the output level of 
different technologies, i.e. the technology mix. In contrast, the top-down approach describes the 
sector’s cost by a smooth cost function depicted by the solid isoquant. The described calibration 
procedure implies that the isoquant’s locus in the production space is determined by the sector’s 
benchmark input of capital and labor. The substitution possibility among inputs is determined by the 
curvature of the isoquant, i.e. by choosing the substitution elasticity. However, only by incident, a 
substitution elasticity which correctly determines factor substitution as implied by detailed technology 
analysis exists. Furthermore, even if the isoquant succeeds in replicating technology substitution, other 
restrictions like pre-installed production capacities and technological potential which imply limited 
technology substitution are not represented. 
Generally, three different approaches exist to overcome the top-down/bottom-up problem. The softlink 
approach links independently developed models using a convergence algorithm. Such approach used 
for example in the MESSAGE-MACRO model (Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000). This approach 
often faces problems of different behavioral assumptions and accounting schemes (Böhringer and 
Rutherford, 2008). In contrast the hardlink approach formulates a highly aggregated reduced form 
macro model with a detailed deciption of the energy system in a single optimization problem. This 
approach is followed for example in the REMIND model (Bauer et al., 2008; Leimbach et al., 2009). 
Finally, using the MCP format, both model formats can be fully integrated. This thesis follows the 
integrating approach which is described in detail in the next section.    
 
3.3.2 Integrating bottom-up and top-down 
Böhringer (1998) and Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) propose exploiting the MCP format in order to 
overcome the problem of technology representation. The basic idea is to set up the bottom-up linear 
programming model, deriving the first order complementarity conditions, and adding them to the CGE 
model in MCP format. 
Consider a specific sector s Є J being subject to the bottom-up representation. The sector uses T 
different technologies (t Є T:={1,2,…,T}) to produce one homogenous output yj. Technologies are 
characterized by unit inputs akt and installed capacities capt. Additionally, technologies’ production 
levels are bounded from above by technological potentials pott.28 Imposing perfect competition, the 
firm seeks to minimize production cost given commodity prices pk, prices for capacity investments pit 
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 The term technological potential is a bit misleading since the potential also might be restricted by policy. For example, in 
the electricity sector the use of hydro power is naturally restricted by possible production sights. However, the potential of 
nuclear power might be restricted by the government’s intention for nuclear phase out.  
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and demand ds for output by choosing technologies’ production levels Bt and investment in new 
capacities It: 
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The dual variables have natural economic interpretations: ps is the dual on the market clearing 
equation and interpreted as the price earned per unit of output, i.e. the price of commodity s; pcapt is 
the capacity rent of technology t; and ppott are rents stemming from the technological potential 
restriction of technology t. The first order conditions for technologies’ production levels become: 
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On the left hand side, the cost of producing one unit of output with technology t is given. They consist 
of the costs of intermediate and factor inputs and possible capacity and potential rents. On the right 
hand side, the earnings of one unit in terms of the output price are given. The complementarity is 
interpreted as zero profit condition: the technology production level is positive iff unit cost equal unit 
income. 
The condition for optimal capacity investment results as:   
 
 t t tpi pcap               I 0         t T≥ ⊥ ≥ ∀ ∈  (16) 
 
Again, this has the natural interpretation of a zero profit condition: investment in production capacity 
of technology t is positive iff the unit income of investment – the capacity rent pcapt – is equal to the 
unit cost given in terms of the investment price. 
Neglecting pre-installed capacities and investment in new capacities for the moment, integration of the 
bottom-up model into the top-down framework is easily done by adding the derived zero profit 
conditions (15) and the restrictions of program (14) to the stylized CGE model described by conditions 
(7), (8), and (10). The integrated model becomes: 
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The technological potential is allocated to households earning the rent if the restriction becomes 
binding, and, consequently, becomes dependent on the household set.  
It is important to note that in this formulation the technologies’ outputs are perfect substitutes, i.e. all 
technologies sell their output at the same price ps. Thus, small changes in relative prices can lead to 
extreme shifts from one technology to another. This undesirable property of the model is often called 
flip-flop behavior (Wing, 2008). The flip-flop problem makes it necessary to include pre-installed 
capacities (capt) and technology investment (It). However, the inclusion of production capacities 
necessarily involves the modelers’ non-trivial decision about what exactly the investment commodities 
It and the associated investment prices pit are. Generally, the best approach is to specify the investment 
demand by technology t in terms of commodities represented in the SAM, to introduce an artificial 
sector producing the investment commodity and selling it to the technology activity, and to add pre-
installed capacities to consumers’ endowment. However, this can become a data intensive procedure. 
For example in the electricity sector it requires specifying detailed input vectors for capacity 
investments into different generation technologies such as nuclear, coal, natural gas, and hydro plants 
in terms of construction services, materials and labor. Such detailed data are rarely available. Even in 
bottom-up models investment is not specified in single commodity terms but in terms of an investment 
price. The problem of the combined, integrated, or hybrid approach is that the top-down framework 
demands specifying the investment commodity to maintain circular flow of commodities and income. 
One approach around the problem is to specify sector specific factor inputs.  
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The stylized models of Böhringer (1998) and Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) specify fossil fuel 
energy resources (coal, natural gas, and refined oil) as sector specific resources which are solely 
supplied by consumers, i.e. energy resources are specified as factors which are only demanded by the 
respective technologies. However, in empirical applications commodities’ supply is endogenously 
determined and, thus, can not be specified as factor. Böhringer (1995) uses the framework for an 
empirical evaluation of the influences of alternative coal subsidies on carbon taxes in Germany. In this 
model, capital inputs are partially specified as sector specific leading to the same desired smooth 
technology substitution. Wing (2008) is the first elaborating the problem explicitly; he proposes the 
following modeling approach: If technologies are determined as Leontief production technologies, the 
supply of sector specific capital naturally puts an upper bound on the output level. He introduces an 
artificial activity taking malleable or intersectoral mobile capital as input and providing technology 
specific capital stocks as output using a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. This 
corresponds to the view that capacities are partially reversible, i.e. can be retired and converted into 
malleable capital, which can be used for investments into new technology specific capital. 
Consequently, the malleability of capacity is governed by the transformation elasticity of the capital 
activity. Additionally, he uses the share preserving character of the CES function that price changes do 
not induce extreme deviation in technologies’ output shares: Each output unit is rewarded with a 
technology specific output price. Outputs are aggregate to a homogenous commodity using a CES 
function with a high substitution elasticity (σ = 10) which results in a nearly linear isoquant (perfect 
substitutability).  
 
3.4 Relevant modeling literature 
In general, the global pollution externality of transport in AGE models is investigated from two 
perspectives: On the on the hand, the energy/environmental approach focuses on the emission of 
greenhouse gases especially from the combustion of fossil fuels. On the other hand, transport 
economic modeling focuses mainly on the congestion externality and partly includes other 
externalities such as pollution and accidents. While in the first class of models the main interest lies in 
an efficient carbon pricing, cost-efficient abatement of emissions and the interaction across polluting 
sectors, the second perspective is primarily interested in an efficient internalization of transport 
externalities within the transport sector and the impacts of changed transport prices and infrastructure 
investments on mode decisions and other sectors.  
A detailed modeling of the transport sector in energy/environmental related studies is relatively rare 
compared to the number of such studies.29 Paltsev et al. (2004, 2005b) develop a method to integrate 
private transport into the MIT Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. The MIT 
                                                     
29
 General surveys of the use of AGE models in energy/environment studies are given for example, in Conrad (1994), 
Bergman (2005), and Wing (2007). Springer (2003) summarizes the literature especially related to tradable greenhouse gas 
permits.  
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EPPA model is a large scale, recursive dynamic CGE model of the world economy.30 Carrying out 
illustrative emission pricing scenarios, the authors show the critical importance of a disaggregated 
representation of household transport to improve the representation of substitution possibilities for 
fossil fuels. While the MIT EPPA model does include transport, it does not differentiate between the 
durable stock of transport capital and the associated service flow. Such an approach is implemented in 
the GEM-E3 model of the European Union (Capros et al., 1997). GEM-E3 offers a detailed 
representation of the EU 15 region and six further aggregated world regions. It is also recursive 
dynamic but includes cars as a stock variable which depreciates over time, is augmented by 
investments, and necessary to obtain the service flow of transport.  
Berg (2007) extends the EMEC model developed by Östblom and Berg (2006) by a detailed 
representation of household transport demand. In this static model of the Swedish economy, different 
transport modes, work and leisure trips are distinguished. Furthermore, households are differentiated 
representing different income groups and locations of living. Berg analyzes the effect of carbon taxes 
in the EMEC model with and without the augmented transport modeling. The model with the detailed 
transport module always shows higher cost of carbon regulation. This result is based on the 
endogenous labor/leisure choice: carbon taxes on fuels increase the price of work trips and thus, exert 
a negative pressure on labor supply. 
Another stream of the environmental/energy literature is concerned with the penetration of advanced 
technologies in the automobile market. Schäfer and Jacoby (2005, 2006) implement a softlink 
approach on the MIT EPPA model with an improved modeling of private transport. They use the 
model together with a mode choice (Schäfer and Victor, 2000) and the MARKAL model (Louluo et 
al., 2004). Transport demand is determined in the EPPA model and passed to the mode choice model. 
The demand for different modes and prices of the EPPA model are processed in the MARKAL model 
which is calibrated to an existing fleet of automobile technologies and other transport modes. 
Consequently, MARKAL determines the penetration of advanced vehicle technologies. In order to 
achieve consistency between the MARKAL energy and the EPPA transport demand, substitution 
elasticities in the household transport module and the autonomous energy efficiency improvement 
parameter are adjusted in an iterative procedure. Implementing different time paths for emission 
reduction, the authors show that advanced technologies such as aluminum intensive vehicles or hybrid 
drive trains do not play a significant role in emission abatement in the US for the next 30 years. 
Sandoval et al. (2008) analyze the prospect of hydrogen cars by introducing a hydrogen production 
sector in the EPPA model. They estimate that in the absence of any climate policy hydrogen cars 
become competitive in the US at a purchase price which is 1.3 times the price of conventional 
automobiles since they are more fuel efficient. In Europe, the technology will become competitive 
even at a price twice the one of conventional cars since high fuel taxes stimulate the use of more fuel 
efficient hydrogen cars. However, the penetration of hydrogen cars only slightly reduces carbon 
                                                     
30
 Recently, a forward looking model version has also been developped (Babiker et al., 2008).  
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emissions since hydrogen production in mainly based on coal combustion. Imposing carbon 
constraints favors the adoption of hydrogen vehicles.  
Jokisch and Mennel (2009) calculate hydrogen penetration rates in the MARKAL model and impose 
them exogenously on the PACE model (Böhringer and Vogt, 2003) to assess the macro-economic 
impacts. PACE is a dynamic, forward looking of international energy use and global trade with a 
special emphasis on Europe. Since hydrogen vehicles are assumed to have learning effects which drive 
lifetime cost below the cost of conventional automobiles, the penetration yields positive welfare 
effects. Karplus et al. (2009) analyze the potential role of plug-in hybrid electric vehicle for the US 
and Japan by augmenting the EPPA model. They show that even in the presence of a strict climate 
policy, additional research on battery design is necessary to lower purchase costs and increase driving 
range. 
The transport economic modeling literature is primarily interested in the congestion externality and the 
welfare impacts of changed transport prices. Accordingly, often road pricing and/or infrastructure 
investments are assessed. Such models often ignore externalities (e.g. Kalinowska et al., 2007; 
Kremers and Kalinowska, 2009) or only focus congestion (e.g. Conrad, 1997; Conrad and Heng, 
2002). Other studies use the same approach as the environmental/energy literature: they include the 
generation of externalities, particularly greenhouse gas emissions, but do not model their impact on the 
economic system (e.g. de Borger and Swysen, 1998; Steininger et al., 2007). Parry and Bento (1999) 
note the importance of other externalities evaluating the welfare effects of congestion pricing. 
Including accident and pollution externalities in a linear separable way into the utility function, they 
show that reduced congestion offers additional positive welfare effects by reducing these externalities 
and illustrate their results with a stylized CGE model. Non-separable transport externalities in the 
utility function and the impacts on production sectors have been model by Meyeres and Proost (1997). 
Mayeres (1999) extends this approach for different household types to assess the equity aspects of 
transport policies.    
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4 Transportation under the European Emission Trading System 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter employs a multi-region computable generally equilibrium model analyzing the impacts of 
European-wide regulation measures addressing the carbon emissions of transport. The introduction of 
a closed emission trading system for transport emissions, the inclusion of the transport sector into the 
EU ETS, and the exemption of transport from carbon regulation are tested against the performance of 
the current EU ETS. The results show that exempting transport from carbon regulation, i.e. shifting the 
reduction burden to the EU ETS, is the most favorable strategy. Concerning fuel pricing strategies, the 
inclusion of transport into the EU ETS incurs lower cost than a closed emission trading scheme. 
Furthermore, a closed emission trading scheme performs only slightly better than transport under 
national carbon taxes. 
Multi-region models have the advantage that changes in terms-of-trade are endogenously determined. 
Analyzing carbon restrictions, terms-of-trade changes occur in two dimensions. First, countries with a 
lower carbon price gain comparative advantages in the production of energy intensive commodities. 
Second, carbon restrictions affect the demand for fossil fuels. Consequently, prices change and create 
substantial spillovers to other countries. The extensive literature on terms-of-trade reaction concludes 
that fossil fuel price changes are the main determinant of terms-of-trade changes (e.g. Krutilla, 1991; 
Böhringer and Rutherford, 2002b; Babiker et al., 2004). Analyzing the introduction of the EU ETS 
compared to purely national regulation on a member state level, the model also shows this result. 
Policies are analyzed at the EU 27 level, i.e. new member states with negative reduction burdens. The 
results show, that these countries incur welfare gains by participating in the EU ETS since they are 
able to sell excess emission allowances.  
 
4.2 Model description 
4.2.1 Overview 
The multi-region model employed in this chapter is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem. 
Three classes of equilibrium conditions exist. No activity makes positive profits (zero-profit 
condition). Excess supply is weakly positive (market clearing condition). Each household fulfils his 
budget restriction. Each class is associated to a class of variables. Activity levels are associated with 
zero-profit conditions. Prices are connected to market clearing equations. Each budget restriction 
determines the income level of the respective household. 
The basic assumptions of the model are: 
• The model is static. 
• International commodity trade is unrestricted.  
• All markets are perfectly competitive, i.e. all agents take prices as given. 
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• Households’ preferences are represented by a representative agent. 
• The household is endowed with capital and labor which are intersectoral but not international 
mobile. Furthermore, an endowment of immobile natural resources exists. All factors are 
inelastically supplied.  
• Investment demand and balance of payment deficits are exogenous and constant. 
• The government imposes taxes to finance the provision of public goods which is assumed to 
be constant. 
• Production and utility functions are represented using nested CES functions. 
 
4.2.2 Algebraic description 
4.2.2.1 Representative agent 
The representative agent (RA) in region r derives utility consuming commodities i (xi,RA,r) according to 
the utility function Ur(.). The initial endowments of capital (Kr), labor (Lr), and natural resource used 
in sector i (Ri,r) determine the income of representative agents. Factors are inelastically supplied. 
While capital and labor are mobile across sectors but not international, natural resources are sector-
specific, i.e. immobile across sectors and regions. Given commodity prices pi,r, factor prices pK,r, pL,r, 
and pR,i,r, the tax rate on final consumption ti,RA,r, and a direct transfer from the government to the 
household transr, the representative agents maximize utility subject to the budget constraint: 
 
 
( )
( )
i ,RA,r
r i,RA,r
x 0
K,r r L,r r R,i,r i,r r i,RA,r i,r i,RA,r i,r
i i i
max U x                                                                                      
s.t.     p K p L p R trans 1 t p x inv
≥
+ + + ≥ + +∑ ∑ ∑
 (18) 
 
invi,r is investment demand which is assumed to be constant. Solving the problem for each 
representative consumer yields the demand function depending on prices (Ci,r). 
 
4.2.2.2 Production 
Each production sector i produces one commodity which can either be sold to the domestic market at 
price pi,rd or be exported at price pi,re. The respective quantities are denoted yi,rd and yi,re and the activity 
level by yi,r. xj,i,r is the intermediate input of commodity j to sector i in region r. Similar, xK,i,r, xL,i,r, and 
xR,i,r are the respective factor inputs. Taxes are imposed on intermediate as well as factor inputs (tj,i,r, 
tK,i,r, tL,i,r, tR,i,r) and on outputs (toi,r). Accordingly, tax inclusive input prices are defined as 
qj,i,r:=(1+tj,i,r)pj,r, qK,i,r:=(1+tK,i,r)pK,r, qL,i,r:=(1+tL,i,r)pL,r, and qR,i,r:=(1+tR,i,r)pR,i,r. Furthermore, tax 
inclusive output prices are given as vi,rd=(1-toi,r)pi,rd and vi,re=(1-toi,r)pi,re. Assuming separability of 
inputs and output and constant returns to scale in production, the unit revenue (ri,r) and cost functions 
(ci,r) can be independently determined from a given production function. The profit optimization 
problems become: 
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The corresponding zero profit conditions become: 
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Shepard’s lemma and a similar relation on the output side (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997) determine 
the optimal input and output quantities: 
 
 
i,r i,r i,r i,r
j,i,r  i,r K,i,r i,r L,i,r i,r R,i,r i,r
j,i,r K,i,r L,i,r R ,i,r
i,r i,rd e
i,r i,r i,r i,rd e
i,r i,r
c c c c
x y             x y            x y          x y
q q q q
r r
y  y               y   y
v v
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
(21) 
 
4.2.2.3 International trade 
International trade is modeled using the Armington (1969) assumption, i.e. commodities are 
distinguished by region of origin. First, commodities from different regions are combined to an import 
composite, and second, domestic commodities and the import composite are aggregated.  
Furthermore, international commodity trade is associated with a transport margin, i.e. trading 
commodity i from region r to regions s requires the transport margin tri,j,r,s of transport service j. The 
importer of the commodity pays the margin. Transport services are produced by an international 
transport pool which combines services from different regions. 
Two different taxes apply on international trade. The export tax for commodity i shipped from region r 
to region s, tei,r,s, applies on the value of the export. In contrast, the import tax tmi,r,s is levied on the 
value of the import commodity including the transport margin. 
Let pti be the price of transport margin i, cit(pi,re) the unit cost function of the international transport 
pool depending on the export prices of commodities coming from different regions, and yit the activity 
level of the international transport pool. Accordingly, the profit optimization problem becomes: 
 
 ( )
t
i
t t e t
i i i,r i
y 0
max p c p y
≥
 
−   (22) 
 
The corresponding zero profit condition and the demand functions become: 
 
 ( )t e t ti i,r i ic p          p                     y 0              i≥ ≥ ∀  (23) 
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The transport margin is combined with the import commodity in a Leontief manner, i.e. for every unit 
of imported i a certain amount of transport margin j is needed. Denoting the amount of the transport 
margin j by αi,j,r,s, the import price of commodity i imported in region s from region r is defined as: 
 
 ( ) ( )m e ti,r,s i,r ,s i,r ,s i,r i, j,r,s j
j
p : 1 tm 1 te p p                              i,r,s
 
= + + + α ∀ 
 
∑  (25) 
 
Imports from different regions are combined using an activity characterized by a CES unit cost 
function ci,sma(pi,r,sm) depending on the import prices from different regions. Denoting the price of the 
import composite as pi,sma and the activity level by yi,sma, the profit maximization problem of the 
Armington activity results as: 
 
 ( )
ma
i ,s
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The zero profit condition and demand functions for imports from different regions result as: 
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where xi,r,sma is the demand for import commodity i in region s coming from region r. xi,j,r,smt is the 
demand for transport commodity i needed to ship commodity j from region r to region s. 
A further activity combines domestic produced commodities and the import composite. The unit cost 
function, depending on domestic production prices and the price of the import composite, is denoted 
by ci,ra(pi,rd, pi,rma) and the activity level by yi,ra. Since the activity level determines the total quantity of 
commodity i available at the market in region r, the market price pi,r determines the unit revenues. 
Consequently, the optimization problem is given as: 
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The resulting zero profit conditions and demand functions result as: 
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4.2.2.4 Government 
Public consumption of governments, Gi,r, is constant and financed by collecting tax income. Beside 
public commodity consumption the government finances the direct transfer to the household and the 
constant balance of payment deficit bopr. The public budget constraint is given as: 
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4.2.2.5 Market clearing conditions 
The available quantity of commodity i at the market in region r, yi,ra, and demands by firms, the 
representative agent, the government, and investment demand, determine the market price: 
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Similar, factor prices are determined by the exogenous endowments and sectors’ demands: 
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Domestic output and demand established by the Armington aggregation enter the market clearing 
condition for domestic products: 
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The price for exported commodities results from the production of commodities for the international 
market in regions r and import demand by all other regions s: 
 
 
e ma e
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The price of the import composite is established by the supply of the composite and the demand by the 
aggregation of domestic and imported commodities: 
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All region demand international transport services which are supplied by the international transport 
pool: 
 
 
t mt t
i i, j,r ,s i
j,r,s
y         x                      p 0         i≥ ⊥ ≥ ∀∑  (38) 
 
4.2.2.6 Carbon restrictions 
In the counterfactual simulation, upper bounds on CO2 emissions are implemented. The emission 
factor βi,j (βi,RA) determines CO2 emissions caused by using one unit of input i in sector j (by the 
representative agent). Each region is characterized by an upper emission bound emaxr. If emission 
trading takes place at a national level, the carbon price is region specific and determined by an 
additional market clearing condition: 
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where pcarbr is the regional emission allowances price, or likewise the regional uniform tax on CO2 
emissions. 
On the other hand, if international emission trading takes place, the emission price is uniform across 
regions and the associated market clearing condition becomes: 
 
 r i,RA i,r i, j i,r,r
r i,r j
emax                 C x                          wcarb 0   
 
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where wcarb is the international emission allowances price. Generally, all intermediate forms between 
the two extreme cases are possible by portioning the regional set, indicating which region is part of 
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international trade, and the set of sectors, declaring which sector is part of national or international 
emission trading. 
The income of carbon regulation accrues to governments. Furthermore, the provision of public goods 
is assumed to be constant. Consequently, the question of revenue recycling arises. In this chapter, 
revenues are generally recycled lump-sum. Therefore, the direct transfers from governments to the 
representative agents are adjusted such that governments’ budget restrictions become binding. 
  
4.2.3 Specification 
4.2.3.1 Model dimensions 
Table 3 defines the dimensions of the model. Member states of the European Union are explicitly 
represented while non-European countries are aggregated to a region of countries listed in Annex I of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and a rest of the world 
region. For each region, commodities most relevant for climate and energy policy analysis are 
modeled in detail, i.e. all energy commodities, energy intensive production, and refineries. To capture 
the effects of policies in the transport sector, an industrial transport sector combining air, water, road 
and rail transports and households’ own provided transport are included. Modeling private transport 
requires a detailed representation of motor vehicle production. Other sectors are aggregated to 
agriculture production and a macro commodity representing manufacture and services.    
 
Table 3: Model dimensions 
Production sectors Name  Regions Name 
Non-energy:   EU15:  
Energy intensive industries EINT  Benelux BEN 
Macro (industries and services) MAC  Denmark DNK 
Agriculture AGR  Finland FIN 
Manufacture of transport equipment CAR  France FRA 
 
  Germany DEU 
Energy:   Italy ITA 
Coal COA  Poland POL 
Crude oil OIL  Spain ESP 
Natural gas GAS  Sweden SWE 
Electricity ELY  United Kingdom GBR 
Refined oil and coke products  P_C  WEU 
    
Transport:   
Western EU 
(Austria, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal) 
 
Industrial transport TRN  Remaining Eastern EU  EEU 
     
Primary factors:   Other:  
Capital CAP  Annex I ANI 
Labor LAB  Rest of the world ROW 
Natural resources RES    
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4.2.3.2 Functional forms 
The utility function of the representative household (Figure 4) combines a CES aggregate non-energy 
and energy commodity consumption with household transportation at the top level. Allowing different 
substitution possibilities of energy and non-energy commodities, these commodity classes are 
separately aggregated. A CES function combines these aggregates. Both, non-energy and energy 
commodities are also combined using a CES function. Private transportation combines purchased 
industrial transport services with the household’s own supplied transport which consists of refined oils 
used as transportation fuels put together with cars and other transport input costs (e.g. repair and 
assurance services). 
 
Figure 4: Utility function 
 
 
Figure 5 depicts the structure of production functions which are assumed to be equal for all sectors 
(Panel a) except for extractive industries (Panel b), i.e. coal, natural gas and crude oil extraction. 
For non-extractive industries, a Leontief function is used at the top level, combining material inputs 
and a CES composite of a primary factor value added CES aggregate and an energy composite. The 
energy aggregate consists of electricity and fossil fuel energy which is a CES composite of coal and 
liquid fossil fuels (natural gas and refined oil). For all sectors and consumers fossil fuel inputs are 
associated with CO2 emissions.  
Extractive industries combine the sector specific natural resource and an aggregate of all other inputs 
at the top level using a CES function. The other inputs are a Leontief composite of materials and the 
primary factor value added aggregate.  
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Figure 5: Production functions (a) non-extractive and (b) extractive industries 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Parameterization 
4.2.4.1 Baseline data 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database provides the basic data for the parameterization 
of the model (Dimaranan, 2006). The GTAP 6 database offers consistent social accounting matrixes 
for 87 regions including a detailed representation of European countries and 57 commodities based on 
the year 2001. These data are aggregated to the sectors and regions given above using the 
GTAP6inGAMS package (Rutherford, 2006). Given the database and normalizing market prices in the 
benchmark to one, the cost shares of the CES function are derived31. 
The GTAP 6 database does not represent household transport in a detailed way. Separating household 
transport expenditures out if the final consumption vector of the representative agent is done using the 
method developed by Paltsev et al. (2004a). Generally, households’ transport expenditures (EXPtrn) 
consist of spendings on purchased transport services (EXPpur) and on own provided transport 
(EXPown):32 
 
 = +trn pur ownEXP EXP EXP  (41) 
 
The GTAP 6 database identifies expenditures on purchased transport but those on own provided and 
total transport are unknown. However, total consumption expenditures (EXPtotal) are also known from 
                                                     
31
 The mapping from the regions and commodities provided by the GTAP 6 database to the model dimensions is given in 
Appendix A. 
32
 For the ease of notation the index for regions is dropped. 
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the GTAP 6 database. Therefore, given the share of total transport spendings in total consumption (ES) 
only own transport expenditures remain unknown and can be solved for using equation (41): 
 
 *= −own total purEXP ES EXP EXP  (42) 
 
The total transport expenditure share (ES) is given in Table 4. It was derived from the European 
Budget Survey (Eurostat, 1999) by dividing the aggregated transport spending33 by the sum of all 
expenditures. For aggregated European regions population-weighted averages are used with 
population data also from Eurostat (2008a). For non-European regions, the values of Paltsev et al. 
(2004) are employed. 
   
Table 4: Parameters for household transport and emission calibration 
 
Emissions in 2001 
(Mt) 
Share of transport fuels in 
refined oil expenditure 
OS 
Share of transportation in 
total consumption 
expenditure 
ES 
Benelux 313.5 91.28% 10.16% 
Denmark 52.7 99.74% 9.06% 
Finland 59.8 68.96% 9.73% 
France 397.3 77.42% 12.59% 
Germany 866.8 84.79% 11.92% 
Italy 447 92.33% 12.47% 
Poland 297.5 90.20% 9.65% 
Spain 307.8 91.91% 11.52% 
Sweden 54.5 90.20% 5.99% 
United Kingdom 550.9 97.62% 11.73% 
Western EU 277.6 82.50% 12.19% 
Eastern EU 418.6 90.20% 9.07% 
Annex I 9988.9 85.50% 13.40% 
Rest of the World 9798.4 90.00% 6.00% 
Sources: Own calculations based on European Budget Survey (Eurostat, 1999), population data (Eurostat, 2008a), emission data (World 
Resource Institute, 2009); share parameter for non-European regions are adopted from Paltsev et al. (2004).  
  
Having derived own provided transport expenditures, one has to split these into different cost 
categories. Generally, these costs consist of expenditures on cars (EXPcar), fuel spendings (EXPfuel), 
and other costs like insurance, maintenance, and services (EXPother): 
 
 = + +own car fuel otherEXP EXP EXP EXP  (43) 
 
The GTAP 6 data directly give the expenditure on cars. Fuel spendings are part of the representative 
agent’s refined oil consumption (CONp_c) which consists of transport fuels and other refined oil uses 
(mainly heating). Applying the share of fuel expenditure in total refined oil consumption (OS) to the 
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total refined oil spendings, transportation fuel purchases are derived (EXPfuel= OS* CONp_c). 
Consequently, only the other costs remain unknown. These are derived residually by fulfilling 
equation (43) and part of the representative agent’s consumption of the aggregated manufacture and 
service commodity: 
 
 
_
*= − −other own car p cEXP EXP EXP OS CON  (44) 
 
The share OS is also given in Table 4 and derived from the European Budget Survey by dividing 
transportation fuel expenditure (CP 0722) by the sum of liquid (CP 0453), solid (CP 0454), and 
transport fuels.34 As above, for aggregated European regions population-weighted averages are used. 
Non-European regions’ values are adopted from Paltsev et al. (2004).  
The resulting cost shares are given in Table 5. The share of purchased transport is between 20 % and 
35 %. For all European regions the share of transport fuels is higher than the share of the Annex I 
region indicating the higher taxes on transportation fuels in European.  
 
Table 5: Cost shares in private transportation 
 
Purchased 
transport 
Fuel cost Car purchases Other costs 
Benelux 29.52% 19.00% 17.50% 33.97% 
Denmark 32.96% 21.77% 6.18% 39.08% 
Finland 36.73% 14.14% 7.60% 41.54% 
France 20.13% 23.51% 27.26% 29.10% 
Germany 24.46% 19.29% 37.14% 19.12% 
Italy 23.47% 20.44% 19.84% 36.25% 
Poland 24.84% 20.04% 22.11% 33.01% 
Spain 32.99% 13.10% 16.33% 37.58% 
Sweden 35.74% 37.30% 26.46% 0.51% 
United Kingdom 30.33% 11.42% 17.21% 41.03% 
Western EU 26.65% 19.63% 20.27% 33.45% 
Eastern EU 30.96% 16.66% 23.57% 28.81% 
Annex I 23.12% 6.41% 14.99% 55.48% 
Rest of the World 49.00% 15.92% 15.85% 19.24% 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The used approach treats car purchases as a pure value flow. This is consistent with the treatment of 
most durable goods in national accounting practice. However, in reality, automobiles are stock 
commodities which provide a service flow to the consumers and depreciate over time. Adopting a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
33
 CP07 in the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP). 
34
 Taking solid fuels into account, a classification problem results: the GTAP 6 data report refined oil and coke oven products 
with a reverence to ISIC 23 (International Standard Industrial Classification). Since there exists no clear cut correspondence 
between these classifications, I decided to take solid fuels into account in the COICOP. For European countries the spending 
on solid fuels is small. Therefore the bias, in the estimate of the OS is negligible.  
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stock and service flow based approach requires estimating the service flow of automobiles as well as 
the implicit rental rate for cars. Such an approach is introduced in the next chapter.   
Table 6 lists fuel taxes for transport. Excise taxes in Europe are at a high level. Except for the Benelux 
countries, fuel taxes in household transport are higher than in industrial transport. Compared to other 
European countries, Poland and the eastern EU have low taxes. 
Table 6 also reveals the net export position in the world markets for fossil fuels and energy intensive 
products. Generally, the EU is net importer of all energy commodities and net exporter of energy 
intensive products. Annex I countries are net imports of crude oil and energy intensive products and 
exporters of  natural gas and the major player in the global coal market. The rest of the world region is 
exporter of all products. It is the largest supplier of crude oil and natural gas. Within Europe, Poland is 
the only exporter of coal. Denmark and the United Kingdom are exporters of crude oil and natural gas. 
Germany is the pre-dominant supplier of energy intensive products followed by the Nordic countries 
Finland and Sweden. 
 
Table 6: Net export positions and fuel taxes in the benchmark 
 Net exports [billion $] Excise tax on transport fuels [%] 
 
Coal Crude oil Energy 
intensives 
Natural 
gas 
Industrial Household 
Benelux -0.847 -10.491 1.109 0.417 510 320 
Denmark -0.238 1.188 -2.084 0.325 153 500 
Finland -0.219 -1.214 9.754 -0.496 251 317 
France -0.612 -10.542 -3.563 -3.994 307 676 
Germany -1.225 -12.869 11.300 -6.443 283 348 
Italy -0.748 -10.052 1.735 -5.066 341 510 
Poland 0.781 -2.029 -0.415 -0.727 59 170 
Spain -0.650 -6.829 -1.493 -1.790 204 367 
Sweden -0.128 -2.315 9.484 -0.086 219 509 
United Kingdom -1.179 5.255 -9.773 1.298 275 368 
Western EU -0.480 -5.185 -2.685 -1.322 226 372 
Eastern EU -0.307 -4.078 -0.035 -3.319 78 116 
EU -5.851 -59.162 16.153 -21.202   
Annex I 3.662 -48.284 -29.488 7.606 31 112 
Rest of the World 2.189 107.446 1.109 13.596 14 48 
Source: GTAP 6 database 
  
4.2.4.2 Substitution elasticities 
Fully specifying the CES function requires to take assumptions on the elasticities of substitution. On 
the production side, the nesting structure is identical to the one used in Böhringer and Rutherford 
(2002b). Therefore, their values are adopted. However, the values used in the MIT EPPA model 
(Paltsev et al., 2005a) or the GTAP energy model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002; Truong et al., 2007) 
do not substantially differ. Generally, substitution elasticities in production show homogeneity in 
environmental/energy oriented CGE models. In extractive industries (coal, natural gas, crude oil) the 
top level elasticity between the sector specific natural resource and the material/value added 
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composited is calibrated to meet price elasticities of supply (Rutherford, 2002: Böhringer and 
Rutherford, 2002b). 
While the used elasticities for energy, value-added, and intermediate input substitution show some 
homogeneity across the environmental oriented CGE literature, elasticities for private transport are 
rarely available. Paltsev et al. (2005b) use a value of 0.5 for the substitution between private transport 
and consumption (σHTOP). This value is expected to have a significant influence on the impact of 
transport policies since a higher value means that transport can be substituted by more consumption. 
Steiniger et al. (2007) calibrated this elasticity together with the elasticity between own and purchased 
transport (σHTRN) for a small open economy CGE model for Austria using a mode choice passenger 
transport model. They use a value of 0.275 for the substitution elasticity between aggregated 
consumption and private transport. In the core simulation Paltsev et al.’s (2005b) value of 0.5 is 
adopted and sensitivity is examined afterwards. 
   
Table 7: Substitution and transformation elasticities 
 Description Value 
 Production elasticities  
ENE Electricity / fossil fuels  0.3 
Coal 0.5 
Crude oil 1 
EXT Sector specific resource / other inputs in extractive 
industries; calibrated to supply elasticities 
Natural gas 1 
FOF Fossil fuels 0.5 
LQD Liquid and gaseous fossil fuels 1 
VA Labor / capital 1 
VAE Energy / value-added 0.8 
   
 Household elasticities  
C Non-energy consumption goods 0.5 
CE Energy / non-energy commodities 0.25 
HE Coal / electricity / natural gas / refined oil products 0.4 
HTOP Consumption / transport 0.5 
HTRN Own supplied / purchased transport 0.2 
OTC Motorized vehicles / other transport costs
 
0.5 
OWN Gasoline / other transport costs – motorized vehicles ~ 0.33 
   
 Trade elasticities  
DM Domestic / imported commodities  
 Non-electricity commodities 2.5 
 Electricity 0.3 
MM Imports from different regions  
 Non-energy goods 5 
 Fossil fuels 4 
 Refined oil products 6 
 Electricity 0.5 
   
 Transformation elasticities  
OUT Domestic / exported commodities 2 
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The substitution elasticity between own provided and purchased transport relates to the choice 
between private and public transport modes. While Paltsev et al. (2005b) use a low value of 0.2 
Steiniger et al. (2007) calibrate a value of 0.635. The low value is adopted and implications of 
parameter changes are explored later on.   
The elasticity between the other cost (cars and other transport cost) nest and refined oils for 
transportation (σown) expresses households’ behavioral response to changing fuel prices. In general, 
there are two different possibilities to react on fuel price changes: changes in kilometers driven and 
switching to more fuel efficient cars. Denoting fuel consumption depending on the fuel price as 
FUEL(pfuel), fuel demand can be expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )=fuel fuel fuelFUEL p EFF p KM p  (45) 
 
EFF(pfuel) is the energy efficiency of cars in liter per kilometer and KM(pfuel) are kilometers driven. 
Taking logarithmic differentials with respect to the fuel price yields: 
 
 
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂
fuel fuel fuel
fuel fuel fuel
p p pFUEL EFF KM
FUEL p EFF p KM p
 (46) 
 
Therefore, the price elasticity of fuel demand (ηfuel) is equal to the sum of the price elasticity of energy 
efficiency (ηEFF) and the price elasticity of kilometers driven (ηkm). 
 
 FUEL EFF KMη η η= +  (47) 
 
Having determined the price elasticity of fuel demand, the substitution elasticity between other costs 
and transport fuels can be approximated as (Hyman et al., 2002): 
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−
 (48) 
 
Schäfer and Jacoby (2005, 2006) use the MIT EPPA model together with a mode choice (Schäfer and 
Victor 1999, 2000) and the MARKAL bottom-up model (Loulou et al., 2004) analyzing  the impacts 
of climate policies in the transport sectors on the diffusion of vehicle technologies. In this hybrid 
model, the aggregated household transport demand is calculated in the MIT EPPA model and passed 
to the MARKAL model. The MARKAL model determines the mix of vehicle technologies and 
subsequently the fuel demand for private transportation. Fulfilling the equilibrium conditions in EPPA 
requires consistency between the fuel demand of MARKAL and the EPPA mode. This consistency is 
achieved by adjusting the substitution elasticity between transport fuels and other inputs (σOWN) over 
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time. Since MARKAL only takes technology shifts into account, the procedure implicitly assumes that 
the price elasticity of kilometers driven is zero. Thus, their price elasticity estimate of around -0.126 
can be taken as value for the price elasticity of energy efficiency. Again, since only technology shifts 
are taken into account, the value can be considered as a low estimate since changes in driving behavior 
which influence energy efficiency (e.g. slower driving, pressure, more maintenance) are neglected. 
Greene et al. (1999) estimate the long-term response of kilometers driven to fuel price changes (ηKM) 
for the US. They provide values in the range of -0.2 to -0.3. Together with the MARKAL estimate by 
Schäfer and Jacoby (2005, 2006) a price elasticity of fuel demand between -0.3 and -0.4 is implied. 
This is in line with econometric estimates of the price elasticity of fuel demand surveyed by Graham 
and Glaister (2002). For the core simulation a value of -0.3 is used. The resulting substitution elasticity 
σOWN is in the range of 0.31 to 0.37. This similarity between the price and substitution elasticity is 
caused by the relatively small cost share parameter in equation (48). Sensitivity of the model to 
changes in this parameter will be performed below.   
In the other cost nest the substitution elasticity between car purchases and other costs like maintenance 
and assurances is set to 0.5 following Paltsev et al. (2004). 
 
4.2.4.3 Emissions 
The GTAP 6 database offers physical energy flows to the corresponding value flows of fossil fuels. 
These data are used to derive the sectors’ carbon emissions, i.e. the carbon coefficients. This is done 
by deriving the sectors’ emission applying the Tier 1 method (IPCC, 2006). The physical energy flows 
are multiplied by emission coefficients as given in the IPCC guideline (Table 8). Since for refineries 
fossil fuel inputs are mainly transformation inputs, emissions of the refined oil sector need to be 
corrected. Energy consumption, transformation, and production tables as provided by Eurostat (2008b) 
imply that approximately 7% of the energy input into refineries is used for combustion. This value is 
employed uniformly for all regions to correct refineries’ emissions. 
  
Table 8: Emission coefficients in [t/TJ] 
 Sectors/household Transport sectors 
Coal 101  
Natural gas 56.1  
Refined oil 79.2 67.5 
Source: IPCC 2006 
 
The TIER 1 method only delivers approximate values of a sector’s emissions since different 
production technologies and fuel qualities are not taken into account. Therefore, emission coefficients 
are adjusted meeting the historical emissions of regions in the base year 2001 as given by the World 
Resource Institute (2009). The historical emission levels are given in Table 4. 
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4.3 Simulations and results 
4.3.1 Policy scenarios 
In all scenarios European regions are obliged to fulfill nominal emission targets as given by the effort 
sharing agreement (EC, 2009a). Table 9 lists the reduction requirements by countries and shows that 
all western European countries have to reduce emissions while the Eastern countries are allowed to 
increase emissions. Remaining Annex I countries are assumed to reduce their emissions by 5%. Non-
Annex I countries do not conduct mitigation efforts. While the structure of the imposed carbon 
regulation differs for European regions depending on the scenario, Annex I countries comply with 
their reduction target using national emission trading, i.e. under the assumed absence of emission 
trading among Annex I countries, and the EU, the strategy adopted is cost efficient. 
 
Table 9: Reduction requirements 
Region Reduction 
(% vs benchmark) 
 Region Reduction 
(% vs benchmark) 
Benelux 16  Spain 10 
Denmark 20  Sweden 17 
Finland 16  United Kingdom 16 
France 14  Western EU 10 
Germany 14  Remaining Eastern EU -15 
Italy 13    
Poland -14  Annex I 5 
 
Two groups of scenarios are analyzed: the introduction of the EU ETS and different approaches 
regulating the emissions of transport. Table 10 gives an overview on the scenario settings. 
The first group examines the effect of increasing flexibility in European emission abatement and 
provides the references for further analysis. In the SECTORAL scenario, European regions fulfill their 
reduction requirements using carbon taxes differentiated by sector. For every sector, the respective 
region’s total mitigation requirement is assigned. The NATIONAL scenario increases flexibility 
allowing emission trading across sectors within a region but not across Europe. This results in a region 
wide uniform emission allowances price which can also be interpreted as a uniform carbon tax.35 
Flexibility is further increased in the FULL scenario by allowing additional emission trade across 
Europe. The ETS scenario examines the impacts of the introduction of the European emission trading 
system. Electricity producers, energy intensive industries, and refined oil sectors trade emission 
allowances across Europe. Other sectors are subject to a national uniform carbon tax. Compared to the 
NATIONAL scenario the introduction of the EU ETS has two counteracting effect. On the one hand, 
flexibility is increased by allowing partial trade of permits across Europe. On the other hand, the 
partition of the emission budgets restricts flexibility by preventing trade between sectors regulated 
under the EU ETS and others. Partition of emission budget poses the question of how many permits 
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should be allocated to the emission trading sectors. It is assumed that countries with positive reduction 
requirements split the emission budget according to the NATIONAL scenario.36 I.e. governments 
provide emission allowances for the emission trading sectors equal to the emissions generated by 
theses sectors in the NATIONAL scenario. Countries with negative reduction requirements do not face 
a reduction burden. Consequently, their emission reductions in the NATIONAL scenario are less or 
equal to zero. These countries allocate their total excess allowances budget to the EU ETS maximizing 
the gain from being part of the emission trading system. Put differently: these countries cap the 
emissions of the non-trading sectors at the benchmark level and allocate the remaining budget to the 
EU ETS. 
 
The second group of scenarios examines regulation approaches for emissions of the transport sectors. 
All scenarios in this group build on the ETS scenario. The emission budget of transport is always 
assigned according to the emissions caused by transport in the NATIONAL scenario. Three different 
variants are considered.  
ETS CLOSED TRN establishes a closed emission trading system for transport sectors. I.e. industrial 
and household transport sectors are allowed to trade emissions across Europe but not with the 
emission trading sectors or the national trading schemes. The scenario can be interpreted as a 
European wide, uniform carbon tax in the transport sector which is set on top of pre-existing national 
fuel taxes.  
ETS TRN includes transport sectors into the EU ETS. Consequently, the emission budget of the EU 
ETS is changed by adding transport emissions caused in the NATIONAL scenarios. 
In ETS EXEMPT TRN transport sectors are exempted from carbon regulation. If transport is 
exempted the reduction burden must increase elsewhere in the economy. Accordingly, the reduction 
burden of the emission trading scheme is increased.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
35
 All carbon prices are derived using quantity restrictions ensuring equal ecological efficiency in all scenarios. The resulting 
emission prices can always be interpreted as a carbon tax applied to all agents included in the respective trading scheme. 
36
 Generally, the allocation of permits to the EU ETS depends on strategic consideration of the member states. Strategic 
partitioning of emission budgets under the EU ETS has been analyzed e.g. by Babiker et al. (2003) and Böhringer and 
Rosendahl (2009).   
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Table 10: Overview of scenario settings 
Scenario Regulation approach EU27 
BAU Benchmark equilibrium without carbon regulation 
  
Group A: Introduction of emission trading 
SECTORAL Carbon taxes differentiated by sector and region 
NATIONAL Uniform carbon tax within regions but not across sectors 
FULL Uniform carbon tax across Europe 
ETS European emission trading for electricity, energy intensive and refined 
oil production 
Other sectors are regulated by region specific carbon taxes 
  
Group B: Regulating transport emissions 
ETS CLOSED TRN Like ETS with additional closed European emission trading for 
transport 
ETS TRN Like ETS with transport included in European emission trading 
ETS EXEMPT TRN Like ETS with transport exempted from carbon regulation and 
reduction burden shifted to emission trading system 
 
Welfare changes using the Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) are adopted as measure for the gross 
cost of carbon regulation, i.e. the cost of the regulation without the benefit of improved environmental 
quality and preventing impacts of climate change. HEV is defined as the amount of money which 
needs to be transferred to the representative agents’ benchmark income in order to make them 
indifferent between the benchmark and the counterfactual situation (e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995). 
Accordingly, a negative (positive) change in the HEV as compared to benchmark indicates a welfare 
loss (gain). Since the gross cost of carbon regulation does not include the benefit of improved 
environmental quality, the welfare changes are negative in all scenarios.  
4.3.2 Group A: Introducing emission trading 
Table 11 lists the welfare changes for scenario group A differentiated by regions. Carbon prices and 
compliance costs are listed in Appendix A.  
 
4.3.2.1 Sectoral regulation 
The SECTORAL scenario imposes the reduction requirements separately on each sector. The welfare 
loss for the European region in total becomes 1.13 % and the total compliance cost for Europe are 
around 22.3 billion $.37 
Welfare impacts on European countries with positive reduction requirements are in the order of around 
0.6 (Western EU) to 1.9 % (Benelux). Generally, the results show correlation with the imposed 
mitigation requirements, i.e. a lower reduction burden implies lower gross cost carbon mitigation.  
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The carbon prices indicate the marginal abatement cost of different sectors. For all countries these are 
the highest for household own provided transport followed by industrial transport and refined oil 
production. The lowest marginal abatement costs always occur in electricity generation.  
Countries with negative or no carbon reductions face a zero carbon price. Nevertheless, their welfare 
is affected in two ways. First, since their carbon price is zero, they gain a comparative advantage on 
the world market due to lower production costs. Second, carbon restrictions imply decreasing fossil 
fuel prices spilling over to non-abating countries. While the first effect is positive, the second depends 
on the net-trade position of countries, i.e. importers of fossil fuels gain from decreasing fossil fuel 
prices while exports suffer a terms-of-trade loss. 
These effects explain the different effects on Poland and the remaining eastern EU region. Both 
regions are net-importers of energy intensive products in the benchmark. Due to the increased 
production cost in abating European countries they increase energy intensive production. In 
consequence, the remaining eastern EU states become exporters. Additionally, this region is also a net-
importer of fossil fuels and benefits from falling prices. In contrast, Poland is a net-exporter of coal. 
Due to the high carbon content of coal, it is the resource which is most affected by carbon policies, i.e. 
incurs the largest price decrease. Thus, Poland is negatively affected by the carbon policy. The fossil 
fuel price effect outweighs the positive effect of improved terms-of-trade in energy intensive 
production explaining the slightly negative welfare impact.  
The same line of arguments is true for the rest of the world region. It increases domestic energy 
intensive production and reduces imports. On the other hand, it is the largest supplier of natural gas 
and crude oil. In consequence, the welfare impact is negative.  
The Annex I region is the largest supplier of coal and the second largest supplier of natural gas. In all 
scenarios, the carbon price in this region is around 4.30 $/t CO2. As a large export of fossil fuels they 
are slightly negatively affected by abatement measures in the European region 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
37
 All monetary units are measured in the benchmark currency, i.e. $ in the year 2001.   
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Table 11: Welfare changes scenario group A [% HEV vs. BAU] 
  SECTORAL NATIONAL FULL ETS 
Benelux  -1.90 -0.91 -0.34 -0.76 
Denmark  -1.42 -0.60 -0.34 -0.43 
Finland  -1.51 -0.54 -0.24 -0.49 
France  -1.46 -0.71 -0.18 -0.65 
Germany  -1.25 -0.33 -0.19 -0.30 
Italy  -1.26 -0.47 -0.18 -0.38 
Poland  -0.02 -0.06 0.59 0.36 
Spain  -0.63 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 
Sweden  -1.63 -0.84 -0.26 -0.78 
United Kingdom  -1.07 -0.34 -0.18 -0.27 
Western EU -0.60 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 
Eastern EU 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.65 
EU 27 -1.13 -0.41 -0.13 -0.33 
Annex I -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Rest of the World -0.15 -0.13 -0.09 -0.11 
 
4.3.2.2 National uniform carbon prices 
In the NATIONAL scenario, carbon prices are uniform across all sectors in a region but differ across 
regions. The total European welfare loss is around 0.4 % and the compliance cost are 9.3 billion $. For 
European countries with positive reduction requirements the welfare loss is between 0.13 (Western 
EU) and 0.9 % (Benelux). Carbon prices are between 10.23 (Spain) and 43.24 $/t CO2 (Sweden). 
While Poland faces a slight welfare loss, the Eastern EU region incurs a slight gain. Both non-
European regions suffer a welfare loss.    
 
4.3.2.3 Full European emission trading 
In the FULL scenarios all sectors in European regions are allowed to trade emission allowances across 
Europe. The total European welfare loss is 0.13 % and the compliance cost are 3.1 billion $. The 
uniform European carbon price becomes 8.77 $/t CO2.  
For countries with positive reduction requirements the welfare loss is between 0.12 % Spain, Western 
EU) and 34 % (Benelux, Denmark). The welfare of Poland and the Eastern EU significantly increases. 
These countries have negative reduction requirements. Accordingly, the introduction of European 
emission trading allows them to sell their excess emission budget to other regions. In fact, these are 
the only exporters of emission allowances.38 Non-European regions suffer a slight welfare loss.  
 
4.3.2.4 The European emission trading system 
The ETS scenario partitions the emission budget. Electricity, energy intensive, and refined oil 
production are allowed to trade emissions across Europe while other sectors are only allowed to trade 
permits nationally. The total European welfare loss becomes 0.33 % and the compliance cost are 5.2 
billion $. The European emission allowances price becomes 6.16 $/t CO2.  
                                                     
38
 Carbon trade results are given in Appendix A.  
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For countries with positive reduction burdens the welfare loss is between 0.12 (Western EU) and 0.78 
% (Sweden). National carbon prices range between 10.81 (Western EU) and 46.73 $/t CO2 (Sweden). 
Countries with negative reduction requirements allocate their excess budget to the emission trading 
system. Consequently, they are able to export emission allowances and thus, incur a welfare gain. 
Since emissions of non-trading sectors are capped at the benchmark level, they have slightly positive 
domestic carbon prices. Again, non-European regions suffer a slight welfare loss. 
 
4.3.2.5 Comparison 
The ranking of the scenarios in terms of the European welfare loss is as expected. The SECTORAL 
scenario shows the highest welfare loss followed by the NATIONAL approach since NATIONAL 
emission trading increases the flexibility of carbon abatement. Put differently, domestic carbon trade 
equalizes the marginal abatement costs within regions. 
Compared the NATIONAL scenario, the introduction of the EU ETS has two counteracting effects. 
On the one hand, flexibility is increased by allowing European trade of electricity, refined oil, and 
energy intensive production. On the other, flexibility is decreasing since trade across sectors is 
restricted by partitioning the emission budget. The results show that the positive effect of European 
trade prevails and European welfare improves. Remarkably, the welfare of all European countries 
improves, i.e. introducing the EU ETS under the effort sharing reduction requirements provides a 
Pareto improvement.39 
Since the FULL European emission trading system removes the partition of the emission budget and 
allows fully flexible emission abatement across sectors and regions, it shows the lowest European 
welfare loss. Again, the result also establishes at the member state level. 
While the Annex I region is nearly unaffected by European regulation approaches, the welfare of the 
rest of the world region improves with increasing flexibility of carbon abatement in Europe. Coal is 
the resource with the highest emission factor. Accordingly, it is always favorable to substitute the 
usage of coal by other energy resources. Increased flexibility in Europe also increases the substitution 
possibilities of coal usage. Consequently, demand for other energy resources increases. The rest of 
world region as the largest exporter of natural gas and crude oil benefits from this demand increase. 
This result can also be seen in the welfare effects for Poland in the SECTORAL and NATIONAL 
scenarios. Since Poland is an exporter of coal but importer of other resources, it is negatively affected 
of the increased carbon abatement flexibility of European regions.      
     
                                                     
39
 This result depends on the imposed reduction burdens. Using reduction requirements of the Burden Sharing Agreement 
(EC, 2002), Böhringer (2002) shows that the introduction of full emission trading across Europe does not provide a Pareto 
improvement. In his study, for some countries (Germany, Austria, France) the loss in comparative advantages in energy 
intensive production induced by equalization of carbon prices overbalances the positive effect of equalized marginal 
abatement cost.   
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4.3.3 Group B: Regulation of transport emissions 
The second scenario group analyzes different regulation approaches to the emissions caused by 
transport. The welfare results are listed in Table 12. As the results of this group are compared against 
the current EU ETS system, the welfare results of the ETS scenario are repeated in this table. 
  
4.3.3.1 Closed emission trading for transport sectors 
The scenario ETS CLOSED TRN introduces a closed emission trading system for transport sectors 
across Europe. Both, industrial and household transport, are allowed to trade allowances across 
Europe. However, trade with EU ETS sectors is not possible. This scenario can also be interpreted as a 
European wide carbon tax in the transport sector. Compared to the ETS scenario, the effects of this 
scenario group are threefold: First, flexibility is positively influenced by allowing allowances trade of 
transport sectors across Europe. Second, flexibility is negatively influenced by further restricting trade 
across national sectors exempting transport sectors from the national strategy. Third, the emission 
budget under the emission trading scheme alters. Countries with negative reduction requirements 
allocate permits to the transport system according to the NATIONAL scenario. Since they do not face 
a carbon restriction in this scenario, transport emissions are rising. Consequently, they allocate part of 
there excess budget to the transport trading system. Furthermore, since emissions of national sectors in 
these countries are capped at the benchmark level, the carbon budget of the EU ETS system 
necessarily decreases compared to the ETS scenario.  
The total European welfare loss becomes 0.31 % which is only a slight improvement compared to the 
EU ETS system. Due to the lower emission budget under the EU ETS, the European allowances price 
is increasing by 3.65 to 9.81 $/t CO2. The carbon price in the transport trading system becomes 17.71 
$/t CO2 indicating the higher marginal abatement cost in transport sectors.  
Although the gross cost of regulation are slightly decreasing, total compliance cost in Europe increase 
by around 1.2 to 6.4 billion $. The increase of compliance cost is due to a restriction of the flexibility 
of carbon mitigation which prevents equalization of marginal abatement cost across transport and 
other sectors under the national emission trading schemes which overbalances the increased flexibility 
by trade of transport sectors across Europe. However, refined oil in transport sectors is the commodity 
which shows the highest tax rate across all inputs. Consequently, the decrease in the carbon price for 
transport sectors reduces the tax interaction effect of carbon and transport taxes. This positive effect 
outweighs the negative effect of increasing compliance cost.  
The effect can be seen at the member state level. Countries with high national taxes in the ETS 
scenario (Benelux, France, Italy, Sweden) gain, since for these countries the decline in the carbon 
price of transport is the highest and, thus the positive effect of reduced tax interaction. Furthermore, 
some of these countries also benefit from decreasing compliance cost. In contrast, countries with 
carbon taxes in the ETS scenario below or the carbon price in the transport sector (Germany, Spain, 
remaining west European countries) all incur a welfare loss, since tax interaction and compliance costs 
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increase. Accordingly, the introduction of a closed emission trading system does not provide a Pareto 
improvement, i.e. some countries loose welfare while others gain compared to the ETS.  
Non-European regions are unaffected by the introduction of the additional trading system. 
 
Table 12: Welfare changes scenario group B [% HEV vs. BAU] 
  ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN ETS EXEMPT TRN 
Benelux  -0.76 -0.64 -0.44 -0.35 
Denmark  -0.43 -0.45 -0.32 -0.28 
Finland  -0.49 -0.45 -0.31 -0.24 
France  -0.65 -0.45 -0.30 -0.22 
Germany  -0.30 -0.33 -0.20 -0.13 
Italy  -0.38 -0.35 -0.23 -0.17 
Poland  0.36 0.34 0.44 0.53 
Spain  -0.13 -0.22 -0.10 -0.03 
Sweden  -0.78 -0.54 -0.36 -0.28 
United Kingdom  -0.27 -0.29 -0.18 -0.13 
Western EU -0.12 -0.20 -0.11 -0.05 
Eastern EU 0.65 0.41 0.73 0.86 
EU 27 -0.33 -0.31 -0.18 -0.11 
Annex I -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Rest of the World -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 
 
4.3.3.2 Including transport into the European emission trading scheme 
The scenario ETS TRN includes transport into the ETS system. Consequently, the two largest emitters 
– transport and electricity generation – trade emissions across Europe. Therefore, flexibility of carbon 
mitigation is increased in the EU ETS compared to the ETS scenario. On the other hand, flexibility in 
national trading schemes decreases. Again, the scenario group comes in three variants distinguishing 
the effect of industrial and household transport under the EU ETS. 
Compared to the ETS scenario the total European welfare loss significantly decreases to 0.18 %.  
Including transport has two positive effects. First, compliance costs are decreasing by 0.7 to 4.6 billion 
$, since transport sectors with high marginal abatement costs are allowed to trade emissions with the 
electricity sector which has the lowest marginal abatement costs. Reduction is shifted to the electricity 
sector, transport expands and compliance cost decrease.40 In consequence, the European allowances 
price increases by 1.11 to 7.27 $/t CO2.   
Second, transport sectors in all regions except countries with negative reduction requirements face a 
lower carbon price than under the national carbon tax scheme. Consequently, tax interaction also 
inclines. Therefore, all of these countries incur a welfare gain. For countries with negative reduction 
requirements, tax interaction increases since the carbon price for transport is increasing in these 
countries compared to the EU ETS system. However, these countries also allocate more allowances to 
the emission trading system and increase the export of emission permits. Since furthermore the 
emission price is increasing, the positive effect of increased allowances export exceeds the negative 
                                                     
40
 Carbon abatement of different sectors is given in Appendix A.  
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one of increased tax interaction. Therefore welfare of these countries also improves. Consequently, the 
introduction of transport provides a Pareto improvement for the European carbon policy.  
Again, the effect on non-European countries is negligible. 
 
4.3.3.3 Exempting transport from carbon regulation 
The ETS EXEMPT TRN scenario analyzes the full exemption of transport from any carbon policy. 
Transport sectors are unregulated and the resulting reduction burden is shifted to EU ETS. Other 
sectors are still regulated under nationally uniform carbon taxes.  
Compared to the ETS scenario, the loss in European welfare significantly decreases by 0.22 to 0.11 %. 
Remarkably, welfare even improves compared to the FULL scenario, which implements full flexibility 
of carbon mitigation by allowing trade across all sectors and European countries and showed a welfare 
loss of 0.13 %.  
Compared to the ETS scenario compliance costs are decreasing by 0.5 to 4.8 billion $. The decrease of 
the compliance cost is explained by the increased reduction burden in the EU ETS. In the ETS case, all 
countries with positive reduction requirements have higher national carbon prices. Since the increased 
abatement effort in the EU ETS increases the allowances price by 1.94 to 8.10 $/t CO2, carbon prices 
getting closer to uniform across sectors. Consequently, the marginal abatement cost are closer to 
uniform and cost efficiency is improved. Countries with negative reduction burdens again gain by the 
increase in the emission price since they are exporters of permits. Put differently, shifting the 
reduction burden of the transport sector to the EU ETS system it is possible to reduce more emissions 
in the electricity at lower cost. Therefore compliance costs decrease.  
The exemption of transport completely removes the interaction effect between transport taxes and 
carbon prices. Consequently, the positive effect of reducing the difference of effective carbon prices is 
maximized.  
The exemption is Pareto optimal in the sense that all member states benefit compared to the ETS 
system.  
The scenario also has an impact on the rest of the world region. The exemption of transport stipulates 
the use of transport fuels compared to the ETS scenario. Accordingly, the crude oil price increases. 
Since the rest of the world region is by far the largest exporter of crude oil, it incurs a welfare gain.  
  
4.3.3.4 Comparison 
Comparing the transport regulation approaches shows a clear-cut ranking in terms of welfare: The 
total exemption of transport improves welfare compared to the inclusion into the EU ETS which 
performs superior to the closed emission trading approach. 
The improvement of emission trading under the EU ETS to the closed emission trading is caused by 
two positive effects. Flexibility of carbon abatement increases and therefore the compliance cost 
decrease. Furthermore since the carbon price for transport sectors is decreasing tax-interaction also 
decreases. 
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Comparing emission trading under the EU ETS to the full exemption of transport, the effects are 
counteracting. On the one hand, compliance costs in the ETS TRN case are lower, due to higher 
flexibility of carbon abatement. On the other, tax interaction is completely reduced. The positive effect 
of reduced interaction prevails explaining the welfare improvement.  
      
4.3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Substitution elasticities used in production function show homogeneity across the environmental, 
energy related modeling literature. However, elasticities in the household own provided transport 
module and the elasticity between aggregated consumption and transport are uncertain. Therefore the 
impact of these elasticities is examined by solving the model under different values. 
The central value of the substitution elasticity between aggregated consumption and household 
transport used in the core analysis was 0.5. The sensitivity of the model results to a change of this 
elasticity is examined by varying its value between zero and one. The resulting welfare changes in the 
mains scenarios (ETS, ETS TRN, ETS CLOSED TRN, ETS EXEMPT TRN) are listed in Appendix A 
and shows that the model results are insensitive altering the elasticity. The same is true for the 
elasticity between fuel purchases and other transport cost.  
Changing the elasticity between household own provided and purchased transport also does not 
influences the results in the core scenarios. While this might come as a surprise, it can be explained by 
the fact that the main scenarios do not differentiate between carbon regulation in industrial and 
household transport. Therefore, both face the same carbon price. Consequently, relative prices are 
hardly affected and no substitution occurs.   
The magnitude to welfare effects reacts sensitive to a change in the elasticity of fuel demand. 
However, the qualitative implications are unaffected, i.e. the welfare ranking between imposed policy 
measures remains stable. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter employs a multi-region top-down computable general equilibrium model analyzing the 
effect of different approaches to carbon mitigation in the transport sector. The GTAP 6 database 
augmented by European data needed to model household transport provides the data necessary to 
calibrate the model. Three different policy approaches for the transport sector are tested:  i) a closed 
emission trading system beside the EU; ii) the inclusion of transport into the EU ETS; and finally, iii) 
the full exemption of transport from carbon regulation increasing the reduction burden in the EU ETS.  
A closed emission trading system for transport only provides small welfare gains. Furthermore, the 
political feasibility of introducing such a system is in doubt since it does not provide a Pareto 
improvement on the member state level.  
Both, transport under emission trading and the full exemption of transport, lead to the reduction of the 
gross cost of carbon regulation. Independently on which approach is chosen, it is possible to shift 
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abatement to the electricity sector which has the lowest marginal abatement costs. Therefore, 
European cost of compliance with the reduction requirements decrease. Moreover, both approaches 
provide Pareto improvements on the member state level indicating good political feasibility. 
The exemption of transport from carbon regulation shows lower welfare losses than the inclusion into 
the EU ETS due to high taxes on transport fuels in the benchmark equilibrium. These taxes interact 
with carbon prices in the transport sector leading to negative welfare impacts. Since the exemption of 
transport leads to transport carbon taxes of zero, the negative tax interaction effect vanishes. In 
consequence, the gross costs of carbon mitigation are even lower than in a situation where carbon 
abatement is fully flexible across Europe and sectors. 
However, the model employed in this chapter does not account for externalities in an explicit way. As 
outlined, transport externalities other than global warming justify a higher tax on transport fuels to 
internalize external effects auch as congestion, accidents, and noise. Therefore, neglecting these 
externalities, the model overestimates the beneficial effect of excluding transport from carbon 
regulation. Thus, congestion as the main externality of transport is explicitly included in the modeling 
framework in the next chapter. 
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5 Technology Rich CGE Model of Germany 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter employs a small open economy model calibrated to the German economy in the year 
2004. Although small open economy models have the disadvantage of abstracting from changes in the 
terms-of-trade assuming infinitely elastic world demand and supply, they have the advantage of 
modeling technological details. The model presented is designed to analyze the interaction between 
electricity generation and carbon measures in road transport, especially private transport. Accordingly, 
electricity production is represented by different generation technologies and accounts for different 
load segments. Private transport occurs by either using automobiles differentiated by fuel type or 
public transport modes. Accounting endogenously for the main externality of transport, congestion is 
included differentiated by travel period and road type. 
The introduction of an emission trading between electricity generation, energy intensive industries, 
and refineries is analyzed. It is compared to the inclusion of road transport into the trading scheme, a 
separate fuel tax increase, and a full exemption of road transport from carbon regulation. Moreover, 
including air transport in the trading system is examined. A further scenario relates to the recycling of 
revenues raised by the introduction of emission trading increasing subsidies on private transport. 
The results show that an increase in fuel taxation leads to large welfare losses. Also the inclusion of 
transport into emission trading does not provide welfare gains. However, the full exemption of 
transport and moving the reduction burden to the emission trading system decreases the gross cost of 
carbon regulation. Including aviation into the trading scheme is a favorable option. Using the income 
of carbon regulation to increase public transport subsidies shows the best performance of all scenarios.   
 
5.2 Model description 
5.2.1 Overview 
The model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem. Three classes of equilibrium 
conditions exist. No activity makes positive profits (zero-profit condition). Excess supply is positive 
(market clearing condition). Each household fulfils his budget restriction. Each class is associated to a 
class of variables. Activity levels are associated with zero-profit conditions. Prices are connected to 
market clearing equations. Each budget restriction determines the income level of the respective 
household. 
The basic assumptions of the model are: 
• The model is static. 
• The economy is small compared to the world market, i.e. world market prices are fix and 
taken as given (small open economy assumption). Furthermore, the balance of payment deficit 
is fix. 
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• All markets are perfectly competitive, i.e. all agents take prices as given. 
• Households’ preferences are represented by a representative agent. 
• There are two factors, capital and labor, which are intersectoral mobile but not international. 
Factors are inelastically supplied by the representative agent. 
• The government imposes taxes to finance the provision of public goods which is assumed to 
be constant. 
• Investment demand is constant.  
• Production and utility functions are represented by separable nested CES functions. 
• Electricity generation is represented by discrete generation technologies. 
• Locations of production plants and the representative household are exogenous and fix.  
 
5.2.2 Algebraic description 
5.2.2.1 Representative agent 
The representative agent (RA) derives utility out of commodity consumption xi,RA, leisure, and leisure 
trips trml using the different transport classes m according to the utility function U(.).41 Beside leisure 
trips, trips complementary to labor trmL need to be financed. However, these trips do not yield utility. 
Since labor is inelastically supplied, the total number of work trips also needs to be constant and is 
given by TRL. One trip requires the purchase of commodity (xi,ml, xi,mL) and additionally a certain time 
requirement, δm(Z) which depend on the congestion index Z.42 Modeling the emissions of private road 
transport in detail, a special treatment is given to private road transport trips trvl and trvL which are 
performed using different vehicle types v. Each of theses trips requires input of durable automobiles 
VEHv and variable inputs xi,vvar. The representative agent is endowed with the stock of vehicles 
VEHvstock and is able to buy new cars on the market purchasing commodities xi,vnew. The function 
V(xi,vnew) determines the composition of commodities required for new cars and the function D(VEHv, 
xi,v
var) expresses the combination of vehicles and variable cost. This approach of distinguishing 
between durable commodities and their associated necessary cost producing the service of the durable 
good, is based on the theoretical work of Conrad and Schröder (1991).  
Beside a (possibly negative) transfer from the government (trans), the household receives income 
from selling capital K (labor L) at price pK (pL). If the restriction on the technological potential of an 
electricity generation technology g becomes binding, the representative agent earns the price ppotg on 
that potential which is the rent on scarce potential. Income is spend to finance commodity purchases 
and investment demands invi which are assumed to be constant.  
Commodity consumption is taxed at rates ti,RA and market prices are denoted as pi. Commodities used 
for transportation, are taxed at different rates ti,m. Furthermore, capital and labor income is taxed at 
                                                     
41
 The approach to include leisure and time allocated to transport is based on the theoretical work of Becker (1965) and 
subsequent research. A survey of the theory of time allocation is given in Bruzelius (1979).  
42
 The time requirement for a trip is always to the minimum trip time required. Therefore, travel is a non-lesire commodity in 
the terminology of deSerpa (1971). 
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rates tK and tL, respectively. The fleet of existing cars is taxed depending on the car technology at rate 
tv. The utility maximization problem of the household is given as:  
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The first constraint is the budget restriction, the second the time constraint, the third holds labor trips 
constant and the last two are definitions. Solving the problem under given prices yields the demand 
functions of the representative agent which are denoted by Ci(inc) where inc is the income defined by 
the left hand side of the budget restriction.43  
 
5.2.2.2 Production 
Each production sector i produces one commodity which can either be sold at the domestic price pid or 
at the export price pie. The quantities supplied are denoted by yid and yie, respectively, intermediate and 
factor inputs by xj,i, xK,i, and xL,i, and the activity level by yi. Taxes are imposed on intermediate (tj,i) 
and factor inputs (tK,i,tL,i) and on outputs (toi). Tax inclusive input prices are denoted by qj,i:=(1 + tj,i)pj, 
qK,i:=(1 + tK,i)pK, and  qL,i:=(1 + tL,i)pL, and output prices by vid:=(1 – toi)pid and vie:=(1 – toi)pie. 
Imposing separability of inputs and output and constant returns to scale, the unit cost (ci) and revenue 
functions (ri) can be independently determined from the given production function yielding the profit 
maximization problem for non-electricity production sectors: 
 
                                                     
43
 For the ease of notation, price dependency of demand functions is not explicitly stated. Furthermore, commodity demand 
also depends on the congestion index. 
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Solving the problem under given prices results in the firm’s zero-profit conditions which determine the 
optimal activity levels:  
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Given the optimal activity level, optimal input and output quantities can be derived using Shepard’s 
lemma: 
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The electricity sector is involved in two activities: electricity generation and an activity which 
represents overhead and transmission and distribution. Electricity generation is represented by 
different technologies g. The technological potentials potg restrict the use of technologies. The 
generation level of technology g is denoted as ygGEN and the associated price pgGEN. One unit of 
generation of technology requires bi,g (bK,g, bL,g) units of commodity i (capital, labor). Given the 
demand for electricity (xELE), the optimal generation mix is determined by minimizing the generation 
cost under the constraints that generation may not exceed the technological potential and that demand 
has to be fulfilled. 
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The Lagrangian multiplier ppotg, is the scarcity price of the technological potential. And pELE is the 
price of one unit electricity under the optimal generation mix.44 Consequently, the constraints have the 
interpretation of market clearing conditions. If potential exceeds generation, the price is zero; if the 
                                                     
44
 The prices are given in monetary per energy units. For example, if generation is measured in megawatt hours and prices are 
given in euro, the objective function is measured in euro and the constraints in megawatt hours. Consequently, the multipliers 
are given in euro per megawatt hour. This implies that the technological potential and total electricity demand are also given 
in megawatt hours.  
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potential is scarce, the constraint is binding and the price becomes positive. A similar interpretation is 
given for the demand constraint. However, the electricity price will never become zero as long as 
demand is positive since excess generation results in excess cost which contrasts the objective of cost 
minimization. The general equilibrium concept of circular value flows requires determining the supply 
of the technological potential and electricity demand. Thus, the potential is added to the representative 
agent’s endowment. Physical electricity demand is determined by the electricity sector (see below). 
The first order condition of the optimization problem (53) is given as: 
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Equation (54) is the zero-profit condition for generation technologies. Producing one unit of electricity 
yields revenues equal to the electricity price. Costs are determined by factor and commodity 
requirements and rents on scarce technological potential. If costs exceed revenues the technology 
makes losses and does not generate electricity. Otherwise the generation level becomes positive. 
Given the optimal generation levels, the demand of technologies is given as: 
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The electricity sector combines factor and commodity demands for overhead and transmission and 
distribution with electricity generation. Thus, physical electricity produced flows from generation 
technologies to the electricity sector. Consequently, it produces the composite electricity commodity 
including generation and overhead and transmission and distribution cost. The rest of the economy 
demands this composite, i.e. pays a price sufficient to cover generation costs as well as the cost for 
other activities. Therefore, the profit optimization problem of the electricity sector and the 
corresponding zero-profit condition become: 
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The commodity and factor demand functions are equivalent to those stated in equation (52). Physical 
electricity demand is given as: 
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5.2.2.3 International trade and government 
Following Armington (1969), imported and domestic produced commodities are combined to the total 
available quantity on the domestic market ai with a constant elasticity of substitution function.45 The 
corresponding cost function is denoted cia(pid, piim) and depends on domestic producer prices pid and 
import prices piim. The Armington sector sells the aggregate at the market price pi. Consequently, the 
profit optimization problem becomes: 
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The zero-profit condition, which determines the total availability of commodity i, is given as: 
 
 ( )a d im ai i i i ic p ,p          p                      y 0≥ ⊥ ≥  (60) 
 
The demand for domestic and imported commodities is derived using Shephard’s Lemma: 
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The public demand of the government is constant and given by Gi. Furthermore, the government 
finances the balance of payment deficit (bop), which is also assumed to be constant, and the transfer to 
the household. Demand is financed by the imposed taxes. Consequently, if tax revenues are changing, 
either the transfer or taxes need to be changed in order to balance the budget restriction of the 
government. This approach allows analyzing refinancing and revenue-recycling effects but neglects 
influences on the composition of public spending.  
 
5.2.3 Market clearing conditions 
 The market price pi is determined by the supply of the Armington commodity and the demand of all 
agents: 
 
 ( )a GENi i, j i i i i
j
y          x x C inc G                        p 0≥ + + + ⊥ ≥∑  (62) 
 
                                                     
45
 A more sophisticated approach would be to specify an Armington aggregate for every agent in the economy. However, two 
problems arise. First, the models dimension increases. For example, if the number of commodities and production sectors is 
ten, it follows with one household and a government that twelve activities have to be modelled. Consequently, the number of 
Armington aggregates rises from ten to 120. Second and more important, reliable estimates of Armington elasticities 
differentiated by agent and commodity are not available.  
 63 
Similar, the market clearing equations for factors are given as: 
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Under the small open economy assumption, world market prices are constant. Furthermore, the 
balance of payments is assumed to be constant. Consequently, the sum of all exports evaluated at fix 
world market prices equals the sum of all imports at world market prices and the balance of payment 
deficit: 
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Upper bars denote constant world prices. The price pfx is the current exchange rate which adjusts in 
order to fulfill the trade balance. The import and export prices faced by the economy’s agent are 
connected to world market prices by the current exchange rate: 
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Figure 6 summarizes the full algebraic model formulation:  
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Figure 6: Algebraic model formulation 
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5.2.4 Extension of the basic model 
Analyzing the impact of carbon policies, the counterfactual simulations extend the model for quantity 
restriction on emissions. The CO2 emission factor βi specifies the carbon dioxide emissions resulting 
of consuming one unit of quantity i. Denoting the upper emission bound by emax, the emission 
restriction becomes: 
 
 ( )emax                          pcarb 0 ≥ + + ⊥ ≥ 
 
∑ ∑ GENi ij i i
i j
x x C incβ  (66) 
 
Equation (66) implicitly assumes that commodity consumption of the government does not emit 
carbon since government’s demand Gi does not enter the right hand side. The complementary variable 
pcarb is the price of an emission permit which has to be paid by the respective consumer of the 
commodity. Consequently, the carbon restriction adds another market clearing equation to the model. 
Therefore, the owner of the emission endowment emax needs to be specified. It is assumed that the 
government owns the emission allowances and sells them to the firms and the representative agent. 
Thus, introducing carbon regulation creates revenues in the form of sold permits. Under the 
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maintained assumption of constant public good provision, this gives rise to the question on how to 
recycle this additional income which will be described in the scenario definitions. 
 
5.2.5 Specification 
5.2.5.1 Model dimensions 
Table 13 summarizes the model dimensions of the model. The two columns on the upper left identify 
the elements of the commodity and sector set i which are divided into three subclasses: non-energy, 
energy and transport commodities. Since the model is designed to analyze the interactions of carbon 
regulation approaches in the energy and transport market, non-energy commodities are chosen such 
that the most important sectors are represented (electricity, energy intensive production, and motor 
vehicle production). All fossil fuel energy sources, the refined oil, and transport sectors are explicitly 
represented. The road and other transport sector also includes provision of metro and tram services.46 
Other sectors are represented by industry classes which are aggregated along the NACE Rev. 2 
(Eurostat,  2009) classification scheme. The two columns on the upper right of Table 13 define vehicle 
and generation technologies. Two vehicle classes are considered: diesel and gasoline cars. The model 
includes all electricity generation technologies used in Germany. The OTHER technology combines 
mainly biomass and generation from municipal waste. In order to allow for important technology 
switches resulting from carbon restriction, the most important future technologies which are not 
already used are included: offshore wind generation and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) 
generation based on either natural gas or lignite.47 The lower part of Table 13 shows the differentiation 
of transport trips. Five different transport modes are available for private transport: own private 
transport and public transport in form of trains, busses, metros and trams, or airplanes. Furthermore, a 
slow mode exists which only requires time input but no monetary cost. Since spatial characteristics are 
important to account for the substitutability of the different trips, a further set distinguishes between 
short and long distance trips. A trip above 500 km is classified to be long distance.48 Modeling 
congestion, which is done for road trips – busses and own private road transport – the time dimension 
as well as the area of transport are important. Thus, trips are further classified by the transport periods, 
which are characterized by their congestion level, and the road network used. Road networks are 
characterized by different freeflow time requirements and congestion levels. Generally, urban streets 
have a lower freeflow speed than non-urban streets and are heavier congested.  
                                                     
46
 It would by preferable to explicitly represent bus and metro and tram transport. However, the underlying SAM does not 
identify these production sectors and data allowing a disaggregation of the OTP are not available. Using the other road 
transport sector expresses the fact that choosing the model dimensions can not be done independently of the creation of the 
underlying empirical base. 
47
 The CCS technology based on hard coal is more expensive than based on lignite (Wissel et al., 2008). Consequently, a hard 
coal technology is not included since cost minimization of the generator implies, that it would never penetratze the market in 
the presented framework.  
48
 The distance classification is adopted from the underlying database.  
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Table 13: Model dimensions 
Description Abbreviation  Description Abbreviation 
Non-energy:   Vehicle classes:   
Agriculture AGR  Diesel car DIESEL 
Energy intensive industries EINT  Gasoline car GASOLINE 
Manufacture MAN    
Mining MIN  Generation technologies:  
Motor vehicle production MVH  Combined cycle gas turbine  CCGT 
Services SER  Hard coal power plant HCOA 
Electricity ELE  Hydro power plant HYDRO 
   Lignite power plant LIGN 
Energy:   Lignite CCS LIGNCCS 
Coal COA  Natural gas CCS GASCCS 
Crude oil CRU  Nuclear power plant NUCLEAR 
Diesel transport fuel DIESEL  Open cycle gas turbine OCGT 
Gasoline transport fuel GASOLINE  Open cycle oil turbine OCOT 
Natural gas GAS  Other technologies OTHER 
Nuclear inputs NUC  Photovoltaic PV 
Refined oils  P_C  Wind onshore WINDON 
   Wind offshore WINDOFF 
Transport:     
Air transport ATP    
Rail transport RAIL    
Road and other transport OTP    
Water transport WTP    
     
     
Transport modes:   Trip distances  
Airplanes PLANE  Long distance trip LONG 
Bicycles, pedestrians SLOW  Short distance trip SHORT 
Busses BUS    
Metro and tram METRAM  Trip time periods  
Own private road transport OWN  Off-peak transport OPEAK 
Private train PTRAIN  Peak period transport PEAK 
     
  
 Road networks  
   Non-urban roads NURBAN 
   Urban road URBAN 
 
 
5.2.5.2 Utility function and private transports 
Figure 7 depicts the structure of the utility function. On the top level, leisure and commodity and 
transport consumption are combined. At the next stage leisure trips trade off against commodity 
consumption subdivided by non-energy and energy commodities. Consequently, utility is partly 
derived from leisure trips. In contrast, labor trips which are complementary to the labor supplied, do 
not spend utility.  
 
Figure 8 shows the structure of private transport which combines trips of different distances at the top 
level. For every distance class, trips are aggregated according to the travel period occurring. Within a 
travel period, the consumer decides about transport modes which are characterized by monetary costs 
and time requirements which are combined using a Leontief function. For road transport modes 
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(busses and cars), the additional choice between different road networks is implemented with a 
composite of the road types. Depending on the congestion level on the networks, the time input 
differs. The tree’s structure expresses the assumption of equal speed levels of different vehicle classes, 
since time and monetary cost are aggregated for the composite of the different car classes. The latter 
are a composite of trips occurring on diesel or gasoline cars. Consequently, vehicle classes only differ 
by their monetary but not by their time cost. Following the approach of Koopman (1995) in the 
EUCAR model, I distinguish committed and minimum mileage of cars expressing the fact that 
consumers can react in two ways to rising fuel prices. First, reducing supplementary mileage to save 
the variable cost and keeping the number of available cars constant. Second, the consumer can reduce 
the number of car purchases reducing committed mileage. The approach is based the assumption that 
buying an automobile implies a certain minimum of kilometers driven per year. Consequently, the 
committed mileage is characterized by the rental cost for the car and the variable cost implied by 
minimum kilometers driven. In addition, it is possible to drive more kilometers – the supplementary 
mileage – which are only characterized by variable cost. According to de Jong (1991) the share of 
committed mileage in observed kilometers driven is around 65%.  
 
Substitution elasticities are based on a literature review (Berg, 2007; Koopman, 1995; Mayeres, 1999; 
Munk, 2003, 2005; Paltsev et al., 2005a; de Ceuster et al., 2007) and are summarized in Table 14.  
 
Table 14: Utility substitution elasticities 
Elasticity  Description Value 
 
Utility function  
σL Leisure and commodity and leisure trips 0.7 
σCT Commodity consumption and leisure trips 0.75 
σC Energy and non-energy commodities 0.25 
σCE Energy commodities 0.4 
σOC Non-energy commodities 0.5 
   
 Transport module  
σD Short and long trips 0.1 
σTP Peak and off peak period 0.9 
σM Different modes 
Peak: 2.2 
Off-peak: 1.9 
σR Urban and non-urban roads 0.1 
σCAR Diesel and gasoline cars 2 
σCS Committed and supplementary mileage 0.15 
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Figure 7: Utility structure 
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Figure 8: Private transport structure 
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5.2.5.3 Production functions 
Figure 9 shows the production function of non-electricity sectors. Outputs are modeled using a CET 
function at the output side. At the top-level, material inputs, transport, and an aggregate of factor and 
energy inputs are combined using a Leontief function. Transportation can either occur on roads or by 
water or air transport. Road transport can either be own supplied or purchased from the road transport 
sector. Own provided transport is distinguished by different transportation fuels. However, the 
transport capital input is not modeled. On the factor and energy side, first a value added composite of 
primary factors and an energy aggregate are combined. Another approach would be to combine labor 
with a capital/energy aggregate (Burniaux and Truong, 2002). However, van der Werf (2008) tests 
different nesting structures of primary factor and energy inputs for twelve OECD countries and shows 
that the adopted nesting structure performs best in reproducing observed time series. The energy 
aggregate trades off electricity input versus fossil fuel commodities which are further subdivided by 
coal and liquid and gaseous commodities. 
 
Figure 10 depicts the electricity production function. At the top level, electricity generation, transport, 
material and a value added aggregate are combined using a Leontief function. The transport composite 
is the same as for non-electricity sectors. Electricity generation is characterized by three different load 
segments: base, middle, and peak load. Depending on their technological specification, generation 
technologies produce in different load segments. The differentiation of load segments is important to 
avoid unrealistic substitution patterns between technologies. From an economic point of view, base 
load power plants are often characterized by high investment and low variable cost. Consequently, 
these plants need to run for a large number of hours per year in order to cover fixed costs. From a 
technical point of view, base load plants often exhibit a long-start up time, i.e. are limited in their 
flexibility. On the other hand, peak load power plants are less expensive in terms of investment cost 
but more flexible regarding the start-up time (e.g. Stoft, 2002). Within a load segment, technologies 
are perfect substitutes. Technologies are either active or inactive in the benchmark equilibrium. For 
active power plants, capital is technology specific expressing the effect of installed capacities. In order 
to control the malleability of installed capacities, i.e. allowing deconstruction of existing power plants, 
the approach of Wing (2006, 2008) is used: a CET function uses perfectly economy-wide malleable 
capital endowment of the representative agent providing technology-specific capital stocks. The 
capital stock of inactive technologies is not technology-specific.   
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Figure 9: Non-electricity production 
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Figure 10: Electricity production 
Output
Generation ... Materials ...
Base
σGEN
Value 
Added
Capital Labor
σVA
Mid Peak
Nuclear
∞
... ...
Transport
Air Water Road
DieselGasoline
Own Purchased
σTRN
σROAD
σOWN
Domestic Market Exports
εOUT
Labor Technology 
specific 
capital
Fuel
...
 
 
 
 
 71 
Essentially, the implementation of discrete generation technologies is a combination of the work of 
Böhringer (1998) and Wing (2006, 2008). Böhringer (1998) treats technologies as perfect substitutes 
with technology specific resources to limit unrealistic flip-flop behavior of technologies. However, 
this approach does not allow for the deconstruction of installed capacities, i.e. capacities are not 
malleable. Wing (2006, 2008) controls the malleability by introducing the CET transformation and 
uses a nearly linear CES function to combine the output of power plants. However, using the CES 
aggregator for power plants’ output does not work if new technologies are included: due to the zero-
value share in the benchmark equilibrium, the inactive technologies cannot be calibrated into the CES 
aggregate. Consequently, the only possibility is to model them as perfect substitutes to the CES 
aggregate of existing technologies. However, this approach favors the adoption of new technologies 
since they do not use technology-specific capital. Additionally, the change in the generation of 
existing technologies is restricted by the share preserving character of the CES aggregator leading to 
unrealistic results. The approach used in this thesis has the advantage that it implements realistic 
technology substitution by modeling them as perfect substitutes and allows controlling the malleability 
of existing installed capacities using the CET transformation of technology specific capital.  
 
Table 15 lists the substitution elasticities used in the production functions. The substitution elasticities 
for the value added and value added/energy aggregated have been estimated by van der Werf (2008). 
Elasticities for the transport module are obtained by a literature review but are generally subject to 
uncertainty. Following Böhringer (1995), the substitution elasticity between load segments is set to a 
value near zero. Other elasticities are adopted from Paltsev et al. (2005a) who employ the same 
production structure. Empirical values for the transformation elasticity of technology specific capital 
do not exist. Therefore, it is set to one and a sensitivity analysis is performed.    
 
Table 15: Production substitution elasticities 
Elasticity  Description Value 
 
Non-electricity production  
εOUT Exports vs. domestic production 2 
σTRN Different transport modes 1 
σVAE Value added and energy  0.33 
σROAD Own and purchased road transport 1 
σVA Labor and capital 0.43 
σOWN Own transport with diesel and gasoline 0.9 
σENE Electricity and fossil fuels 0.25 
σFOF Coal and liquid fossil fuels 0.5 
σLQD Natural gas and refined oils 1 
   
 Electricity production  
σGEN Load segments 0.1 
εKE Transformation elasticity for technology-specific capital  1 
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Welsch (2007) estimates elasticities for the Armington aggregation for European countries including 
Germany. The adopted values are given in Table 16.49 Generally, the values estimated by Welsch 
(2007) are lower than those used in comparable studies.    
 
Table 16: Armington elasticities 
Commodity Elasticity  Commodity Elasticity 
Agriculture 0.575  Mining 1.5 
Air transport 0.5  Motor vehicles 2 
Coal 0.37  Other transport  0.5 
Energy intensive industries 0.8  Refined oils 0.37 
Electricity 0.3  Rail transport 0.5 
Natural gas 0.37  Services 0.5 
Manufacture 1.5  Water transport 0.5 
Source: Welsch (2007) 
   
5.2.5.4 Congestion function 
The congestion function relates the time needed to travel one kilometer (timem.n) using the mode m on 
the road network n to the travel flow on that network measured in person car equivalents per hour 
(flown). The congestion function is assumed to be exponential and given in equation (67) which has 
been empirically validated by (O'Mahony et al., 1997). The left hand side is the time needed to travel 
one kilometer using mode m on network n. The time depends on the total flow in the network, flown, 
measured in personal car equivalents per hour. The A parameters need to be calibrated.   
 
 
41 2 3
, ,
n nA flow
m n m n n ntime A A A e = +   (67) 
 
5.2.6 Parameterization 
5.2.6.1 Underlying data 
The model is based on four main data sources: the German input-output (IO) table of the year 2004 
Destatis (2008a), the corresponding physical IO table (Destatis, 2008b), and transport data of the 
TREMOVE (de Ceuster et al., 2007) demand module and the German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW, 2006).  
The German IO table identifies domestic production and imports for 71 commodities measured at 
producer prices. Furthermore, labor inputs, depreciation, and net profits for industries as well as tax 
payments differentiated by production and intermediate input taxes are given. Final demands include 
consumption of households, the government, and non-profit organizations. In addition, investments, 
stock changes, and exports are included. 
The physical IO table provides energy inputs to the different production sectors and households 
differentiated by energy commodities. These inputs are given in two forms: total energy and emission 
                                                     
49
 Since crude oil and nuclear inputs are only imported no elasticity is given. 
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relevant energy inputs. While the former include transformation inputs, the latter are net of double 
counted energy flows. The physical IO table also includes total CO2 emission by production sector. 
Transport data are extracted from the TREMOVE demand module which provides data for private and 
freight transport in the form of person and vehicle kilometers differentiated by travel distance, period, 
and roads. Furthermore, speeds of different travel modes as well as cost coverage rates of public 
transport modes are given. 
Household expenditures for private transport are given in DIW (2006) and are differentiated by car 
purchases, fuel spendings subdivided by net cost and different tax categories, and other cost. 
Moreover, used quantities and prices on different transport fuels and kilometers driven on gasoline and 
diesel automobiles are provided. 
The next sections describe the creation of the database in detail. The corresponding programs are 
given in Appendix D. 
 
5.2.6.2 Social accounting matrix 
The construction of the social accounting matrix is based on the IO table. Intermediate and labor 
inputs into domestic production, imports and exports as well as household’s demand can be directly 
derived out of the IO table. Capital input is defined as the sum of net profits and depreciation.50 Total 
investment demand is taken as the sum of investment demand and stock changes. 
Crude oil and natural gas production and consumption are represented in the German IO table in an 
aggregated fashion. Moreover, gasoline, diesel, and nuclear fuels are included in the refined oil 
account. In order to disaggregate these accounts, the physical IO table, which identifies input of these 
commodities in physical energy units except for nuclear fuels, is used. Using prices given in BP 
(2007), energy inputs are converted into monetary units. The resulting input commodities’ shares are 
applied to each aggregated monetary demand in the IO table. Concerning the supply side, crude oil is 
assumed to be not domestically produced.51 Transport fuel sectors are pure transformation sectors, i.e. 
they take the Armington aggregate of refined oils as inputs and provide diesel and gasoline 
respectively as outputs.52 Nuclear fuels are specified as pure import commodities. The demand for 
nuclear fuels is identified in the creation of different electricity generation technologies described 
below and separated out of the refined oil imports. 
                                                     
50
 Net profits may be negative eventually resulting in negative capital inputs with the model formulation. Following Paltsev 
and Rutherford (1999) in the case of negative capital inputs labor input is adjusted. 
51
 This neglects around 2.5% of domestic crude oil production (BP, 2007; Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, 2008). Splitting the 
aggregated domestic production account requires additional data on the cost structure of natural gas and crude oil. These data 
are hardly available. Consequently, additional assumptions are necessary. Since domestic crude oil production is small and 
additional assumptions on cost structures also distort the data basis, I decided to treat crude oil as pure input which essentially 
facilitates the creation of the SAM.  
52
 This implies that production of refined oil can perfectly switch from diesel to gasoline production and vice versa. 
Choumert et al. (2006) note that this is not possible due to the existing configuration of refineries. They split the outputs of 
the refined oil sector in the MIT EPPA model into different refined oil products like transportation fuels, heavy fuel oil, and 
petroleum coke. However, this splitting also comes at cost: beside additional data requirements modeling the refined oil as 
multi-output sector requires choosing additional transformation elasticities. Moreover, solely splitting outputs under the 
maintained assumption of separability of the cost and revenue function implies equal cost structure of the production of 
different refined oil types.    
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All taxes are derived as ad-valorem taxes. Production taxes are directly derived from the IO table and 
implemented as output tax on total production. OECD (2007) reports taxes on labor income and social 
insurance contributions of households and firms. These data are used to derive the labor income tax 
and a labor use tax which is assumed to be uniform across sectors.  
The value-added tax in Germany in the year 2004 was 16 % which applies to all commodities except 
transportation fuels and refined oils. Consumption tax rates on gasoline and diesel are derived on the 
base of the DIW (2006) expenditure data which provide net payments for fuels and the tax component 
separately distinguished by mineral oil tax, eco tax, and value added tax. Other refined oils are tax at a 
rate of 41.8 % (IEA, 2008). Subsidies on public transport use are derived using cost coverage rates 
given by the TREMOVE model. Motor vehicle taxes apply on the value of total available cars. The 
construction of this value and the corresponding tax rate is described below. 
Transportation fuel tax rates for intermediate inputs are the same as for final consumption net of the 
value added tax. IEA (2008) gives a tax of 20 % for refined oil intermediate inputs. In Germany, the 
aviation sector does not pay taxes on refined oil (kerosene) inputs. Consequently, the tax rate is set to 
zero. This is also done for the refinery sector since inputs are mainly transformation inputs which are 
not subject to the mineral oil tax. For the remaining intermediate inputs tax rates are derived residually 
by subtracting fuel tax payments from total intermediate tax payments given by the IO table and 
dividing by the total value of intermediate inputs. Generally, these taxes are in the magnitude of 3 %. 
A direct transfer from the government to the representative agent is implemented in such that the 
budget constraints are fulfilled. Selected tax rates are given in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Selected benchmark tax rates [%] 
 Production Household 
Diesel 150 174 
Gasoline 234 273 
Refined oils 20 42 
Labor 15.6 46 
Bus  - 18 
Metro and tram  - 18 
Private train  - 45 
 
As in the previous chapter, emission coefficients are taken from IPCC (2006) and uniformly scaled to 
meet total emissions by sectors as given in the physical IO table. Table 18 shows the CO2 emissions 
differentiated by energy input. The electricity sector is with 40.5 % of the total emission the largest 
emitter mainly using coal followed by natural gas and oil. The representative agent is the second 
largest emitter. 45 % of his emissions are caused by transportation and the remaining part by using 
fossil fuels for heating and cooking. Emissions in the energy intensive sector are mainly caused by 
fossil fuel use. Transportation fuels only play a minor role. In contrast, in the service sector, which 
accounts for 11 % of the total emissions, 52 % of the emissions are caused by road transport and the 
remaining by natural gas and refined oils.   
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Table 18: CO2 emissions by sector and energy input [million t] 
 
Coal Natural 
gas 
Refined 
oils 
Diesel Gasoline Total 
Agriculture 0 1 2 5 0 8 
Air transport 0 0 4 0 0 4 
Coal 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Energy intensives  55 39 11 2 0 106 
Electricity 323 33 8 0 0 363 
Natural gas 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Manufacture 4 38 15 5 1 64 
Mining 6 0 0 0 0 6 
Motor vehicles 0 2 0 1 1 3 
Other transport  0 0 0 11 0 11 
Refined oils 0 2 16 0 0 18 
Rail transport 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Services 1 27 20 44 8 100 
Water transport 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Repr. agent 3 61 50 20 72 206 
Total 393 205 125 91 82 896 
 
 
5.2.6.3 Private transport 
Creating the data basis for the private transport module involves three major steps: First, the existing 
automobile stock and the cost structure of different car types are derived. Second, the monetary inputs 
into different transport modes need to be determined. Third, the congestion function is calibrated and 
time inputs to transport modes are derived. 
Table 19 provides the data used to derive the cost structure of different car types. The reference cars, 
which have nearly equal performance data, are an Opel Vectra 1.8 for gasoline and an Opel Vectra 1.0 
CDTI for diesel. Purchase prices and new car purchases are used to split consumers’ motor vehicle 
demand given by the SAM and the implied prices per new cars. The stock of automobiles is converted 
to monetary units using a rental price which is derived as continuous annuity on the purchase price 
under the given lifetime and an assumed interest rate of 10 %. Given the cubic capacities, the motor 
vehicle tax rates, and the total motor vehicle tax payments (DIW, 2006) the ad-valorem tax rate on 
cars is computed. The total monetary annual car costs are given as the sum of the annuity and the 
motor vehicle tax. Annual fuel costs are directly given from DIW (2006) which also gives the total 
other spendings on car use. However, the other costs are not differentiated by automobiles. Assuming 
other costs to be equal for car types and proportional to the number of total cars, the annual other costs 
per car type are derived. The total other costs are disaggregated to different commodity demands using 
the consumption transition matrix coming with the German IO table.   
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Table 19: Basic data for car types 
 Diesel car Gasoline car 
Purchase pricea [€] 26540 24710 
Cubic capacitya [ccm] 1910 1796 
Specific emissionsa [g CO2/km] 154 173 
Lifetimeb [years] 12 12 
Total kilometers drivenb [million km] 177589 412820 
Total fuel useb [million l] 12210 34582 
Fuel spending net of taxb [million €] 2856 9274 
Taxes on fuelsb [million €] 4970 25250 
Motor vehicle taxc [€/ 100 ccm] 15.5 6.75 
Stock net of scrappingd [million] 7620 34479 
New carse [million] 1437 1822 
Sources: a Motor Presse Stuttgart (2008); b DIW (2006); c BMF (2009); d,e KBA (2005a,b) 
 
Table 20 gives the resulting cost shares of the two car classes. Including the rental costs of the existing 
car stock and motor vehicle taxes in the car costs results in car expenditure as the main determinant of 
costs. Diesel cars have a high car cost share than gasoline cars but are more fuel efficient. 
 
Table 20: Cost shares of car types [%] 
 Diesel car Gasoline car 
Car 70 53.6 
Fuel 10.9 18 
Other cost 19 28.5 
 
The described procedure identifies the monetary cost of car use per vehicle kilometer. Using the 
TEMOVE data, which identify person and vehicle kilometers differentiated by trip type, distance, and 
period, the costs are converted to a per person kilometer basis. Consequently, occupancy rates 
differing by trip class are implicitly included. Total private train and aviation consumption are directly 
given from the SAM and also converted to a per person kilometer basis. The SAM does not offer 
disaggregated inputs to bus and metro and tram use. These costs are included in the other road 
transport sector. Under the assumption of equal prices these inputs are converted to the per person 
kilometer basis.    
 
The TREMOVE model also offers the speed of different transport modes differentiated by trip class. 
Using the speed data, occupancy rates, and person kilometer traveled the time inputs for different trips 
purposes are computed. Destatis (2006) reports 81 minutes of transport time per day. Both, working 
and recreation time are around 8 hours (Destatis, 2002). Consequently, transportation is around 17% 
of the total leisure time budget which is used to determine the time endowment. 
Calibrating the congestion function requires identifying four parameters for each road type. For cars 
the A1 parameter in equation (67) is set to one. The TREMOVE data imply that busses are on average 
11 % (26 %) slower than cars on urban (non-urban) streets and the A1 parameter for busses is set 
accordingly. Consequently, the number of parameters reduces to three. The TREMOVE data give the 
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speed in the peak and off peak period for each road type, the personal car equivalents in different 
periods, and the duration of periods. Using the Bureau of Public Roads formula (e.g. Small, 1992) 
which only depends on two parameters the freeflow speed is derived. Given these three points the 
unknown parameters can be derived. Table 21 gives the input data to the calibration procedure and 
Figure 11 shows the relation between the traffic flow and time necessary to drive one kilometer using 
cars. 
 
Table 21: Data for calibration of the congestion function 
 Urban road Non-urban road 
Peak period speed [km/h] 68 40 
Off-peak period speed [km/h] 84 47 
Freeflow speed [km/h] 99 50 
Peak traffic flow [billion PCE/h] 0.083 0.026 
Off-peak traffic flow [billion PCE/h] 0.066 0.018 
Source: TREMOVE and own calculations. 
 
Figure 11: Calibrated congestion functions for automobiles 
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The model includes a detailed representation of private transport. However, freight transport is 
modeled in a typical top-down manner. Consequently, the model is not able to predict the change of 
traffic flows resulting from freight transport. Therefore, the contribution of trucks to congestion is held 
constant at the benchmark level.  
 
5.2.6.4 Electricity generation 
Extraction of different generation technologies from the electricity account is a two-step procedure: 
First, data from bottom up engineering studies are used to derive the cost shares of different generation 
technologies. Second, material and factor demands of technologies are fitted into the SAM format by 
minimizing the distortion of the derived cost shares. 
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Table 22 lists the technological characterization of the generation technologies and their physical 
output levels in the benchmark equilibrium. According to David and Herzog (2000) the CO2 capture 
rate of CCS technologies is set to 90 %. 
Annualized capital costs are derived using the continuous annuity method on the product of plants’ 
size and investment costs under assumed interest rate of 7.5 %. Operation and maintenance costs are 
regarded as annual labor cost. Using the plants’ availability and size, heat efficiencies, and fuel prices, 
the annual fuel cost are obtained.  
The method of integrating the generation technologies into the SAM framework is described in detail 
in Wing (2008). The top-down framework requires that the material and factor inputs of all generation 
technologies and the overhead activity sum to the total demands given by the SAM. Moreover, output 
also has to equal the output of the electricity sector in the SAM. The sum of squared deviations of 
predicted cost share and cost shares fitting into the top-down data is minimized. A further restriction is 
added to minimize the deviation of the heat efficiency from its predicted value.53 The predicted and 
used values consistent with the SAM are given in Table 23. 
Table 23 also states the respective load segment for technologies. Conventional technologies active in 
the benchmark equilibrium in the mid load segment, the CCGT and hard coal plant, are allowed to 
produce in the base load segment, too. This allows substitution of lignite base load production by more 
environmentally friendly but also more expensive mid load technologies. For inactive technologies, 
the concept of cost markup over the benchmark price in the load segments is used (e.g. Böhringer, 
1998; McFareland et al. 2004). The markup of technologies already active in the mid load but not in 
the base load segment is equal to the average spread between the respective prices in 2004 (European 
Energy Exchange, 2004). McFareland et al. 2004 estimate the markup of CCS technologies. The 
values for offshore wind and photovoltaic are derived using the generation prices as implied by the 
bottom-up data.  
The technological potential given in Table 23 was estimated by BMU (2007) for wind and 
photovoltaic technologies. For hydro power and other technologies no additional potential is given. 
Consequently, the limit is set to the benchmark production. Since new installation of nuclear power 
plants is prohibited in Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002), generation of nuclear power is also 
capped at the benchmark level.  
                                                     
53
 See Appendix D for the employed GAMS code. 
  
Table 22: Data on electricity generation technologies 
 
Size 
[MW] 
Investment 
[106 €/MW] 
Variable operation and 
maintenance costs 
[€/MWh; 
% of investment for renewables] 
Fixed operation and 
maintenance costs 
[€/MW; 
103 €/year for 
renewables] 
Heat efficiency 
[%] 
Fuel priced 
[€/MWh] 
Availability 
[hours/year] 
Lifetime 
[years] 
Production 
2004 
[TWh] 
Combined cycle gas turbinea  400 0.6 1.9  55 15 7500 30 30.7 
Hard coal power planta 400 1.1 4.9  48 6 7500 30 140.8 
Hydro power plantc 2.5 1.5 5% 50   5400 60 26.9 
Lignite power planta 1050 1.1 5.2  44.5 3.5 7500 35 158 
Lignite CCSa 450 1.4 4  44.5 3.5 7500 35 0 
Natural gas CCSa 425 1 2  55 15 7500 35 0 
Nuclear power planta 1450 1.8 5.8  36 2.2 7500 60 167.1 
Open cycle gas turbineb 160 0.4 4 9.98 45 15 7500 30 30.7 
Open cycle oil turbineb 160 0.4 4 9.98 45 17.7 7500 30 10.3 
Other technologiesb 100 1.7 2.89 44.88   7500 30 25.3 
Photovoltaicc 2 3.7 1.05% 50   1000 20 0 
Wind onshorec 2.5 0.9 6.12% 50   1900 20 15.5 
Wind offshorec 3.6 2.1 10% 50   3500 20 0 
Sources: (a) EUSUTEL project (2006); (b) Wing (2008); (c) Reichmuth et al. (2007); (d) BP (2007) for natural gas; Wissel et al. (2008) for hard coal, lignite, and nuclear fuel; IEA (2008) for oil  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 23: Generation technologies in the benchmark equilibrium 
 
Load Markup 
[%] 
Capital share Labor share Fuel share Technical 
potential 
[TWh] 
 
  predicted 
[%] 
used 
[%] 
deviation 
[%] 
predicted 
[%] 
used 
[%] 
deviation 
[%] 
predicted 
[%] 
used 
[%] 
deviation 
[%] 
deviation 
[%] 
Combined cycle gas turbine mid  19.41 19,72 1.61 5.22 5.25 0.43 74.37 75.03 -0.45 ∞ 
Combined cycle gas turbine base 19  19,72   5.25   75.03  ∞ 
Hard coal power plant mid  38.84 35.66 -8.19 13.90 13.49 -2.93 47.27 50.86 7.59 ∞ 
Hard coal power plant base 19  35.66   13.49   50.86  ∞ 
Hydro power plant base  53.89 53.89 0 46.11 46.11 0 
 
  26.9 
Lignite power plant base  50.29 49.92 -2.74 19.78 19.57 -1.08 29.92 31.51 5.31 ∞ 
Lignite CCS base 25  27.12   4.86  
 
68.02  ∞ 
Natural gas CCS mid 15  57.70   14.42  
 
28.08  ∞ 
Nuclear power plant base  59.37 60.62 2.12 19.79 19.93 0.71 20.85 19.45 -6.70 167.1 
Open cycle gas turbine peak  11.47 11.60 1.16 9.49 9.58 0.96 79.04 78.82 -0.28 ∞ 
Open cycle oil turbine peak  10.02 10.11 0.85 8.29 8,35 0.70 81.68 81.54 -0.17 ∞ 
Other technologies base  87.81 87.81 0 12.19 12.19 0 
 
  25.3 
Photovoltaic mid 150  77.88   22.12  
 
  105 
Wind onshore mid  33.81 33.81 0 66.19 66.19 0 
 
  68 
Wind offshore mid 10  63.72   73.72  
 
  235 
Sources: own calculations 
 
 5.2.7 Model critics and extension  
The presented framework overcomes the bottom-up/top-down discussion of technological details 
including different electricity generation technologies. Furthermore, private transport is included in 
detail and congestion is modeled. Although not done in this thesis, representing different road types 
and congestion also allows analyzing the effect of infrastructure policies determining the effect of 
infrastructure provision on the congestion function and road pricing policies. 
Freight transport is addressed in an aggregated way considering intermediate inputs of transport 
commodities and energy inputs differentiated by fuel type. Consequently, it is not possible to keep 
track of the vehicle kilometers traveled by freight transport. Therefore, the contribution of freight 
transport to the traffic flow in the congestion function is held constant at the benchmark level. Thus, a 
fruitful extension of the model is the detailed representation of industrial transport. This requires 
estimation of the transport capital by sector and of trips by travel period, distance and mode. The 
TREMOVE demand module offers aggregated data on a vehicle and tone kilometer basis 
distinguished by trip categories. Transport capital in form of the vehicle stock are given in KBA (2005 
a,b). DIW (2006) includes data on transit transport in Germany. Given these data, there are two main 
tasks to solve: First, the aggregated TREMOVE data on traffic use need to be disaggregated to a 
sectoral basis, i.e. answering the question which sector uses how much of the transport volume. 
Second, given the transport volume of single sectors it needs to be determined how much of the 
sector’s transport is own provided and how much is purchased. Obviously, the main effort is in the 
first task which is a matter of data. The second task might by solved by estimating own provided 
transport using the data on transport capital and fuel expenditure. 
The model treats labor supply as constant. This is done in order to concentrate on the interaction 
between emission abatement in electricity generation and road transport and to facilitate the 
interpretation by ruling out labor supply effects. Labor supply effects can be easily included specifying 
labor as part of the time constraint. Including labor in the time constraint has an additional effect on 
the private transport decisions since the value of time, which is endogenous in the model, is further 
linked to the wage rate. Consequently, the decision on the travel mode is further influenced by the 
model’s reactions on the labor market. Such an analysis has been carried out for example in the 
empirical analysis of Berg (2007). 
The modeling of households using a representative agent is costly in two directions: First, the model 
does not allow for analyzing important equity aspects. Second, the location of living of households 
which affects the substitution possibilities across transport modes and roads are not represented. A 
more detailed representation of households requires splitting expenditure and income data as done for 
Germany by Kalinowska et al. (2007) and Kremers and Kalinowska (2009). 
New technologies for automobiles should be included in future versions of the model allowing for a 
detailed analysis of fuel efficiency related policies. Modeling new technologies in the car market is 
more complicated than in electricity generation since cars are not perfect substitutes like generation 
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technologies. Beside the important preferences of consumers, adoption of technologies also depends 
on the availability of fueling networks (Achtnicht et al., 2008). 
Athough the model accounts for the congestion externality, other externalities such as local pollution, 
accidents, and noise are ignored. Therefore, a future extension of the model should include these 
externalities, too, as done e.g. in Meyeres and Proost (1997) and Mayers (1999). 
 
5.3 Simulations and results 
5.3.1 Scenario description 
In all scenarios the German economy reduces 20 % of its CO2 emissions in the benchmark which 
amounts to 179.2 million tones. In the ETS scenario, the reduction requirement is achieved using 
emission trading between the electricity sector, energy intensive industries, and refineries which are 
referred to as ETS sectors. However, only emissions caused by coal, natural gas, or refined oil 
combustion are included into the system. Emissions caused by using transport fuels are not covered. 
Permits are owned by the government which sells them to the emission trading sectors. Consequently, 
the introduction of carbon regulation increases the government’s revenues. The ETS AIR scenario 
additionally includes the aviation sector. The ETS FUEL and FUEL TAX scenarios include reduction 
efforts of road transportation. In ETS FUEL, all sectors and the representative agent have to hold 
emission allowances for emissions caused by gasoline or diesel use. These allowances are tradable 
with the ETS sectors. The FUEL TAX scenario implements a separated strategy for road transport 
emissions. It requires road transport to reduce emissions by 5 %. Firms and the representative 
household are allowed to trade allowances for transport fuels. However, they are not allowed to trade 
permits with the ETS sectors which fulfill the remaining reduction requirement complying with the 
overall 20 % reduction target. This closed emission trading system for road transport fuels is 
equivalent to an increase of the existing fuel tax distinguishing carbon contents of transport fuels. In 
all of these scenarios the revenues are recycled lump-sum to the representative agent holding the 
provision of public goods constant. The ETS SUB scenario is the only exemption to this rule. In this 
scenario, the income generated by the ETS system is used to uniformly increase the subsidies for bus, 
metro and tram, and private train transport. Table 24 gives an overview over the scenario settings. 
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Table 24: Scenarios of the small open economy model 
 Carbon regulation 
ETS 
Electricity sector, energy intensive production, and refineries reduce 20% of 
the total emissions using emission trading  
Revenues recycled lump-sum 
ETS AIR Aviation sector is additionally included in the ETS system Revenues recycled lump-sum 
ETS FUEL Emissions caused by road fuel use are included in the ETS system Revenues recycled lump-sum 
FUEL TAX 
Road transport has to reduce 5% of its emissions 
Remaining reduction requirement is fulfilled by ETS sectors using emission 
trading 
Revenues recycled lump-sum 
ETS SUB Like the ETS scenario Revenues recycled uniformly increasing public transport subsidies 
  
The Hicksian equivalent variation is adopted as measure of the overall welfare change. Additionally, 
the change in the direct transfer to the household and the total abatement cost are listed. Carbon prices 
reflect the marginal abatement cost of regulation. As an indicator of distortionary extra costs not 
reflected in the marginal abatement cost the average cost of carbon mitigation are derived as the loss 
in consumption of representative agent by the total amount of CO2 abated (Paltsev et al., 2005b). In a 
partial equilibrium setting, the ratio of average to marginal abatement cost is slightly below one half 
depending on the curvature of the abatement cost function.54 If the general equilibrium framework 
leads to excess welfare costs (gains) the ratio will be above (substantially below) one half.  
      
5.3.2 Introducing emission trading 
The ETS scenario introduces emission trading for electricity production, energy intensive industries 
and refineries. Other sectors are exempted from carbon regulation. With 487 Mt CO2 the sectors under 
the trading system account for 54 % of the benchmark emissions and have to reduce 179.2 Mt CO2. 
Consequently, the effective reduction rate for these sectors is around 36 %. The welfare change is 
given as Hicksian equivalent variation and measures the gross cost of carbon regulation: i.e. the gain 
of environmental regulation in form of improved air quality and reduced impacts of global warming 
are not included. Furthermore, the changes in direct transfer from the government to the household, 
total abatement costs, and CO2 prices, which are interpreted as the marginal abatement cost, are listed 
in Table 25. 
 
                                                     
54
 To see this, consider a linear abatement cost function. If Q is the amount abated and P the resulting price or marginal 
abatement costs, the total abatement cost  (TAC) measured as the area under the abetment cost function are given as: TAC = 
0.5*Q*P. Dividing both sides by the quantity abated the average abatement costs are exactly equal to half of the abatement 
cost. As long as the abatement cost curve is assumed to be convex, the resulting ratio is below 0.5.  
 84 
With -0.61 ‰ the welfare effect of introducing emission trading is moderate. The total abatement cost 
amount to 1.76 billion € and the marginal abatement cost become 9.86 €/t CO2. The ratio between 
average and marginal carbon cost is around 59 % indicating that cost other than carbon regulation 
occur. The direct transfer to the household increases by around 2 %.  
 
Table 25: Summery results of the small open economy model 
 ETS ETS 
AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Welfare change [‰] -0.61 -0.60 -0.92 -2.30 -0.21 
Transfer change [%] 2.11 2.14 2.88 6.26 0.00 
Abatement cost [billion €] 1.76 1.76 1.75 2.04 1.75 
CO2 price emission trading [€/t CO2] 9.86 9.86 9.79 9.42 9.84 
CO2 price transport fuels [€/t CO2] 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.93 0.00 
Average consumption cost [€/t CO2] 5.86 5.74 8.81 22.38 1.98 
 
As Table 26 shows, the reduction burden is shifted from energy intensive sectors and refineries to the 
electricity sector which reduces 41 % of its emissions. The main mitigation results from a decreasing 
use of coal (Table 28). Note that the emission trading sectors avoid only 178.9 Mt CO2 of the total 
reduction requirement of 179.2 Mt CO2. This is due to second order effects which lead via price and 
demand changes to contraction and expansion of non emission trading sector resulting in changes of 
their emissions. Since the overall target is to reduce the economy’s emission by 20 %, these changes 
spill over to the emission trading sectors by slightly altering the allowances budget. Due to the reduced 
usage of coal, emissions in the coal sector are the main determinant of this secondary effect.  
 
  Table 26: CO2 reduction of selected sectors 
 
 ETS ETS AIR ETS FUEL FUEL TAX ETS SUB 
[mio t CO2] 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 Aviation [%] 0.05 0.68 -0.44 -2.53 0.34 
[mio t CO2] 147.52 147.51 145.85 136.61 146.59 Electricity [%] 40.64 40.64 40.18 37.63 40.38 
[mio t CO2] 30.99 30.98 30.91 30.47 30.99 Energy 
intensives [%] 29.23 29.23 29.16 28.75 29.24 
[mio t CO2] 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.63 0.42 Refineries [%] 1.99 2.04 2.31 3.50 2.33 
[mio t CO2] 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.31 1.22 Private 
cars [%] 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.34 1.33 
[mio t CO2] -0.18 -0.19 1.29 6.76 -0.16 Services [%] -0.18 -0.19 1.29 6.76 -0.16 
[mio t CO2] 179.20 179.20 179.20 179.20 179.20 Total [%] 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Table 27 shows the impacts on electricity generation. Total generation is decreasing by 12.5 %. 
Consequently, production in all segments is reduced. In the base load, nuclear and hydro power and 
the generation of other technologies stay constant since they are upper bounded at the benchmark 
production level and do not cause emissions. The generation of dirty lignite plants decreases by almost 
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63 % to 99 TWh. The penetration of lignite CCS plants, which are the only available technology 
reducing emissions in the base load segment beside the use of CCGT and hard coal power plants, 
partly balances the decrease in base load generation producing 40 TWh.  
In the mid load segment, emissions are mitigated by decreasing the use of hard coal by 54 %. 
Furthermore, the output of the CCGT technology declines by 40 %. The increase in wind power partly 
adjusts the offset of mid load generation. Offshore wind energy intensely enters the market with 
around 31 TWh. In contrast, onshore wind generation only slightly expands by around 5 %. As shown 
below in the sensitivity analysis, the expansion of onshore generation heavily depends on the degree of 
capital malleability, i.e. on the transformation elasticity of the capital transformation for technology 
specific capital. 
For peak load generation only OCGT and OCOT plants are available. While the generation of natural 
gas fired plants (OCGT) stays constant, oil based production (OCOT) is decreasing. This result can be 
explained by the higher carbon content of refined oil compared to natural gas which leads to higher 
CO2 intensity of oil-fired power plants. Consequently, oil based generation is decreases in importance. 
In order to satisfy peak load electricity demand, generation of natural gas power plants does not 
decline. 
 
Table 27: Electricity generation [TWh] 
 Bench-
mark 
ETS ETS AIR ETS FUEL FUEL TAX ETS SUB 
Base load       
Hydro 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 
Lignite 158.0 99.0 99.0 99.9 104.8 99.4 
Lignite CCS   40.1 40.1 39.2 34.3 40.3 
Nuclear  167.1 167.1 167.1 167.1 167.1 167.1 
Other technologies 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 
Total 377.3 358.4 358.4 358.4 358.5 359.0 
Mid load       
CCGT 30.7 18.6 18.6 18.8 19.6 18.7 
Hard coal 140.8 64.4 64.4 65.1 68.8 64.8 
Wind onshore 25.5 26.7 26.7 26.7 27.1 26.7 
Wind offshore   30.6 30.6 30.2 28.1 30.6 
Total 197.0 140.3 140.3 140.8 143.7 140.7 
Peak load       
OCGT 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.8 
OCOT 10.3 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 
Total 41.0 39.4 39.4 39.4 39.4 39.4 
Total generation 615.3 538.1 538.1 538.6 541.6 539.2 
  
 
Table 28: Price and quantity effects [% vs. benchmark] 
 Quantity effects Price effects 
 
ETS ETS AIR ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS SUB ETS ETS AIR ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS SUB 
Agriculture -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 -0.27 -0.16 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.39 0.13 
Air transport -0.05 -0.29 0.44 2.53 -0.37 -0.01 0.19 -0.02 -0.05 0.10 
Coal -33.11 -33.11 -32.90 -31.66 -32.90 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.52 
Crude oil -0.85 -0.90 -1.18 -2.40 -1.19 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.26 
Diesel -0.13 -0.11 -1.24 -5.40 -0.18 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.65 
Energy intensives  -1.31 -1.31 -1.33 -1.39 -1.45 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.12 
Electricity -3.05 -3.04 -3.05 -3.07 -2.87 7.58 7.58 7.55 7.42 7.69 
Natural gas -4.68 -4.68 -4.66 -4.48 -4.71 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.22 
Nuclear fuel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.26 
Gasoline -0.12 -0.12 -0.28 -0.97 -1.19 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.65 
Manufacture -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 -0.26 -0.33 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.19 
Mining -1.76 -1.76 -1.78 -1.84 -1.79 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.38 
Motor vehicles 0.26 0.27 0.20 -0.06 -1.56 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 
Other transport  -0.13 -0.11 0.42 2.76 0.88 -0.05 -0.05 0.15 1.06 0.08 
Refined oils -0.27 -0.32 -0.60 -1.85 -0.63 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.65 
Rail transport -0.61 -0.61 -0.50 0.02 21.81 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.39 
Services -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 
Water transport 1.21 1.24 1.78 4.28 1.37 -1.00 -1.01 -1.04 -1.23 -1.06 
Both effects are measured in terms of the Armington composite, i.e. reflect the change of the total quantity used and the market price. Effect on production, intermediate and final demands, and trade are given in Appendix C  
 
  87   
Table 29 lists the effects on private transport are listed in. Total private transport is slightly decreasing. 
The decrease can fully be explained by the declining use of trains. With 4.8 % of electricity in the total 
cost, the rail sector is one of the most electricity intensive sectors. Consequently, it is indirectly 
affected by the carbon policy by the change of the electricity price which increases by 7.6 % (Table 
28). Accordingly, the price of rail transport rises and therefore, leads to a decrease in private 
transportation and the substitution of private by air transport, busses, and metro and trams. 
 
Table 29: Private transport 
 
 Bench-
mark 
ETS ETS AIR ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS SUB 
billion pkm 91.656 91.727 91.731 91.589 91.007 96.017 Bus %  0.08 0.08 -0.07 -0.71 4.76 
billion pkm 923.849 923.839 923.868 923.276 920.737 914.654 Car %  0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.34 -1.00 
billion pkm 12.101 12.115 12.115 12.080 11.931 12.933 Metro
/tram %  0.11 0.12 -0.18 -1.41 6.87 
billion pkm 43.922 43.926 43.787 43.964 44.135 43.679 Plane %  0.01 -0.31 0.10 0.49 -0.55 
billion pkm 55.328 55.348 55.346 55.426 55.777 55.175 Slow %  0.04 0.03 0.18 0.81 -0.28 
billion pkm 67.328 66.968 66.974 67.087 67.620 89.466 Train %  -0.53 -0.53 -0.36 0.43 32.88 
billion pkm 1194.184 1193.923 1193.822 1193.421 1191.207 1211.924 Total %  -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.25 1.49 
Detailed results distinguishing between trips purposes, distances, and travel period are given in Appendix C. 
 
Since the refineries are part of the emission trading system, the price of transport fuels increases by 0.5 
%. The total use of cars only slightly reacts. Table 30 reveals that the change in transport fuel 
consumption is mainly balanced by a change in the automobile fleet. Since the tax on gasoline fuels is 
higher than the tax diesel, the representative household decreases purchases on gasoline cars and 
partly replaces them by diesel cars. 
 
Table 30: Change in new car purchases [% vs. benchmark] 
 ETS ETS AIR ETS FUEL FUEL TAX ETS SUB 
Diesel 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.69 -1.90 
Gasoline -0.02 -0.01 -0.35 -1.84 -4.36 
 
5.3.3 Including aviation into emission trading 
The ETS AIR scenario additionally includes the aviation sector into the emission trading system. 
Emissions covered by the trading system slightly rise by 4 Mt CO2. Accordingly, there is no effect on 
the total or marginal abatement costs compared to the ETS scenario. However, the average costs of 
carbon mitigation are slightly decreasing and the ratio of marginal to average carbon cost drops to 58 
%. The direct transfer to the representative agent is increasing due to an increase in emission 
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allowances. The additional inclusion of aviation leads to a small reduction in the gross cost of carbon 
regulation. The mitigation effort of the electricity sector is the same as in the ETS scenario. 
Consequently, electricity generation also shows the same results. 
Due to the increased cost, the price of aviation rises. Therefore, private transport reacts with a 
decreasing number of plane trips. This decline is only partly balanced by switching to private road 
transport, busses, and trains. As a result the total person kilometer decrease by 360 million person 
kilometers compared to the benchmark. 
The change in new car purchases shows the same qualitative pattern as in the ETS case: since fuel 
prices rise and diesel is lower taxed, the composition changes in favor of diesel automobiles. Since 
own private road transport slightly expands, new car purchases are generally higher than in the ETS 
case. 
 
5.3.4 Fuel based regulation approaches 
The scenarios ETS FUEL and FUEL TAX examine fuel-based strategies mitigating carbon emissions 
of road transport. Road transport has to reduce 5 % of its emissions or 8 Mt CO2. The remaining 
mitigation is achieved by emission trading between electricity, energy intensive industries and refined 
oil production (171.2 Mt CO2).  
The FUEL TAX scenario establishes a price on the CO2 emissions of road transport fuel use. All 
sectors have to pay the price except the water and rail transport sectors in which diesel fuel relates to 
water and rail transport. This is interpreted as an increase in the fuel tax differentiating by the carbon 
content of fuels. The ETS FUEL scenario also establishes a price of road transport emissions. 
However, emissions of road transport are included into the emission trading scheme. Consequently, 
the marginal abatement costs equalize across sectors and a uniform carbon price for road transport and 
emissions from further fossil fuel use in the trading sectors emerges. 
 
Comparing the FUEL TAX scenario with the ETS scenario, a significant welfare decrease is observed. 
Since part of the reduction burden is shifted to road transport, the mitigation effort in the emission 
trading sector is lower. Consequently, the permit price under the trading system is decreasing by 0.44 
to 9.42 €/t CO2. For transport fuels, the carbon price is at a high level of 53.93 €/t CO2 indicating the 
high marginal abatement cost of road transport. Due to the coexistence of the emission trading 
systems, the total abatement costs are increasing being the main determinant of the welfare loss. The 
hybrid regulation approach which leads to different marginal abatement cost is the main determinant 
of the significant increase of the average cost of carbon regulation. A large increase in the direct 
transfer to the representative agent is observed, since the high carbon price of transport results in an 
increase of the government’s income of carbon regulation. 
Electricity generation responds to the decrease in the carbon price by increasing production. The 
generation mix also changes. Since the price of carbon is declining, coal fired generation is increasing 
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compared to the ETS scenario. Accordingly, production of cleaner CCS plants and offshore wind 
power reduces. To put it clear: Regulating road transport separately, decreases the reduction burden of 
the emission trading sectors resulting in a lower carbon price which indirectly subsidizes the use of 
coal plants.  
Concerning road transport, industrial sectors carry out the main reduction burden. The service sector, 
which is the main industrial polluter of road transport emissions, reduces its emissions by 6.8 %.  
Emissions are mitigated switching from own provided transport to purchased transport.  
In contrast, the representative agent only slightly reduces his emissions by 0.3 %. Emissions are 
decreased in two ways. First, the composition of the new car fleet significantly changes using more 
carbon efficient diesel cars allowing driving the same distance with lower emissions. Second, total 
trips are reduced and a mode shift towards private trains, airplanes, and the slow mode is observed. 
The unexpected result of decreasing use of public transport in form of busses and metro and trams is 
explained by the model’s structure: the monetary costs of both modes are specified in terms of input of 
the other transport sector. Emissions resulting from diesel and gasoline use in this sector are also 
addressed by the emission trading system. Accordingly, the cost of this sector increase. Furthermore, 
increased demand from industrial sectors exerts an upward price pressure. Consequently, the price of 
the other transport sector is rising by 1 % leading to substitution effects away from busses and metro 
and tram use. 
 
Comparing the ETS FUEL scenario, which includes road transport into the emission trading system, 
with the ETS, an additional welfare loss is observed and total abatement costs are slightly decreasing. 
The carbon price slightly declines, since all sectors are affected by the carbon price on transport fuels 
leading to decreasing outputs. In consequence, the use of fossil fuels other than gasoline and diesel are 
also decreasing yielding a decline in these emissions. This second order effect lowers the reduction 
requirement under the emission trading system since the environmental target is always defined as a 
20 % reduction of the economy’s emissions. However, the average cost of carbon mitigation increase. 
The ratio of average to marginal abatement costs raise to 0.9 indicating an increase in the cost of 
carbon regulation. Due to the high tax on transport fuels, it is favorable to exempt the road transport 
sector from fuel based carbon regulation. Cost efficiency of carbon regulation requires an equal carbon 
price for all sectors and commodities, i.e. the effective carbon price should be equalized. However, the 
high tax on transport fuels is already environmentally motivated; i.e. a price on carbon in the transport 
sector exists. Consequently, putting an additional carbon price on top of the pre-existing fuel tax 
effectively induces higher carbon prices in the transport sector, and thus leads to cost inefficiency. In 
essence, the induced cost inefficiency outweighs the gain of increased flexibility of transport under 
emission trading. 
Since it might come as a surprise that the flexibility gain is more than offset by the distortionary effect, 
a numerical example shall illustrate the argument. In 2004, the mineral oil tax per liter of gasoline was 
0.65 € (BMF, 2009). Combustion of this liter gasoline causes 2.3 kg CO2. Accordingly, the 
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consumption of around 435 liter of gasoline results in one ton of CO2. Therefore, the implicit pre-
existing carbon tax on transport fuels is 283.61 €/t CO2. Exempting road transport from carbon 
regulation leads a carbon price of around 10 €/t CO2 and, therefore, the difference in effective carbon 
taxes is reduced. In contrast, in the FUEL TAX scenario the carbon price in the transport sector 
increases by around 54 €/t CO2 while emission trading sectors pay a price 9.50  €/t CO2. Thus, the gap 
in effective carbon taxes is even increased. 
While the example is illustrative, it neglects taxes on transport fuels that do not solely relate to carbon 
emissions. Other externalities such as local pollution and associated health damages, congestion, 
noise, and accidents are also addressed. However, congestion as the main externality of road transport 
is included in the model. Regardless, the exemption of transport shows a positive effect.  
Due to the higher marginal abatement cost in road transport, reduction mainly takes place in the 
emission trading sectors especially in electricity generation. Consequently, the generation mix is only 
slightly affected by an increase of hard coal fired generation in the mid load segment. 
Concerning private transport, the ETS FUEL scenarios mirrors the results of the FUEL TAX scenario 
in an attenuated form. The composition of the new car purchases is influenced towards more fuel 
efficient diesel cars and total trips are slightly reduced. Own private road transport, bus, and metro and 
tram trips incline and are partly substituted by the use of private trains, the slow mode, and airplanes. 
 
5.3.5 Increasing subsidies on public transport 
Like the ETS scenario, the ETS SUB introduces emission trading between electricity generation, 
energy intensive industries, and refined oil production. However, in contrast to the ETS scenario the 
revenues of carbon regulation are not to recycled lump-sum but used to uniformly increase subsidies 
on public transport, i.e. busses, private trains trips, and metro and trams. 
Revenue recycling using increased public transport subsidies shows a clear positive welfare effect 
compared to emission trading under lump-sum recycling. Total and marginal abatement costs slightly 
reduce. Remarkably, the average costs of carbon regulation strongly decline resulting in a ratio of 
marginal to average abatement costs of 0.2. The subsidy on private trains becomes 52 % and busses 
and metro and tram trips are subsidized at a rate of 21 %.   
Increased public transport subsidies yield substitution away from private road transport towards the 
subsidized modes bus, metro and tram, and trains. Accordingly, emissions of private cars are 
decreasing by 1.3 %. This decrease is even larger than in scenarios where road transport emissions are 
addressed by fuel based regulation approaches. The fuel based approaches implement economy wide 
regulation, i.e. also include transport emissions of industrial sectors. In consequence, the abatement 
burden is shifted to industries showing only small effects on private transport. In contrast, public 
transport subsidies solely affect the households’ decision of private transport modes and offer 
incentives substituting away from cars.  
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The increased reduction effort of private road transport spills over to the emission trading system since 
the overall reduction of 179.2 Mt CO2 is fixed. While energy intensive production and refineries 
increase emissions, the electricity sector further reduces its emissions. Despite reduced emissions, 
electricity generation is expanding compared to the ETS by expanding the use of the CCS technology 
in the base load. 
Private transport subsidies induce a switch to public transport modes simultaneously increasing the 
total number of kilometers traveled. Trips using cars are decreasing by 1 %, while trips on busses, 
metros and trams, and trains increase by 4.8, 6.9, and 32.9 %, respectively. The excessive use of trains 
is explained by the assumption that revenues are recycled uniformly increasing subsidies. Since the 
subsidy on trains are already higher in the benchmark, a uniform multiplier on subsidies results in 
larger absolute effects on the subsidies for private train trips. 
The clear cut positive welfare effect is explained by the reduction of the congestion externality. Table 
31 shows the impact of the scenarios on speed on different road types differentiated by travel periods. 
While all other scenarios show negligible impacts on speed, the ETS PUB scenario results in a 2 % 
(1.5 %) increase of travel speed on urban (non-urban) roads in the peak period.    
 
Table 31: Impacts on road speed [% vs. benchmark] 
 
 ETS ETS AIR ETS FUEL FUEL TAX ETS SUB 
peak 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.52 Urban 
off-peak -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.19 1.99 
peak 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.16 Non-Urban 
off-peak -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.20 1.46 
 
5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
5.4.1 Malleability of technology specific capital 
The malleability of generation capacities is controlled by the transformation elasticity of the activity 
which converts malleable capital into technology specific capital (εKE). The sensitivity of the results to 
a change of the transformation elasticity is examined by halving and doubling the benchmark value of 
unity. A lower value of the elasticity implies a higher degree of irreversibility in electricity generation. 
Table 32 shows the impact of varying the transformation elasticity on the gross cost of regulation and 
total and marginal abatement cost for the ETS and ETS FUEL scenarios. A lower value of the 
elasticity implies a higher degree of irreversibility in electricity generation, i.e. the reallocation of 
technology specific capital is limited. Accordingly, welfare losses and abatement costs are decreasing 
in the value of the elasticity since the ability of responding to price changes is increased. Although the 
magnitude of the results is affected, the qualitative effect of including transport fuel into the emission 
trading scheme remains. Still the inclusion shows a negative welfare impact.  
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Table 32: Sensitivity to capacity malleability 
 εKE = 0.5 εKE = 1 εKE = 2 
 ETS ETS FUEL ETS ETS FUEL ETS ETS FUEL 
Welfare change [‰ HEV] -0.83 -1.23 -0.64 -0.92 -0.44 -0.69 
Abatement cost [billion €] 2.27 2.25 1.76 1.75 1.46 1.46 
CO2 price emission trading 
[€/t CO2] 
12.68 12.55 9.86 9.79 8.17 8.14 
  
5.4.2 Private transport 
Following Harrison et al. (1992), the sensitivity of the result to a change of the elasticities in the utility 
function and private transport module is examined using unconditional, systematic sensitivity analysis. 
The values given in Table 14 are taken as expected values of the substitution elasticities which are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed in the interval from half to double the expected value. The model 
is repeatedly run 5000 times drawing elasticities from their respective distribution and solving the 
scenarios. Table 33 lists characteristics of the resulting distribution of the welfare results. 
 
Table 33: Sensitivity to substitution elasticities in household transport [‰ HEV] 
 ETS ETS AIR ETS FUEL FUEL TAX ETS SUB 
Mean  -0.61 -0.60 -0.92 -2.30 -0.19 
Standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.53 
Minimum -0.65 -0.63 -0.98 -2.65 -1.68 
Maximum  -0.59 -0.57 -0.86 -1.95 1.15 
  
The mean of the welfare changes are close to the central model estimates. Policies which address 
household transport by separate instruments (FUEL TAX, ETS SUB) show a higher variability since 
the elasticities are more important than in economy wide regulation approaches. The FUEL TAX 
scenario always incurs the highest gross costs of carbon regulation. The ranking of welfare costs is 
independent of the parameter choice for all scenarios except the ETS SUB one. Beside ETS SUB, the 
ETS AIR scenario always has the lowest cost followed by ETS and ETS FUEL. The ETS SUB 
scenario shows a high standard deviation and range of results. However, in around 77 % of the 
simulation runs the conclusion of the central model estimate is valid: the recycling of revenues from 
carbon regulation increasing subsidies on public transport shows the lowest gross cost of carbon 
regulation.55  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a small open economy model of Germany based on the year 2004. The model 
includes technological details of electricity generation incorporating different generation technologies 
                                                     
55
 In 90 % of the runs, increasing subsidies show lower cost than the inclusion of public transport in the emission trading 
scheme. 
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differentiated by load segment. Furthermore, private transport decisions are taken into account by a 
detailed description of trips distinguished by purpose, distance, and travel period and the main 
important transport modes. Moreover, the model integrates congestion as the main externality of road 
transport affecting the time needed to drive one kilometer and consequently the utility of the 
representative agent. 
The results show that exempting transport from carbon regulation is beneficial shifting the reduction 
burden to electricity generation and energy intensive production. Optimal taxation of carbon requires a 
carbon price which is equal for all sectors. The pre-existing tax on transport fuels already implies a 
price on carbon in road transport. Consequently, exempting road transport lowers the difference in 
carbon prices. Due to the magnitude of the pre-existing tax, the beneficial effect of lowering the 
difference in carbon prices outweighs the loss of decreasing flexibility of carbon mitigation. However, 
even if the model accounts for congestion as the main externality of road transport, other external 
effects such as accidents and noise are not accounted for. Therfore, the model still overestimates the 
beneficial effect of excluding transport from carbon regulation. Nevertheless, the systematic bias is 
smaller than in the previous chapter due to the inclusion of congestion. 
The introduction of an emission trading system including refineries induces a shift to more fuel 
efficient diesel cars. Although diesel has a higher carbon content than gasoline, diesel cars are more 
carbon efficient since the effect of the higher fuel efficiency exceeds the one of higher carbon content. 
Accordingly, refineries under emission trading imply a switch to more carbon efficient diesel cars. 
Since the input costs of refineries are increasing, the price of transport fuels also rises implying 
incentives switching to diesel cars. The lower tax on diesel fuels amplifies this effect. 
Using the revenues obtained by the introduction of emission trading increasing subsidies on public 
transport clearly leads to positive effects. Increased public subsidies result in a mode switch from 
private cars towards public transport. On the one hand, carbon emissions of private transport are 
decreasing even more than in fuel based regulation approaches where reduction mainly occurs in 
industrial road transport. On the other, decreasing car use also reduces the congestion externality 
raising speed mainly in the peak travel period. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and conclusion 
This thesis posed the question whether including road transport into the EU ETS will lower the cost of 
carbon regulation. Two different CGE models are employed: an international and a small-open 
economy model. 
The multi-region model shows that a European-wide increase of transport fuel taxes is not a promising 
option regulating the carbon emissions of transport. Including road transport into the EU ETS indeed 
can lower the gross cost of carbon regulation. However, the most preferable approach is exempting 
transport from regulation.  
The results are confirmed by the small-open economy model which offers a far more detailed 
representation of electricity generation and private transport but abstracts from term-of-trade changes. 
Including transport in emission trading lowers the cost compared to an increase in fuel taxes but the 
exemption is the most favorable approach. 
Thus, the answer to the main question depends on the basic approach of policy makers. If governments 
decide to use pricing strategies for transport fuels, then the inclusion into emission trading is the best 
approach. However, generally, no carbon regulation in the road transport sector is the best strategy. 
Due to already high excise taxes, the exemption of transport moves the after-regulation tax scheme 
closer to the optimal one. Put differently, the exemption leads to effective carbon tax rates that are 
closer to uniform across the economy. The small-open economy model shows that the result is stable 
concerning congestion as a justification for high fuel tax rates. However, both models exclude further 
external effects such as accidents and noise and, therefore, the results overestimate the beneficial 
effext of not further increasing transport fuel prices. It is an interesting topic for future research to 
include these effects in a detailed and concise manner. 
The detailed model shows that including aviation in the trading scheme further lowers the cost of 
regulation. Furthermore, the results indicate that subsidies on public transport may play a significant 
role in addressing the carbon emission of private transport. Subsidies have two positive effects. First, 
the costs of carbon regulation decrease by the induced switch to environmentally friendly public 
transport. Second, the congestion externality inclines due to fewer vehicles on roads. Further welfare 
gains not included in the model can be expected since the decrease in the traffic-flow also reduces 
other externalities of transport such as accidents, noise, and local pollution. However, this claim has 
not been tested against other revenue recycling schemes, in particular the cut of labor taxes. Whether 
or not the result will prove stable is subject to future research. 
 
6.2 Future research 
This thesis neglects the spatial and network aspects of the transport problem as well as of electricity 
transmission. The inclusion of the spatial dimension of transport is an important topic for future 
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research since it determines the substitution possibilities available for private cars, e.g. rural 
households have less access to public transport modes and, accordingly, less substitution possibilities. 
Such differences can be captured in modeling different household types with different locations of 
living and utility functions (e.g. Mayeres, 1999; Kalinowska et al., 2007). However, such models are 
not well suited to model households’ modes decisions or mode switches in freight transport. An 
approach of explicitly including transport networks into the general equilibrium model would be 
preferable. Furthermore, such models allow a better assessment of transport infrastructure 
improvement. It has to be decided whether the CGE and network models are designed in an integrated 
formulation or whether they are separately designed and linked in some algorithm.  
Roson (1996) describes the MITER model which iteratively links three different sub-models. Ferris et 
al. (1999) show a Wardop equilibrium problems can be represented in a mixed-complementarity 
problem. Such a representation allows including detailed network representations into the general 
equilibrium framework. A first application of integrating public and freight transport networks into a 
CGE model is given by Ivanova (2003). The discussion about the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions of transport would benefit from such a modeling approach in order to assess interesting 
topics such as improved public transport networks and freight network intermodality. 
Electricity networks play a substantial role in the penetration of renewable electricity generation. 
Leuthold et al. (2009) show the impact of additional wind power on the European transmission grid. 
While the amount of additional grid investments in their study is modest, the integration of solar 
power from the Middle East and northern Africa into the European grid imposes real challenges (DLR, 
2006). In order to assess such scenarios in a general equilibrium framework, it would be useful to 
integrate grid requirements. This can also be done using the MCP framework. 
However, for both, transport and electricity networks, the detailed modeling implies an increase in 
data requirements. For every node in the network, data on production and demand need to be 
collected. Furthermore, an increased number of modeled power plants increases the number of 
installed capacities in the consumers’ endowments. Accordingly, income effects become larger and 
models become computably less tractable. This points into the direction of falling back to 
decomposition methods and building detailed transport and energy system models. Efficient 
decomposition methods for CGE models in MCP models have been demonstrated by Rausch and 
Rutherford (2007) and Rutherford and Tarr (2007) a large number of consumers as well as Böhringer 
and Rutherford (2009) for large scale energy system models. A combination of these approaches 
would allow for the implementation of the spatial dimension into the energy system model and using 
the aggregation approach for households to upscale data from the detailed geographical dimension to a 
representative agent in the CGE model. A similar approach is implementable for transport system 
models. 
96 
Literature 
Aarts, L. and I. van Schagen (2006): Driving speed and the risk of road crashes: A review. Accident 
Analysis and Preventions 38(2): 215-224. 
Achtnicht, M., Georg Bühler, and C. Hermeling (2008): Impact of Service Station Networks on 
Purchase Decisions of Alternative-fuel Vehicles. Centre for European Economic Research 
Discussion Paper 08-088. 
Albrecht, J. (2000): The Diffusion of Cleaner Vehicles in CO2 Emission Trading Designs. 
Transportation Research Part D 5(5): 385-401. 
Albrecht, J. (2001): Tradable CO2 Permits for Cars and Trucks. Journal of Cleaner Production 9(2): 
179-189. 
Archer, D. (2007): Global Warming: Understanding the Forecast. Oxford et al., Blackwell Publishing. 
Armington, P. S. (1969): A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Paper 16(1): 159-176. 
Arrow, K. J. (1950): A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. The Journal of Political Economy 
58(4): 328-346. 
Arrow, K. J., H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow (1961): Capital-Labor Substitution and 
Economic Efficiency. The Review of Economics and Statistics 43(3): 225-250. 
Arrow, K. J. and G. Debreu (1954): Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy. 
Econometrica 22(3): 265-290. 
Arrow, K. J. and F. H. Hahn (1971): General Competitive Analysis. San Francisco, Holden-Day. 
Auerbach, A. J. and J. R. Hines (2002): Taxation and Economic Efficiency. In: Handbook of Public 
Economics, Vol. 3, Chapter 21. Ed. A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Amsterdam, North 
Holland: 1347-1421. 
Babiker, M. H., P. Criqui, A. D. Ellerman, J. M. Reilly and L. L. Viguier (2003). Assessing the Impact 
of Carbon Tax Differentiation in the European Union. Environmental Modeling and 
Assessment 8(3): 187-197. 
Babiker, M., J. Reilly, and L. Viguier (2004): Is International Emissions trading always Beneficial? 
The Energy Journal 25(2): 33-56. 
Babiker, M., A. Gurgel, S. Paltsev, and J. Reilly (2008).: A Forward Looking Version of the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model. MIT Joint Program on the Science 
and Policy of Global Change Report 161. 
Bauer, N., L. Baumstark, M. Haller, M. Leimbach, and M. Lueken (2008): REMIND: The Equations, 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. 
Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates (1988): The Theory of Environmental Policy. 2nd edition. New York et 
al., Cambridge University Press. 
Becker, G. S. (1965): A Theory of the Allocation of Time. The Economic Journal 75(299): 493-517. 
Berg, C. (2007): Household Transport Demand in a CGE Framework. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 37(3): 573-597. 
 97 
Bergman, L. (2005): CGE Modeling of Environmental Policy and Resource Management. Handbook 
of Environmental Economics: 1273-1306. 
Bickel, P. and R. Friedrich (eds.) (2005): ExternE: Externalities of Energy - Methodology 2005 
Update Luxembourg. European Commission. 
Bickel, P., S. Schmid, and R. Friedrich (2005): Environmental Costs. Research in Transportation 
Economics 14: 185-209. 
Böhringer, C. (1995): Allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle als Instrument der energie- und 
umweltpolitischen Analyse. Dissertation. Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang Verlag. 
Böhringer, C. (1998): The Synthesis of Bottom-Up and Top-Down in Energy Policy Modeling. 
Energy Economics 20(3): 233-248. 
Böhringer, C. (2002): Industry Level Emission Trading between Power Producers in the EU. Applied 
Economics 34(4): 523-533. 
Böhringer, C. and K. E. Rosendahl (2009): Strategic Partitioning of Emission Allowances under the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme. Resource and Energy Economics 31(3): 182-197. 
Böhringer, C. and T. F. Rutherford (2002a): In Search of a Rationale for Differentiated Environmental 
Taxes, Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper 02-30. 
Böhringer, C. and T. F. Rutherford (2002b): Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers: A 
Decomposition of General Equilibrium Effects. Environmental and Resource Economics 
22(3): 391–417. 
Böhringer, C. and T. F. Rutherford (2008): Combining Bottom-Up and Top-Down. Energy Economics 
30: 574–596. 
Böhringer, C. and T. F. Rutherford (2009): Integrated Assessment of Energy Policies: Decomposing 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33(9): 1648-1661. 
Böhringer, C. and C. Vogt (2003): Economic and Environmental Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Canadian Journal of Economics 36(2): 475-494. 
Boiteux, M. (1956): Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints a l'equilibre budgetaire. 
Econometrica 24(1): 22-40. 
Bosquet, B. (2000): Environmental Tax Reform: Does it Work? A Survey of the Empirical Evidence. 
Ecological Economics 34(1): 19-32. 
Boveneberg, A. L. (1999): Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: An Updated Reader's Guide. 
International Tax and Public Finance 6(3): 421-443. 
Bovenberg, A. L. and R. A. d. Mooij (1994). Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation. The 
American Economic Review 84(4): 1085-1089. 
Bovenberg, A. L. and F. van der Ploeg (1994): Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labor 
Market in a Second-Best World. Journal of Public Economics 55(3): 349-390. 
Bovenberg, L. A. and L. G. Goulder (1996): Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other 
Distortionary Taxes: General-Equilibrium Analysis. American Economic Review 86(4): 985-
1000. 
 98 
British Petrol (2007): BP Statistical Review of World Energy. http://www.bp.com, retrieved 
21.06.2008. 
Brooke, A., D. Kendrick, and A. Meeraus (2008): GAMS a User’s Guide. Washington, GAMS 
Development Cooperation. 
Browning, E. K. (1976): The Marginal Cost of Public Fund. The Journal of Political Economy 84(2): 
283-298. 
Bruzelius, N. (1979): The value of travel Time: Theory and Measurement. London, Croom Helm. 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) (2009): Entwicklung der Energie- (vormals Mineralöl-) und 
Stromsteuersätze in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU) (2007): Erneuerbare 
Energien in Zahlen – national und international Entwicklungen. 
Burniaux, J.-M. and T. P. Truong (2002): GTAP-E: An Energy-Environmental Version of the GTAP 
Model. GTAP Technical Paper 16. 
Button, K. (1990): Environmental Externalities and Transport Policy. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 6(2): 61-75. 
Capros, P., P. Georgakopoulos, D. Van Regemorter, S. Proost, and C. Schmidt (1997): The GEM-E3 
General Equilibrium of the European Union. Economic and Financial Modeling: 21-160. 
Chiang, A. C. and K. Wainwright (2005): Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics. New 
York, McGraw-Hill. 
Christensen, L. R., D. W. Jorgenson, and L. J. Lau (1973): Transcendental Logarithmic Production 
Frontiers. The Review of Economics and Statistics 55(1): 28-45. 
Christensen, L. R., D. W. Jorgenson, and L. J. Lau (1975): Transcendental Logarithmic Utility 
Functions. The American Economic Review 65(3): 367-383. 
Choumert, F., S. Paltsev, and J. Reilly (2006): Improving the Refining Sector in EPPA. MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Technical Note 9. 
Coase, R. (1960): The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 
Conrad, K. (1994): Applied General Equilibrium Modeling for Environmental Policy Analysis. Annals 
of Operations Research 54(1): 129-142. 
Conrad, K. (1997): Traffic, Transportation, Infrastructure and Externalities: A Theoretical Framework 
for a CGE Analysis. The Annals of Regional Science 31(4): 369-389. 
Conrad, K. and S. Heng (2002): Financing Road Infrastructure by Savings in Congestion Costs: A 
CGE Analysis. The Annals of Regional Science 36(1): 107-122. 
Conrad, K. and M. Schröder (1991): Demand for Durable and Nondurable Goods, Environmental 
Policy and Consumer Welfare. Journal of Applied Econometrics 6(3): 271-286. 
Cottle, R. W., J.-S. Pang, and R. E. Stone (1992): The Linear Complementarity Problem. San Diego, 
Academic Press Inc. 
 99 
Criqui, P., S. Mima, and L. Viguier (1999): Marginal Abatement Costs of CO2 Emission Reductions, 
Geographical Flexibility and Concrete Ceilings: An Assessment using the POLES Model. 
Energy Policy 27(10): 585-601. 
Cropper, M. L. and W. E. Oates (1992): Environemental Economics: A Survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature 30(2): 675-740. 
Crutzen, P. J., A. R. Mosier, K. A. Smith, and W. Winiwarter (2008): NO2 Release from Agro-biofuel 
Production Negates Global Warming Reduction by Replacing Fossil Fuels. Atmospheric 
Chemistry and Physics 8(2): 389-395. 
Dales, J. H. (1968): Pollution Properties and Prices. Toronto, University of Toronto  Press. 
David, J. and H. Herzog (2000): The Cost of Carbon Capture. Presented at: Fifth International 
Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, Cairns, Australia. 
De Borger, B. and D. Swysen (1998): Optimal Pricing and Regulation of ransport Externalitites: A 
welfare Comparison of Some Policy Alternatives. In: Environmental and Transport Modeling, 
Ed. R. Roson and K. A. Small. Dordrecht et al., Kluwert Academic Publishers: 10-38. 
De Ceuster, G. D., B. v. Herbruggen, O. Ivanova, K. Carlier, A. Martino, and D. Fiorello (2007):  
TREMOVE. http://www.tremove.org, retreived: 26.07.2007. 
De Jong, G. C. (1991): Utility Model of Car Ownership and Private Car Use. European Economic 
Review 34(5): 971-985. 
Debreu, G. (1959): Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium. London, Yale 
University Press. 
Destatis (2002): Tabellenband I zur Zeitbudgeterhebung 2001/02. Aktivitäten in Stunden und Minuten 
nach Geschlecht, Alter und Haushaltstyp. http://www.destatis.de, retreived 15.02.2009. 
Destatis (2006): Verkehr in Deutschland 2006. http://www.destatis.de, retreived 22.01.2009. 
Destatis (2008a): VGR des Bundes - Input-Output-Rechnung: http://www.destatis.de, retrieved: 
30.01.2009. 
Destatis (2008b): Tabellen der Umweltökonomische Gesamtrechnung. Available on request.  
DeSerpa, A. C. (1971): A Theory of the Economic of Time. The Economic Journal 81(324): 828-846. 
Deutscher Bundestag (2002): Gesetz zur geordneten Beendigung der Kernenergie zur gewerblichen 
Erzeugung von Elektrizität, Bundesgesetzblatt, 2002(I) 26. 
Deutscher Bundestag, (2009). Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Kraftfahrzeugsteuer und Änderung anderer 
Gesetze, Bundesgesetzblatt (I) 29. 
Deutsches Institut für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) (2006): Trans-Mediterraner Solarstromverbund: 
Zusammenfassung. Studie im Auftrag des Bundesminsteriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit. 
Diamond, P. A. and J. A. Mirlrlees (1971a): Optimal Taxatiom and Public Production I: Production 
Efficiency. The American Economic Review 61(1): 8-27. 
Diamond, P. A. and J. A. Mirrlees (1971b): Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules. 
The American Economic Review 61(3): 261-278. 
 100
Diewert, W. E. (1971): An Application of the Shephard Duality Theorem: A Generalized Leontief 
Production Function. The Journal of Political Economy 79(3): 481-507. 
Diewert, W. E. and T. J. Wales (1987): Flexible Functional Forms and Global Curvature Conditions. 
Econometrica 55(1): 43-68. 
Dimaranan, B. V., Ed (2006): The GTAP 6 Data Base. West Lafayette, Centre for Global Trade 
Analysis, Department of Agriculture Economic, Purdue University. 
Dirkse, S. P. and M. C. Ferris (1995): The PATH Solver: A Non-Monotone Stabilization Scheme for 
Mixed Complementarity Problems. Optimization Methods and Software 5(2): 123-156. 
Dobes, L. (1999): Kyoto: Tradable Greenhouse Emission Permits in the Transport Sector. Transport 
Reviews 19(1): 81-97. 
Duvall, M. (2004): Advanced Batteries for Electric-Drive Vehicles: A Technology and Cost-
Effectiveness Assessment for Battery Electric Vehicles, Power Assist Hybrid Electric 
Vehicles, and Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles. Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto. 
Downing, P. B. and L. J. White (1986): Innovation in Pollution Control. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 13(1): 18-29. 
EC (2002): Council Decision of 25 April 2002 Concerning the Approval, on Behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Joint Fulfillment of Commitments thereunder. Official Journal of the 
European Union L 130/1. 2002/358/CE. 
EC (2003): Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and 
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. Official Journal of the European Union L 275/32. 
2003/87/EC. 
EC (2008a): Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 
L8/1. 2008/101/EC. 
EC (2008b): Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and 
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L140/16. 2009/28/EC.  
EC (2009a): Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the Effort of Member States to Reduce their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the 
Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments up to 2020. Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 140/136. 406/2009/EC. 
EC (2009b): Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance trading 
Scheme of the Community. Official Journal of the European Union, L140/63. 2009/29/EC. 
 101
EC (2009c): Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 Setting Emission Performance Standards for New Passenger Cars as Part of the 
Community’s Integrated Approach to Reduce CO2 Emissions from Light-duty Vehicles, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L140/1. 443/2009/EC. 
Ellerman, D. A., H. D. Jacoby, and M. B. Zimmerman (2006): Bringing Transportation into a Cap and 
Trade Regime. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Climate Change 
Report 136.  
Elmer, C.-F. and  Fischer C. (2009): Designing Vehicle CO2 Emission Standards. Resources for the 
Future Discussion Paper forthcoming. 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) (2007): Cutting Transport CO2 Emissions: 
What Progress? Paris, OECD. 
European Energy Exchange: Sportpreise für Stundenkontrakte 2004. http://www.eex.de, retreived: 
21.08.2006.   
Eurostat (1999): Household Budget Survey of 1999. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, retrieved: 
10.10.2008. 
Eurostat (2008a): Population Data. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, retrieved: 10.10.2008. 
Eurostat (2008b): Annual Energy Statistics. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, retrieved: 15.10.2008. 
Eurostat (2009a): Indicators for air pollution and climate change. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 
retrieved: 14.02.2009. 
Eurostat (2009b): Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, Rev. 2 
(NACE Rev. 2). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon,   retrieved 27.04.2009. 
EUSUSTEL (2006): European Sustainable Electricity: Comprehensive Analysis of Future European 
Demand and Generation of European Electricity and its Security of Supply. 
http://www.eusustel.be. 
Feldstein, M. (1976): On the Theory of Tax Reforms. Journal of Public Economics 6(1): 77-104. 
Ferris, M. C., A. Meeraus, and T. F. Rutherford (1999): Computing Wardropian Equilibria in a 
Complementarity Framework. Optimization Methods and Software 10(5): 669-685. 
Ferris, M. C. and T. S. Munson (2000): Complementarity Problems in GAMS and the Path Solver. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24(2): 165-188. 
Ferris, M. C. and J. S. Pang (1997): Engineering and Economic Applications of Complementarity 
Problems. SIAM Review 39(4): 669-713. 
Fischer, C., W. Harrington, and I. W. H. Parry (2007): Should Automobile Fuel Economy Standards 
be Tightened? The Energy Journal 28(4): 1-29. 
Galeotti, M. and C. Carraro (1996): Environmental Taxation and Unemployment: Some Evidence on 
the 'Double Dividend Hypothesis' in Europe. Journal of Public Economics 62(1): 141-181. 
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) (2006): Verkehr in Zahlen 2006/2007. Hamburg, 
Deutscher Verkehrsverlag.  
 102
Ginsburgh, V. and M. Keyzer (1997): The Structure of Applied General Equilibrium Models. 
Cambridge et al., MIT Press. 
Goulder, L. H. (1995): Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader's Guide. 
International Tax and Public Finance 2: 157-183. 
Graham, d. J. and S. Glaister (2002): The Demand for Automobile Fuel: A Survey of Elasticities. 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy: A Survey of Elasticities 36(1): 1-26. 
Graves, P. E., D. R. Lee, and R. L. Sexton (1993): Speed Variance, Enforcement, and the Optimal 
Speed Limit. Economics Letter 42(2): 237-243. 
Greene, D. L., J. R. Kahn, and R. C. Gibson (1999): Fuel Economy Rebound Effect of U.S. Household 
Vehicles. The Energy Journal 20(3): 1-31. 
Hahn, R. W. (1984): Market Power and Transferable Property Rights. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 99(4): 753-765. 
Hammar, H., Å. Löfgren, and T. Sterner (2004): Political Economy Obstacles to Fuel Taxation. The 
Energy Journal 25(3): 1-17. 
Harrison, G. W. and H. D. Vinod (1992): The Sensitivity of Applied General Equilibrium Models: 
Completely Randomized Factorial Sampling Designs. The Review of Economics and Statistics 
74(2): 357-362. 
Herry, M., N. Sedlacek, R. Tomschy, P. Bickel, and S. Schmid (2001): UNITE: The Pilot Accounts 
for Austria  UNIfication of accounts and marginal costs for Transport Efficiency - Working 
Funded by 5th Framework RTD Programme. ITS, University of Leeds. 
Hoel, M. (1996): Should a Carbon Tax be Differentiated across Sectors? Journal of Public Economics 
59(1): 17-32. 
Hourcarde, J.-C., M. Jaccard, C. Bataille, and F. Ghersi (2006): Hybrid Modeling: New Answers to 
Old Challanges. The Energy Journal - Special Issue: Hybrid Modeling of Energy-
Environmental Policies: Reconceiling Bottom-up and Top-Down: 1-11. 
Hyman, R. C., J. M. Reilly, M. H. Babiker, A. D. Masin, and H. D. Jacoby (2002): Modeling Non-
CO2 Greenhouse Gas Abatement. Environmental Modeling and Assessment 8(3): 175-186. 
International Energy Agency (2008): Energy Prices and Taxes. Quarterly Statistics, 2nd Quarter 2008. 
Paris, OECD.    
IPCC (2006): 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Ed. H. S. Eggleston, L. 
Buendia, K. Miwa, T. Ngara and K. Tanabe. Institute for Global Environmental Strategy. 
IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Ed. 
Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H.L. 
Miller. Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press.  
Jaffe, A. B., R. G. Newell, and R. N. Stavins (2002a): Technological Change and the Environment. In: 
Ed. K.-G. Mäler and J. Vincent: Handbook of Environmental Economics, Vol. I. Amsterdam, 
Elsevier Science: Chapter 11, 461-516. 
 103
Jaffe, A. B., R. G. Newell, and R. N. Stavins (2002b): Environmental Policy and Technological 
Change. Environmental and Resource Economics 22(1): 41-69. 
Jeger, J. F., E. Quinet, D. A. R. Schwartz, J.-P. Taroux, H. Link, L. Stewart, and P. Bickel (2001).: 
UNITE: Pilot Accounts - Results for France. UNIfication of accounts and marginal costs for 
Transport Efficiency - Working Funded by 5th Framework RTD Programme. ITS, University 
of Leeds. 
Jokisch, S. and T. Mennel (2009): Hydrogen in Passenger Transport: A Macroeconomic Analysis. 
Transport Reviews 59(4): 415-438. 
Kalinowska, D., H. Kremers, and T. P. Truong (2007): An Assessment of Road-price Measures on 
Household travel Demand in Germany Using a Computable General Equilibrium Framework. 
Presented at: EconMod Conference on Energy and Environmental Modeling. Moscow. 
Karplus, V. J., S. Paltsev, and J. M. Reilly (2009): Prospects for Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles in 
the United States and Japan: A General Equilibrium Analysis. MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change Report 172. 
Keller, W. J. (1976): A Nested CES-type Utility Function and its Demand and Price-Index Functions. 
European Economic Review 7(2): 175-786. 
Keller, W. J. (1980): Tax Incidence: A General Equilibrium Approach. Amsterdam et al., North -
Holland Publishing. 
Koopman, G. J. (1995): Policies to Reduce CO2 Emissions from Cars in Europe. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy 29(1): 53-70. 
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA) (2005a): Statistische Mittelungen: Bestand an Kraftfahrzeugen und 
Kraftfahrzeuganhängern am 1. Januar 2004. 
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA) (2005b): Statistische Mittelungen: Neuzulassungen – Besitzumschrei-
bungen – Löschungen von Kraftfahrzeugen und Kraftfahrzeuganhängern im Jahr 2004. 
Kremers, H. and D. Kalinowska (2009): The Distributional Effects of Car Road Charging: Application 
of a Computable General Equilibrium Model Including Passenger Travel. Presented at: 17th 
Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economist 
Amsterdam. 
Krutilla, K. (1991): Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 20(2): 127-142. 
Leimbach, M., N. Bauer, L. Baumstark, and O. Edenhofer (2009): Mitigation Costs in a Globalized 
World: Climate Policy Analysis with REMIND-R. Environmental Modeling and Assessment 
forthcoming. 
Light, M. (1999): Optimal Taxation: An Application of Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium 
Constraints. University of Colorado. mimeo. 
Link, H. (2004): Transport Accounts: Methodological Concepts and Empirical Results. Journal of 
Transport Geography 13(1): 41-57. 
 104
Link, H., L. H. Stewart, C. Dol, P. Bickel, Stephan Schmid, R. Friedrich, R. Krüger, B. Droste-Franke, 
and W. Krewitz (2001): UNITE: The Pilot Accounts for Germany. UNIfication of accounts 
and marginal costs for Transport Efficiency - Working Funded by 5th Framework RTD 
Programme. ITS, University of Leeds. 
Lipsey, R. G. and K. Lancaster (1956): The General Theory of Second Best. The Review of Economic 
Studies 24(1): 11-32. 
Liski, M. and J.-P. Montero (2008): Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market: The Case of 
Storable Pollution Permits. 
Luo, Z.-Q., J.-S. Pang, and D. Ralph (1996): Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints. 
Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press. 
Loulou, R., G. Goldstein, and K. Noble (2004): Documentation for the MARKAL Family of Models. 
http://www.etsap.org/documentation.asp, retrieved: 07.08.2009. 
Mansur, A. and J. Whalley (1984): Numerical Specification of Applied General Equilibrium Models: 
Estimation, Calibration, and Data. In: Applied General Equilibrium Analysis. Ed. H. E. Scarf 
and J. B. Shoven. Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press: 69-126. 
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory. New York et al., 
Oxford University Press. 
Mathiesen, L. (1977): Marginal Cost Pricing in a Linear Programming Model: A Case with 
Constraints on Dual Variables. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 79(4): 468-477. 
Mathiesen, L. (1985): Computational Experience in Solving Equilibrium Models by a Sequence of 
Linear Complementarity Problems. Operations Research 33(6): 1125-1250. 
Mayeres, I. (1993): The Marginal External Cost of Car Used with an Application to Belgium. 
Tijdschrift voor Ecoiiomie en Management 38(3): 225-258. 
Mayeres, M. (1999): The Control of Transport Externalities. PhD Thesis. Faculteit Economische en 
Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
Mayeres, I., S. Ochelen, and S. Proost (1996): The Marginal External Costs of Urban Transport. 
Transportation Research Part D 1(2): 111-130. 
Mayeres, I. and S. Proost (1997): Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of 
Externalities. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99(2): 261-279. 
McFarland, J. R., J. M. Reilly, and H. J. Herzog (2004): Representing Energy Technologies in Top-
Down Economic Models using Bottom-Up Information. Energy Economics 26(4): 685-707. 
Messner, S. and L. Schrattenholzer (2000): MESSAGE-MACRO: Linking an Energy Supply Model 
with a Macroeconomic Module and Solving it Iteratively. Energy 25(3): 267-282. 
Mineralölwirtschaftsverband (2008): Fakten und Trends: Statistischer Monatsbericht Februar 2008. 
http://www.erdoel-erdgas.de/Statistischer_Monatsbericht-101-1-69b.html, retreived 
12.05.2009.   
Montgomery, W. D. (1972): Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs. Journal of 
Economic Theory 5(3): 395-418. 
 105
Motor Presse Stuttgart (2008): Auto Motor und Sport Spezial: Auto Katalog: Das Modellangebot 
weltweit. 
Munk, K. J. (2003): Computable General Equilibrium Models and their Use for Transport Policy 
Analysis. Dansih Transport Research Institut Report 4. 
Munk, K. J. (2005): Assessment of the introduction of road pricing using a Computable General 
Equilibrium model, Economics School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. 
Munk, K. J. (2009): The Public Economics of Agricultural Policy: A CGE Approach. Université 
Catholique de Louvain, mimeo.  
Navon, D. (2003): The Paradox of Driving Speed: Two Adverse Effects on Highway Accident Rates. 
Accident Analysis and Preventions 35(3): 361-367. 
Negishi, T. (1960): Welfare Economics and existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy. 
Metroeconomica 12(2): 92-97. 
Newbery, D. M. (1988): Road User Charges in Britain. The Economic Journal 98(390): 161-176. 
Newbery, D. M. (1990): Pricing and Congestion: Economic Principles Relevant to Pricing Roads. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6(2): 22-38. 
Newbery, D. M. (2004): Road User and Congestion Charges. In: Theory and Practice of Excise 
Taxation: Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Polluting, and Driving. Ed. S. Cnossen. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
OECD (2007): Revenue Statistics 1965-2006, 2007 Edition. Paris, OECD. 
Östblom, G. and C. Berg (2006): The EMEC Model: Version 2.0, The National Institute of Economic 
Research Working Paper. 
O'Mahony, M., K. Kirwan, and S.McGrath (1997): Modeling the Internalization of External Costs of 
Transport. Transportation Research Record 1576: 93-98. 
Paltsev, S., L. Viguier, M. Babiker, J. Reilly, and K. H. Tay (2004): Disaggregating Household 
Transport in the MIT-EPPA Model. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global 
Change Technical Note 5. 
Paltsev, S., J. M. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby, R. S. Eckaus, J. McFarland, M. Sarofim, M. Asadoorian, and 
M. Babiker (2005a): The MIT Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model: 
Version 4. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Report 125. 
Paltsev, S., H. D. Jacoby, J. M. Reilly, L. Viguier, and M. Babiker (2005b): Modeling the Transport 
Sector: The Role of Existing Fuel Taxes in Climate Policy. In: Energy and Environment: 25th 
Anniversary of the Group for Research in Decision Analysis Vol.3., Ed. R. Loulou, J. Waaub, 
and G. Zaccour. New York, Springer Verlag: 211-238. 
Paltsev, S. and T. F. Rutherford (1999): From an Input-Output Table to a General Equilibrium Model: 
Assessing the Excess Burden of Indirect Taxes in Russia, Department of Economics, 
University of Colorado, mimeo. 
Parry, I. W. (1995): Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling. Environmental Economics and Resource 
Management 29(3): 67-77. 
 106
Parry, I. W. and A. Bento (2001): Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Effects of Road Pricing. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103(4): 645-671. 
Parry, I. W. and A. Bento (2002): Estimating the Welfare Effect of Congestion Taxes: The Critical 
Importance of Other Distortions within the Transport System. Journal of Urban Economics 
51(2): 339-365. 
Parry, I. W. and K. A. Small (2005): Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax? 
The American Economic Review 95(4): 1276-1289. 
Parry, I. W., M. Walls, and W. Harrington (2007): Automobile Externalities and Policies. Journal of 
Economic Literature XLV: 373-399. 
Pearce, D. (1991): The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming. The Economic Journal 
101(407): 938-948. 
Perman, R., Y. Ma, J. McGilvray, and M. Common (2003): Natural Resource and Environmnetal 
Economics. 3rd edition. Essex  et al., Pearson Education Lim. 
Perroni, C. and T. F. Rutherford (1995): Regular Flexibility of Nested CES Functions. European 
Economic Review 39(2): 335-343. 
Perroni, C. and T. F. Rutherford (1998): A Comparison of the Performance of Flexible Functional 
Forms for Use in Applied General Equilibrium Modelling. Computational Economics 11(3): 
245-263. 
Pigou, A. C. (1920): The Economics of Welfare. London, Macmillian. 
Pyatt, G. and J. I. Round (1985). Social accounting matrices: A basis for planning, Washington, The 
World Bank. 
Ramsey, F. P. (1927): A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. The Economic Journal 37(145): 47-
61. 
Rausch, S. and T. F. Rutherford (2007): Computation of Equilibria in OLG Models with Many 
Heterogeneous Households, Ruhr Economic Papers 15. 
Reichmuth, M., W. Bohnenschäfer, Jaqueline Daniel, N. Fröhlich, K. Lindner, M. Müller, A. Weber, 
J. Witt, F. Seefeldt, A. Kirchner, and C. Michelsen (2006): Auswirkungen der Änderungen des 
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes hinsichtlich des Gesamtvolumens der Förderung, der 
Belastung der Stromverbraucher sowie der Lenkungswirkung der Fördersätze für die 
einzelnen Energiearten. Studie im Auftrage des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie. 
Raux, C. (2004): The Use of Transferable Permits in Transport Policy. Transportation Research Part 
D 9: 185-197. 
Raux, C. and G. Marlot (2005): A System of tradable CO2 Permits Applied to Fuel Consumption by 
Motorists. Transport Policy 12(3): 255-265. 
Roson, R. (1996): The Macroeconomic Impact of traffic Congestion: A CGE Analysis. In: Recent 
Advantages in Spatial Equilibrium Modeling: Methodology and Applications. Ed. N. C. J. M. 
van den Bergh, P. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld. Berlin et al., Springer Verlag: 261-277. 
 107
Rutherford, T. F. (1993): MILES: A Mixed Inequality and Non-Linear Equation Solver. 
http://www.gams.com/dd/docs/solvers/miles.pdf  
Rutherford, T. F. (1995): Extension of GAMS for Complementarity Problems Arising in Applied 
Economic Analysis. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19(8): 1299-1324. 
Rutherford, T. F. (1999): Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as a GAMS 
Subsystem: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax. Computational Economics 
14(1): 1-46. 
Rutherford, T. F. (2002): Lecture notes on Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functions. 
http://www.gamsworld.org/mpsge/debreu/ces.pdf, retreived 06.09.2007. 
Rutherford, T. F. (2006): GTAP6inGAMS: Dataset and Model. http://www.mpsge.org/gtap6/, 
retreived: 05.08.2008. 
Rutherford, T. F. and D. G. Tarr (2007): Poverty Effects of Russia's WTO Accession: Modeling 
"Real" Households with Endogenous Productivity Effects. Journal of International Economics 
75(1): 131-150. 
Sandamo, A. (1975): Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities. Swedish Journal of Economics 
77(1): 86-98. 
Sandamo, A. (1993): Optimal Redistribution when Tastes Differ. FinanzArchiv 50(2): 149-63. 
Sandoval, R., V. J. Karplus, S. Paltsev, and J. M. Reilly (2008): Modeling the Prospect for Hydrogen 
Powered Transportation Through 2100. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of 
Global Change Report 154. 
Scarf, H. E. (1984): The Computation of Equilibrium Prices. in: H. E. Scarf and J. B. Shoven (eds.) 
Applied General Equilibrium. Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press: 1-50. 
Schäfer, A. and D. G. Victor (1999): Global Passenger travel: Implications for Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions. Energy 24(8): 657-679. 
Schäfer, A. and D. G. Victor (2000): The Future Mobility of the World Population. Transportation 
Research Part A 34: 171-205. 
Schäfer, A. and H. D. Jacoby (2005): Technological Details in a Multisector CGE Model: Transport 
Under Climate Policy. Energy Economics 37(1): 1-24. 
Schäfer, A. and H. D. Jacoby (2006): Vehicle Choice under CO2 Constraint: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis. Energy Policy 34(9): 975-985. 
Schallböck, K. O., M. Fischedick, B. Brouns, H.-J. Luhmann, F. Merten, H. E. Ott, A. Pastowski, and 
J. Venjakob (2006). Klimawirksame Emissionen des PKW-Verkehrs und Bewertung von 
Minderungsstrategien. Wuppertal Institute für Klima, Umwelt, Energie Spezial 34. 
Shoven, J. B. and J. Whalley (1992): Applying General Equilibrium. Cambridge et al., Cambridge 
University Press. 
Small, K.A., 1992: Urban Transport Economics. Chur , Harwood Academic. 
Small, K. A. and K. V. Dender (2007): Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining 
Rebound Effect. The Energy Journal 28(1): 25-51. 
 108
Springer, U. (2003): The market for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: a survey of 
model studies. The Energy Economics 25(5): 527-551. 
Starr, R. M. (1997): General Equilibrium Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge et al., Cambridge 
University Press.  
Steininger, K. W., B. Friedel, and B. Gebetsroither (2007): Sustainability Impacts of Car Road 
Pricing: A Computable general Equilibrium Analysis for Austria. Ecological Economics 
63(1): 59-69.  
Sterner, T. (2007): Fuel Taxes: An Important Instrument for Climate Policy. Energy Policy 35(6): 
3194-3202. 
Stoft, S. (2002): Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity West Sussex, UK, 
Wiley & Sons. 
Stronzig, M., G. Bühler, and U. Lambrecht (2002): Ansatzpunkte für einen Emissionshandel im 
Verkehrssektor. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft 26(3): 193-208. 
Strotz, R. H. (1957): The Empirical Implications of a Utility Tree. Econometrica 25(2): 269-280. 
Tietenberg, T. H. (2006): Emission Trading: Principles and Practice. Washington, RFF Press. 
Todd, M. J. (1984): Efficient Methods of Computing Economic Equilibria. In: Applied General 
Equilibrium. Ed.  H. E. Scarf and J. B. Shoven. Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press: 
51-68. 
Truong, T. P., C. Kemfert, and J.-M. Burniaux (2007): GTAP-E: An Energy-Environmental Version 
of the GTAP Model with Emission Trading. German Institute for Economic Research 
Discussion Paper 668. 
Tweddle, G., J. Nellthorp, T. Sansom, H. Link, L. Stewart, and P. Bickel (2001): UNITE: Pilot 
Accounts for the United Kingdom. UNIfication of accounts and marginal costs for Transport 
Efficiency - Working Funded by 5th Framework RTD Programme. ITS, University of Leeds. 
United Nations (2007). Sustainable Bioenergy: A Framework for Decision Makers. UN-Energy. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992): United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. FCCC/INFORMAL/84. Rio de Janeiro.    
UNFCCC (1998): Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Kyoto. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2005): Emission Facts: Average Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions Resulting from Gasoline and Diesel Fuel. Office of Transportation and Air Quality, 
EPA420-F-05-001. 
Van der Werf, E. (2008): Production Functions for Climate Policy Modeling: An Empirical Analysis. 
Energy Economics 30(6): 2964-2979. 
Verhoef, E., P. Nijkamp, and P. Rietveld (1995): The Economics of Regulatory Parking Policies: The 
(Im)Possibility of Parking Policies in Traffic Regulation. Transportation Research Part A 
29(2): 141-156. 
Verhoef, E., P. Nijkamp and P.Rietveld (1997): Tradable Permits: Their Potential in the Regulation of 
Road transport Externalities. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 24: 527-548. 
 109
Vickery, W. S. (1963): Pricing in Urban and Suburban Transport. The American Economic Review 
53(2): 452-465. 
Walters, A. A. (1961): The Theory and Measurement of Private and Social Cost of Highway 
Congestion. Econometrica 29(4): 679-699. 
Welsch, H. (2008): Armington Elasticities for Energy Policy Modeling: Evidence from Four European 
Countries. Energy Economics 30: 2252-2264. 
West, S. E. (2004): Distributional Effects of Alternative Vehicle Pollution Control Policies. Journal of 
Public Economics 88(4): 735-757. 
Wing, I. S. (2006): The Synthesis of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approaches to Climate Policy 
Modeling: Electrical Power Technologies and the Cost of Limiting US CO2 Emissions. The 
Energy Journal 34(18): 3847-3869. 
Wing, I. S. (2008): The Synthesis of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approaches to Climate Policy 
Modeling: Electrical Power Technologies Detail in a Social Accounting Framework. Energy 
Economics 30(2): 547-573. 
Wing, I. S. (2009): Computable General Equilibrium Models for the Analysis of Energy and Climate 
Policies. in: Research Tools in Natural Resource and Environmental Economics, Ed. A. 
Batabyal and P. Nijkamp. New Jersey  et al., World Scientific Publishing. 
Wissel, S., S. Rath-Nagel, M. B. U. Fahl, and A. Voß (2008). Stromerzeugungskosten im Vergleich, 
Institute of Energy Economics and the Rational Use of Energy, University Stuttgart Working 
Paper. 
World Resource Institute (2009): Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0. 
http://cait.wri.org/, retrieved: 08.04.2009. 
 110
Appendix A Additional results for Chapter 4 
Table 34: Correspondence of GTAP6 and model commodities 
GTAP 
Label Description  
GTAP 
Label Description 
Agriculture (AGR) 
b_t Beverages and tobacco products  omt Meat products nec 
c_b Sugar cane sugar beet  osd Oil seeds 
cmt Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse  pcr Processed rice 
ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses  pdr Paddy rice 
frs Forestry  pfb Plant-based fibers 
fsh Fishing  rmk Raw milk 
gro Cereal grains nec  sgr Sugar 
lea Leather products  tex Textiles 
lum Wood products  v_f Vegetables fruit nuts 
mil Dairy products  vol Vegetable oils and fats 
oap Animal products nec  wap Wearing apparel 
ocr Crops nec  wht Wheat 
ofd Food products nec  wol Wool silk-worm cocoons 
     
Energy intensive production (EINT) 
fmp Metal products  nmm Mineral products nec 
i_s Ferrous metals  ppp Paper products publishing 
nfm Metals nec    
     
Industrial transport (TRN) 
atp Air transport  wtp Sea transport 
otp Other transport (road, rail, pipeline)    
     
Industries and services (MAC) 
cgds Aggregate investment  ome Machinery and equipment nec 
cmn Communication  omf Manufactures nec 
cns Construction  omn Minerals nec 
crp Chemical,  rubber, plastic products  osg 
Public administration, defense, health, 
and education 
dwe Dwellings  otn Transport equipment nec 
ele Electronic equipment  ros Recreation and other services 
isr Insurance  trd Trade 
obs Business services nec  wtr Water 
ofi Financial services nec    
  
   
Natural gas (gas) 
gas Natural gas  gdt Natural gas manufacture & distribution 
     
Not aggregated 
coa Coal  oil Crude oil 
ely Electricity  p_c Petroleum coal products 
mvh* Motor vehicles and parts    
* Relabeled as CAR sector; nec: not elsewhere classified 
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Table 35: Correspondence of GTAP6 and model regions 
GTAP 
Label Description  
GTAP 
Label Description 
Annex I 
aus Australia  tur Turkey 
can Canada  usa United States 
che Switzerland  xef Rest of EFTA 
jpn Japan  xer Rest of Europe 
nzl New Zealand  xsu Rest of Former Soviet Union 
rus Russian Federation    
     
Benelux 
bel Belgium  nld Netherlands 
lux Luxembourg    
     
Remaining east European countries 
bgr Bulgaria  ltu Lithuania 
cyp Cyprus  mlt Malta 
cze Czech Republic  rom Romania 
est Estonia  svk Slovakia 
hun Hungary  svn Slovenia 
lva Latvia    
     
Rest of the world 
alb Albania   twn Taiwan  
arg Argentina   tza Tanzania  
bgd Bangladesh   uga Uganda  
bra Brazil   ury Uruguay  
bwa Botswana   ven Venezuela  
chl Chile   vnm Vietnam  
chn China   xap Rest of Andean Pact 
col Colombia   xca Central America  
hkg HongKong  xcb Rest of the Caribbean 
hrv Croatia   xea Rest of EastAsia 
idn Indonesia   xfa. Rest of FTAA 
ind  India   xme Rest of Middle East 
kor Korea   xna Rest of North America 
lka SriLanka  xnf. Rest of North Africa 
mar Morocco   xoc Rest of Oceania 
mdg Madagascar   xsa Rest of South Asia 
mex Mexico   xsc Rest of South African CU  
moz Mozambique   xsd RestofSADC 
mwi Malawi   xse Rest of Southeast Asia 
mys Malaysia   xsm Rest of South America 
per Peru   xss Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
phl Philippines   zaf. SouthAfrica 
sgp Singapore   zmb Zambia  
tha Thailand   zwe Zimbabwe  
tun Tunisia     
     
Remaining west European countries 
aut Austria  grc Greece 
irl Ireland  prt Portugal 
Non-aggregated European regions are not listed. 
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Table 36: Selected carbon prices in the SECTORAL scenario [$/t CO2] 
  
Manufacture 
and services 
Electricity Energy 
intensives 
Refined 
oils 
Industrial 
transport 
Household 
transport 
Benelux  26.28 10.85 19.98 33.89 71.17 200.88 
Denmark  33.08 9.03 14.64 156.35 47.44 232.90 
Finland  30.63 9.74 30.66 36.14 63.06 159.36 
France  19.76 8.23 19.64 60.82 50.62 231.52 
Germany  16.46 6.83 15.38 55.09 54.06 152.17 
Italy  20.92 8.80 18.42 45.02 56.39 178.02 
Poland  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain  11.53 3.94 13.79 40.80 27.69 93.74 
Sweden  40.11 7.79 74.82 47.92 44.15 156.90 
United Kingdom  16.08 8.35 18.01 58.45 71.81 232.12 
Western EU 15.19 4.68 10.89 49.17 23.96 90.83 
Eastern EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 37: National carbon prices [$/t CO2] 
  NATIONAL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN ETS EXEMPT TRN 
Benelux  27.31 31.10 29.20 29.46 29.34 
Denmark  21.21 23.70 24.49 25.29 25.01 
Finland  19.84 23.00 22.80 23.42 23.15 
France  32.79 34.47 34.06 34.21 34.23 
Germany  14.70 16.03 15.40 15.70 15.59 
Italy  21.74 25.03 24.40 25.01 24.84 
Poland  0.00 1.30 0.00 1.35 1.36 
Spain  10.23 10.73 10.19 10.70 10.56 
Sweden  43.24 46.73 46.57 46.73 46.54 
United Kingdom  18.32 19.81 19.37 19.77 19.73 
Western EU 10.35 10.81 10.38 10.69 10.49 
Eastern EU 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.27 0.25 
Annex I 4.36 4.25 4.31 4.24 4.24 
Rest of the World 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 38: European carbon prices [$/t CO2] 
  FULL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN ETS EXEMPT TRN 
Electricity  8.77 6.16 9.81 7.27 8.10 
Transport  8.77  17.71 7.27 0.00 
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Table 39: Export of carbon permits [Mt CO2] 
  Full ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN ETS EXEMPT TRN 
Benelux  -32.329 -18.412 -14.641 -21.733 -22.074 
Denmark  -5.419 -4.967 -3.477 -5.184 -5.218 
Finland  -5.270 -5.297 -3.734 -5.318 -5.207 
France  -38.474 -10.779 -8.955 -20.658 -23.052 
Germany  -44.083 -47.199 -25.252 -44.520 -43.011 
Italy  -32.366 -26.304 -19.136 -28.856 -29.239 
Poland  92.992 71.684 57.802 77.399 79.780 
Spain  -3.203 -7.721 -0.379 -6.288 -7.368 
Sweden  -6.832 -2.871 -2.505 -5.693 -6.230 
United Kingdom  -41.055 -34.207 -22.157 -33.899 -33.322 
Western EU -3.539 -8.042 -0.850 -6.461 -7.200 
Eastern EU 119.580 94.114 43.283 101.209 102.140 
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Table 40: Compliance cost [billion $] 
  SECTORAL NATIONAL FULL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN ETS EXEMPT TRN 
Benelux  2.599 1.374 0.158 0.776 0.698 0.609 0.615 
Denmark  0.613 0.221 0.044 0.074 0.092 0.062 0.065 
Finland  0.412 0.191 0.038 0.054 0.073 0.047 0.051 
France  3.711 1.824 0.150 1.405 1.111 0.997 0.990 
Germany  4.935 1.790 0.681 0.766 1.147 0.769 0.827 
Italy  3.280 1.264 0.226 0.507 0.551 0.396 0.409 
Poland  0.000 0.000 0.449 0.184 0.477 0.259 0.309 
Spain  0.783 0.317 0.244 0.181 0.374 0.197 0.207 
Sweden  0.641 0.393 0.020 0.248 0.120 0.093 0.091 
United Kingdom  0.679 0.289 0.213 0.150 0.329 0.167 0.178 
Western EU 4.382 1.621 0.416 0.743 0.919 0.708 0.738 
Eastern EU 0.000 0.000 0.501 0.195 0.553 0.282 0.324 
EU 27 22.034 9.284 3.140 5.283 6.444 4.586 4.803 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115
 
 
 
Table 41: Emission reduction of selected sectors [%] 
  NATIONAL FULL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN ETS EXEMPT TRN 
 ELE HTRN TRN ELE HTRN TRN ELE HTRN TRN ELE HTRN TRN ELE HTRN TRN ELE HTRN TRN 
Benelux  29.5 3.3 7.8 11.4 0.9 2.2 9.8 3.0 6.6 14.0 1.8 4.0 11.0 0.6 1.5 11.9 -0.1 -0.3 
Denmark  33.4 2.1 9.7 16.6 0.7 3.9 12.9 2.4 10.4 19.0 1.7 7.8 14.9 0.6 3.2 16.2 -0.2 -0.3 
Finland  26.4 2.4 5.8 12.4 0.9 2.2 9.2 2.7 5.9 14.4 2.0 4.6 10.7 0.7 1.7 11.9 -0.3 -0.2 
France  35.3 2.6 9.7 13.2 0.4 2.2 11.9 2.4 9.5 16.4 1.1 4.8 13.0 0.3 1.8 14.0 -0.3 -0.4 
Germany  26.1 1.4 4.1 16.8 0.7 2.2 12.6 1.4 3.9 18.9 1.6 4.4 14.5 0.5 1.7 15.9 -0.3 -0.3 
Italy  25.4 1.9 5.9 12.1 0.6 2.1 9.7 2.0 5.9 14.0 1.4 4.3 10.9 0.4 1.7 11.9 -0.3 -0.2 
Poland  -2.2 -0.5 -1.1 22.9 0.0 5.1 16.6 -0.9 0.4 25.0 2.0 9.8 19.3 0.1 4.1 21.1 -1.3 0.1 
Spain  21.2 0.9 3.7 18.9 0.8 3.3 14.1 1.0 3.7 20.8 1.9 6.7 16.2 0.6 2.7 17.6 -0.3 -0.3 
Sweden  43.7 5.8 16.4 14.9 0.9 3.4 12.6 5.6 16.5 17.6 2.1 6.9 14.0 0.7 2.8 15.2 -0.2 -0.3 
United Kingdom  28.8 1.4 4.4 15.8 0.6 1.9 12.1 1.4 4.3 18.0 1.3 3.9 13.9 0.4 1.5 15.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Western EU 19.0 0.9 4.1 16.4 0.8 3.9 12.1 1.0 4.2 18.2 1.9 7.8 14.0 0.6 3.1 15.3 -0.4 -0.4 
Eastern EU -2.8 -0.7 -1.3 19.9 0.5 5.3 14.3 -1.1 -0.1 21.3 3.0 9.6 16.6 0.4 4.1 18.0 -1.4 0.1 
Legend: ELE: Electricity; HTRN: Household own provided transport; TRN: Industrial transport 
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Table 42: Sensitivity results substitution elasticity between own transport and consumption [% 
HEV vs. BAU] 
  NATIONAL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN 
ETS EXEMPT 
TRN 
0 -0.413 -0.328 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.1 -0.413 -0.328 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.2 -0.413 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.3 -0.413 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.4 -0.413 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.5 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.6 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
0.7 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
0.8 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
0.9 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
1 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
Default value is marked in grey. 
 
 
Table 43: Sensitivity results fuel price demand elasticity [% HEV vs. BAU] 
  NATIONAL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN 
ETS EXEMPT 
TRN 
0 -0.39 -0.31 -0.30 -0.18 -0.12 
0.1 -0.40 -0.32 -0.30 -0.18 -0.12 
0.2 -0.41 -0.32 -0.31 -0.18 -0.11 
0.3 -0.41 -0.33 -0.31 -0.18 -0.11 
0.4 -0.42 -0.34 -0.32 -0.18 -0.11 
0.5 -0.43 -0.34 -0.32 -0.18 -0.11 
0.6 -0.43 -0.35 -0.33 -0.18 -0.10 
0.7 -0.44 -0.36 -0.33 -0.18 -0.10 
0.8 -0.45 -0.36 -0.34 -0.19 -0.10 
0.9 -0.45 -0.37 -0.34 -0.19 -0.10 
1 -0.46 -0.38 -0.34 -0.19 -0.09 
Default value is marked in grey. 
 
 
Table 44: Sensitivity results substitution elasticity other transport cost [% HEV vs. BAU] 
  NATIONAL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN 
ETS EXEMPT 
TRN 
0 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.1 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.2 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.3 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.4 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.5 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.6 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
0.7 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
0.8 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
0.9 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
1 -0.414 -0.329 -0.312 -0.179 -0.11 
Default value is marked in grey. 
 
 
 117
Table 45: Sensitivity results substitution elasticity own and purchased transport [% HEV vs. 
BAU] 
  NATIONAL ETS ETS CLOSED TRN ETS TRN 
ETS EXEMPT 
TRN 
0 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.1 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.2 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.3 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.4 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.5 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.6 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.7 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.8 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
0.9 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
1 -0.414 -0.329 -0.311 -0.179 -0.11 
Default value is marked in grey. 
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Appendix B GAMS codes for the international model 
 
GAMS code to calibrate household transport 
$title Calibration of the International Transport Emission Trading Model 
 
$ontext 
***** STRUCTURE 
         (1) LOAD AND RENAME GTAP DATA 
         (2) SEPARATE HOUSHOLD TRANSPORT SECTOR 
         (3) CREATE HOUSEHOLD TRANSPORT SECTOR HTRN 
         (4) CALIBRATE EMISSIONS 
         (5) SAVE DATA TO GDX 
 
***** OPTIONS 
         ds:             name of GTAP6 source file 
         datadir:        name of data directory 
         out:            name of output file 
         trn:            label of transport sector 
         xls:            name of xls file containing additional data 
 
 
***** Additional files 
         gtap6data.gms   rutherford tool to load GTAP6 data 
         http://www.mpsge.org/gtap6/ 
 
REFERNECES: 
Paltsev et al. (2004): "Dissaggregating Household Transport in the MIT-EPPA Model". 
         MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. 
         Technical Note No 5 
$offtext 
 
* GTAP 6 input file 
$set ds ET_TRN 
$set out ET_TRN_htrn 
 
* Assign default values 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set trn $set trn "trn" 
$if not set xls $set xls trn_shares 
 
* Check inputs 
$if not set ds $abort "###### Specify Data Source ######" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%ds%.gdx"  $abort "###### Source File Missing ######" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%xls%.xls"  $abort "###### Additional Data File Missing ######" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                         (1) LOAD AND RENAME GTAP DATA 
*############################################################################### 
* Load data using GTAP6 tools 
$include gtap6data 
 
parameter 
         y0      total output 10^9$ 
         d0      output to domestic market 10^9$ 
         e0      exports 10^9$ 
         to      output tax 
         id0     intermediate inputs  10^9$ 
         pi0     intermediate input price 
         ti      intermediate input tax 
         fd0     factor demand 10^9$ 
         pf0     factor purchase price 
         tf      factor tax 
 
         c0      total private consumption (incl tax) 10^9$ 
         cd0     private consumtion 10^9$ 
         pc0     private consumption purchase price 
         tc      tax on private consumption 
         fs0     factor supply 10^9$ 
         inv0    investment 
 
         g0      total public consumption (incl tax) 10^9$ 
         gd0     public consumption 10^9$ 
         pg0     public consumption purchase price 
         tg      tac on public consumption 
         bop     balance of payment 10^9$ 
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         ctax    direct consumer tax 10^9$ 
 
         a0      armington output 10^9$ 
         m0      aggregated imports 10^9$ 
         mad0    transport margin demand fo imports 10^9$ 
         md0     import by countries 10^9$ 
         tm      tax on imports 
         te      tax on exports 
         pm0     bilateral import price 
         ma0     trnsport margin 10^9$ 
         mae0    transport margin exports by country 10^9$ 
         pma0    margin price 10^9$ 
 
         check   check of equilibrium conditions should be zero 
; 
 
scalar 
         rounding        rounding factor for data        /8/ 
; 
 
*----------------------------- FIRM PARAMETER ---------------------------------- 
e0(i,r)          = round(sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s)) + vst(i,r), rounding); 
d0(i,r)          = round(vdpm(i,r) + vdgm(i,r) + sum(j, vdfm(i,j,r)) + vdim(i,r), rounding); 
y0(i,r)          = e0(i,r) + d0(i,r); 
to(i,r)          = rto(i,r); 
id0(i,j,r)       = round(vdfm(i,j,r) + vifm(i,j,r), rounding); 
ti(i,j,r)$id0(i,j,r) = (rtfd(i,j,r)*vdfm(i,j,r) + rtfi(i,j,r)*vifm(i,j,r))/(id0(i,j,r)); 
pi0(i,j,r)       = 1 + ti(i,j,r); 
fd0(f,i,r)       = round(vfm(f,i,r), rounding); 
tf(f,i,r)        = rtf(f,i,r); 
pf0(f,i,r)       = 1 + tf(f,i,r); 
 
check("zpf",i,r) = round(y0(i,r)*(1-to(i,r)) - ( 
                         sum(j, pi0(j,i,r)*id0(j,i,r)) 
                         + sum(f, fd0(f,i,r)*pf0(f,i,r)) 
                         ),8); 
 
*----------------------------- PRIVATE PARAMETER ------------------------------- 
cd0(i,r)          = round(vdpm(i,r) + vipm(i,r),rounding); 
tc(i,r)$cd0(i,r)  = (vdpm(i,r)*rtpd(i,r) + vipm(i,r)*rtpi(i,r))/cd0(i,r); 
pc0(i,r)          = 1 + tc(i,r); 
c0(r)             = sum(i, cd0(i,r)*pc0(i,r)); 
fs0(f,r)          = round(evom(f,r),rounding); 
inv0(i,r)         = round(vdim(i,r),rounding); 
ctax(r)           = sum(f, evom(f,r)) - c0(r) - sum(i, inv0(i,r)); 
check("inc","x",r)  = round(c0(r) + sum(i, inv0(i,r)) + ctax(r) 
                      - sum(f, fs0(f,r)) ,8); 
 
*----------------------------- TRADE PARAMETER --------------------------------- 
md0(i,r,s)       = round(vxmd(i,r,s),rounding); 
* If no imports from the region exist set exports of region to zero 
e0(i,r)$(not sum(s, md0(i,r,s))) = 0; 
tm(i,r,s)        = rtms(i,r,s); 
te(i,r,s)        = -rtxs(i,r,s); 
pm0(i,r,s)       = (1+te(i,r,s))*(1+tm(i,r,s)); 
mad0(i,j,r,s)    = round(vtwr(i,j,r,s),rounding); 
m0(i,r)          = round(vigm(i,r) + vipm(i,r) + sum(j, vifm(i,j,r)),rounding); 
mae0(i,r)        = round(vst(i,r),rounding); 
ma0(i)           = round(vtw(i),rounding); 
pma0(i,r,s)      = 1 + tm(i,r,s); 
a0(i,r)          = m0(i,r) + d0(i,r); 
 
check("imports",i,r) = round(m0(i,r) - ( 
                         sum(s, md0(i,s,r)*pm0(i,s,r)) 
                         + sum((s,j), mad0(j,i,s,r)*pma0(i,s,r))),8); 
 
check("margin",i,"x") = round(ma0(i) - sum(r, mae0(i,r)),8); 
 
*---------------------------- PUBLIC PARAMETER --------------------------------- 
gd0(i,r)         = round(vdgm(i,r) + vigm(i,r),rounding); 
tg(i,r)$gd0(i,r) = (vdgm(i,r)*rtgd(i,r) + vigm(i,r)*rtgi(i,r))/gd0(i,r); 
pg0(i,r)         = 1 + tg(i,r); 
g0(r)            = sum(i, gd0(i,r)*pg0(i,r)); 
bop(r)           = round(vb(r),rounding); 
 
check("gov","x",r) = round(g0(r) - ( 
                         ctax(r) 
                         + sum(i, gd0(i,r)*tg(i,r)) 
                         + sum(i, cd0(i,r)*tc(i,r)) 
                         + sum((i,j), id0(i,j,r)*ti(i,j,r)) 
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                         + sum((i,f), fd0(f,i,r)*tf(f,i,r)) 
                         + sum(i, y0(i,r)*to(i,r)) 
                         + sum((i,s), tm(i,s,r)*md0(i,s,r)*(1+te(i,s,r))) 
                         + sum((i,j,s), tm(i,s,r)*mad0(j,i,s,r)) 
                         + sum((i,s),te(i,r,s)*md0(i,r,s)) 
                         ) 
                     - bop(r),8); 
display "Initial equilibrium condition check: ", check; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                (2) SEPARATE HOUSHOLD TRANSPORT SECTOR 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         es(r)           share of own transportation in total expenditure 
         os(r)           share of gasoline in refined oil consumption 
         own             own transport spendings 
         gaso            gasoline spendings 
         otc             other transport costs 
         car             car purchases 
         emi             empirical total emissions by region 
         sharesHH        data parameter 
; 
 
* Load data from xls 
execute "gdxxrw %datadir%%xls%.xls o=%datadir%%xls% par=sharesHH rng=GAMS!A1" 
 
$gdxin "%datadir%%xls%" 
$load sharesHH 
 
es(r)    = sharesHH(r,"ES"); 
os(r)    = sharesHH(r,"OS"); 
emi(r)   = sharesHH(r,"emi")/1000; 
own(r)   = es(r)*c0(r); 
gaso(r)  = cd0("p_c",r)*os(r); 
car(r)   = cd0("car",r); 
otc(r)   = (own(r) - gaso(r)*pc0("p_c",r) - car(r)*pc0("car",r))/pc0("mac",r); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                (3) CREATE HOUSEHOLD TRANSPORT SECTOR HTRN 
*############################################################################### 
i("htrn") = yes; 
set 
         trn(*)     set of transport modes 
         /%trn%/ 
; 
display trn; 
 
* CARS 
id0("car","htrn",r)      = car(r); 
ti("car","htrn",r)       = tc("car",r); 
pi0("car","htrn",r)      = 1 + ti("car","htrn",r); 
 
* FUELS 
id0("p_c","htrn",r)      = gaso(r); 
ti("p_c","htrn",r)       = tc("p_c",r); 
pi0("p_c","htrn",r)      = 1 + ti("p_c","htrn",r); 
 
* OTHER TRANSPORT COST 
id0("mac","htrn",r)      = otc(r); 
ti("mac","htrn",r)       = tc("mac",r); 
pi0("mac","htrn",r)      = 1 + ti("mac","htrn",r); 
 
* TRANSPORT 
id0(trn,"htrn",r)        = cd0(trn,r); 
ti(trn,"htrn",r)         = tc(trn,r); 
pi0(trn,"htrn",r)        = 1 + ti(trn,"htrn",r); 
 
* OUTPUT 
y0("htrn",r)             = own(r) + sum(i$trn(i), cd0(i,r)*pc0(i,r)); 
d0("htrn",r)             = y0("htrn",r); 
a0("htrn",r)             = d0("htrn",r); 
 
 
* Correct household sector 
cd0("car",r)             = 0; 
cd0("p_c",r)             = cd0("p_c",r) - gaso(r); 
cd0("mac",r)             = cd0("mac",r) - otc(r); 
cd0("htrn",r)            = y0("htrn",r); 
cd0(trn,r)               = 0; 
tc("htrn",r)             = 0; 
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pc0("htrn",r)            = 1 + tc("htrn",r); 
 
c0(r)   = sum(i, pc0(i,r)*cd0(i,r)); 
a0(i,r)  = m0(i,r) + d0(i,r); 
 
* Again check of zero profit and income conditions: 
check("zpf",i,r) = round(y0(i,r)*(1-to(i,r)) - ( 
                         sum(j, pi0(j,i,r)*id0(j,i,r)) 
                         + sum(f, fd0(f,i,r)*pf0(f,i,r)) 
                         ),8); 
 
check("inc","x",r) = round(c0(r) + sum(i, inv0(i,r)) + ctax(r) 
                     - sum(f, evom(f,r)) ,8); 
 
check("gov","x",r) = round(g0(r) - ( 
                         ctax(r) 
                         + sum(i, gd0(i,r)*tg(i,r)) 
                         + sum(i, cd0(i,r)*tc(i,r)) 
                         + sum((i,j), id0(i,j,r)*ti(i,j,r)) 
                         + sum((i,f), fd0(f,i,r)*tf(f,i,r)) 
                         + sum(i, y0(i,r)*to(i,r)) 
                         + sum((i,s), tm(i,s,r)*md0(i,s,r)*(1+te(i,s,r))) 
                         + sum((i,j,s), tm(i,s,r)*vtwr(j,i,s,r)) 
                         + sum((i,s),te(i,r,s)*md0(i,r,s)) 
                         ) 
                     - bop(r),8); 
display "Final equilibrium condition check: ", check; 
 
* Split energy data 
evf("p_c","htrn",r) = evh("p_c",r)*os(r); 
evh("p_c",r) = (1-os(r))*evh("p_c",r); 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                          (4) CALIBRATE EMISSIONS 
*############################################################################### 
scalar   convert converstion factor Mtoe -> EJ   /0.04186798/; 
 
evf(i,j,r) = convert*evf(i,j,r); 
evh(i,r)   = convert*evh(i,r); 
 
parameter 
         emic    emission coefficient Source:IPCC Guidelines 
         co20    benchmark carbon emissions in Gt 
; 
emic("coa",i,r)          = 0.101; 
emic("gas",i,r)          = 0.0583; 
emic("p_c",i,r)          = 0.0792; 
emic("coa","htrn",r)       = 0.101; 
emic("gas","hh",r)       = 0.0583; 
emic("p_c","hh",r)       = 0.0792; 
 
* Assign special factor for household transport 
emic("p_c","htrn",r)     = 0.0675; 
emic("p_c",i,r)$trn(i)   = 0.0675; 
 
* Carbon emission below 1 Million t are neglected 
co20(i,j,r)$id0(i,j,r)   = round(emic(i,j,r)*evf(i,j,r),3); 
 
* Account for transformation input in refineries (~7% are combustion input, Eurostat energy 
* tables) 
co20(i,"p_c",r)          = co20(i,"p_c",r)*0.07; 
co20(i,"hh",r)$cd0(i,r)  = round(emic(i,"hh",r)*evh(i,r),3); 
co20("total",i,r)        = sum(j, co20(j,i,r)); 
co20("total","hh",r)     = sum(i, co20(i,"hh",r)); 
co20("total","region",r) = sum(i, co20("total",i,r)) + co20("total","hh",r); 
 
display co20; 
 
*------------------- SCALE EMISSIONS TO EMPIRICAL DATA ------------------------- 
* If no empirical emission data are provided take calibrated data: 
emi(r)$(not emi(r)) = co20("total","region",r); 
 
parameter 
         checkemi        check of calibrated emission deviation from empirical emissions 
; 
 
checkemi("predicted",r) = co20("total","region",r); 
checkemi("empirical",r) = emi(r); 
checkemi("abs dev",r)   = co20("total","region",r) -  emi(r); 
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checkemi("rel dev",r)   = (co20("total","region",r) -  emi(r))/co20("total","region",r); 
 
parameter 
         correct(r)      correction factor to meet empirical emissions 
; 
 
correct(r)               = 1 - checkemi("rel dev",r); 
co20(i,j,r)              = round(correct(r)*emic(i,j,r)*evf(i,j,r),3); 
co20(i,"p_c",r)          = co20(i,"p_c",r)*0.07; 
co20(i,"hh",r)$cd0(i,r)  = round(correct(r)*emic(i,"hh",r)*evh(i,r),3); 
co20("total",i,r)        = sum(j, co20(j,i,r)); 
co20("total","hh",r)     = sum(i, co20(i,"hh",r)); 
co20("total","region",r) = sum(i, co20("total",i,r)) + co20("total","hh",r); 
 
checkemi("predicted2",r) = co20("total","region",r); 
checkemi("abs dev2",r)   = co20("total","region",r) -  emi(r); 
checkemi("rel dev2",r)   = (co20("total","region",r) -  emi(r))/emi(r); 
display checkemi; 
 
parameter 
         co20shares       share of sectors in emissions 
; 
 
co20shares(i,r) = co20("total",i,r)/co20("total","region",r); 
co20shares("hh",r) = co20("total","hh",r)/co20("total","region",r); 
display co20shares, co20; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                          (5) SAVE DATA TO GDX 
*############################################################################### 
$if not set out $exit 
execute_unload "%datadir%%out%.gdx" co20, i, f, r, rnum, mf, sf, 
         y0, d0, e0, to, id0, pi0, ti, fd0, pf0, tf, 
         c0, cd0, pc0, tc, fs0, inv0, 
         g0, gd0, pg0, tg, bop, ctax, 
         a0, m0, mad0, md0, tm, te, pm0, ma0, mae0, pma0, 
         etrae, esubva, esubm, esubd, eta, epsilon 
; 
 123
GAMS model codes 
The model is written in a modular form. call.gms is the main file. In this file the data source and the 
scenarios are defined. It calls dataload.gms which loads the data and performs additional data 
manipulation. Afterwards the file model.gms is included which generates the MPSGE model. The 
selected scenarios are computed and the results are stored. Finally, the results are exported to Excel in 
a pivot table friendly format.   
 
Figure 12: Programming flow chart 
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call.gms 
$title Call File for European Transport Emission Trading Model 
$ontext 
STRUCTURE: 
         (1)     ASSIGN INPUTS FILES AND LOAD DATA 
         (2)     DEFINE POLICY PARAMETER 
         (3)     GENERATE MODEL 
         (4)     INVOKE SCENARIOS 
         (5)     CREATE RESULTS FILE 
 
***** OPTIONS 
         ds:             name of data source gdx 
         results:        name of result file 
         model:          model file name 
         datadir:        name of data directory 
         resultsdir:     directory for results 
         scenariodir:    directory with scenario files 
         scale:          scaling value for monetary data; orginal unit is 19**9 $ 
         sensi:          yes if sensitivity analysis is performed 
 
***** ELASTICITIES 
         PEtrn:          price elasticity of demand of transport fuels 
                         default: 0.3 
         esub_htop:      substitution between consumption and transport 
                         default: 0.3 
         esub_htrn:      substitution purchased vs own transport 
                         default: 0.2 
         esub_hotc:      substitution other transport costs 
                         default: 0.5 
$offtext 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                   (1)     ASSIGN INPUTS FILES AND LOAD DATA 
*############################################################################### 
* Set Inputs 
$set ds ET_TRN_HTRN 
$set model model 
$set results results_tax 
 
* Assign default values 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set debug $set debug no 
$if not set resultsdir $set resultsdir "..\results\" 
$if not set scenariodir $set scenariodir "..\scenarios\" 
$if not set PEtrn $set PEtrn 0.3 
$if not set scale $set scale 1 
$if not set sensi $set sensi no 
 
* Check inputs 
$if not set ds $abort "###### Specify Data Soource ######" 
$if not set model $abort "##### Specify model file #####" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%ds%.gdx"  $abort "###### Source File Missing ######" 
 
* Install default elasticities 
$if not set PEtrn $set PEtrn 0.3 
$if not set esub_htop $set esub_htop 0.5 
$if not set esub_htrn $set esub_htrn 0.2 
$if not set esub_hotc $set esub_hotc 0.5 
$if not set etagas $set etagas 1 
$if not set etaoil $set etaoil 1 
$if not set etacoa $set etacoa 0.5 
 
* Load data 
$include dataload 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                   (2)     DEFINE POLICY PARAMETER 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         carblimI(r)     endowment for first trading system 
         carblimII(r)    endowment for second trading system 
         carblimIII(r)   endoement for third trading system 
         carblimS(*,r)   endowment for sectoral policy 
         keynes          one if keynesian closure is used     /0/ 
; 
 
carblimI(r)      = 0; 
carblimII(r)     = 0; 
carblimIII(r)    = 0; 
 125
carblimS(i,r)    = 0; 
carblimS("hh",r) = 0; 
 
set 
         etsI(*,r)       sectors under emission trading system I 
         etsII(*,r)      sectors under emission trading system II 
         etsIII(*,r)     sector under emission trading system III 
         intI(r)         countries which participate in international trade with system I 
         intII(r)        countries which participate in international trade with system II 
         intIII(r)       countries which participate in international trade with system III 
         exempted(*,r)   sector exempted from carbon policy 
         euets(*)        sectors under European emissions trading 
         euetsII(*)      sector under European emission trading II 
; 
 
etsI(i,r) = no; etsI("hh",r) = no; etsII(i,r) = no; etsII("hh",r) = no; etsIII(i,r) = no; 
etsIII("hh",r) = no; intI(r) = no; intII(r) = no; intIII(r) = no; exempted(i,r) = no; 
euets(i) = no; euetsII(i)= no; 
 
parameter        redu    reduction requirements by countries (effort sharing) 
         / 
         dnk     0.20 
         fin     0.16 
         fra     0.14 
         deu     0.14 
         gbr     0.16 
         ita     0.13 
         esp     0.10 
         swe     0.17 
         pol     -0.14 
         ben     0.16 
         weu     0.10 
         eeu     -0.15 
         ani     0.05 
         / 
; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                   (3)     DEFINE POLICY PARAMETER 
*############################################################################### 
$include "model" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                   (4)     INVOKE SCENARIOS 
*############################################################################### 
$include "%scenariodir%benchmark" 
$include "%scenariodir%Sectoral" 
$include "%scenariodir%National" 
$include "%scenariodir%Full" 
$include "%scenariodir%ETS" 
$include "%scenariodir%ETS_closed_trn" 
$include "%scenariodir%ETS_trn" 
$include "%scenariodir%ETS_exempt_trn" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                   (5)     CREATE RESULTS FILE 
*############################################################################### 
$if not set results $exit 
$if exist "%resultsdir%%results%.xls" $call "rm %resultsdir%%results%.xls" 
$set workbook "%resultsdir%%results%" 
$set pivotids pivotids.txt 
$batinclude pivotdata activity scenario type from to region 
$batinclude pivotdata price Scenario Variable From To Region 
$batinclude pivotdata abatement Scenario Sector Region 
$batinclude pivotdata carbon Scenario Sector Region 
$batinclude pivotdata reduction Scenario Sector Region 
$batinclude pivotdata carbonlim Scenario Sector Region 
$batinclude pivotdata carbontrade Scenario System Region 
$batinclude pivotdata reduction Scenario Sector Region 
$batinclude pivotdata report Scenario Stat Region 
$batinclude pivotdata trntax Scenario Type Sector Region 
$batinclude pivotdata htrnshares Type Input Region 
$batinclude pivotdata tot scenario type Region 
$batinclude pivotdata eint input sector region 
$batinclude pivotdata cint region 
$batinclude pivotdata expo scenario type level commodity region 
$batinclude pivotdata fueltax sector region 
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dataload.gms 
$title Data load for EU transport Emission Trade Model 
$ontext 
STRUCTURE: 
         (1)     LOAD ALL RELEVANT DATA FROM GDX 
         (2)     DEFINE NESTING SETS 
         (3)     DEFINE AND ASSIGN ELASTICITIES 
         (4)     ADDITIONAL CALIBRATION OF SECTO SPECIFIC RESOURCES 
         (5)     DEFINE REPORT PARAMETER 
$offtext 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                 (1)     LOAD ALL RELEVANT DATA FROM GDX 
*############################################################################### 
set 
         i       set of commodities 
         f       set of factors 
         r       set of regions 
         rnum(r) numeraire region 
         mf(f)   mobile factors 
         sf(f)   sluggish factors 
; 
$load i f r rnum mf sf 
alias (i,j), (r,s); 
 
set 
         eu(r)           EU 27 countries 
         /dnk, fin, fra, deu, gbr, ita, esp, swe, pol, ben, weu, eeu/ 
         annexI(r)       remaining annex I countries 
         /ani/ 
         nonannexI       non-annex I countries 
; 
nonannexI(r)$(not eu(r) and not annexI(r)) = yes; 
 
parameter 
         y0      total output 10^9$ 
         d0      output to domestic market 10^9$ 
         e0      exports 10^9$ 
         to      output tax 
         id0     intermediate inputs  10^9$ 
         pi0     intermediate input price 
         ti      intermediate input tax 
         fd0     factor demand 10^9$ 
         pf0     factor purchase price 
         tf      factor tax 
         c0      total private consumption (incl tax) 10^9$ 
         cd0     private consumption 10^9$ 
         pc0     private consumption purchase price 
         tc      tax on private consumption 
         fs0     factor supply 10^9$ 
         inv0    investment 
         g0      total public consumption (incl tax) 10^9$ 
         gd0     public consumption 10^9$ 
         pg0     public consumption purchase price 
         tg      tax on public consumption 
         bop     balance of payment 10^9$ 
         ctax    direct consumer tax 10^9$ 
         a0      Armington output 10^9$ 
         m0      aggregated imports 10^9$ 
         mad0    transport margin demand for imports 10^9$ 
         md0     import by countries 10^9$ 
         tm      tax on imports 
         te      tax on exports 
         pm0     bilateral import price 
         ma0     transport margin 10^9$ 
         mae0    transport margin exports by country 10^9$ 
         pma0    margin price 10^9$ 
         co20    carbon dioxide emission Gt 
         ra0     benchmark consumers income 
         gov0    benchmark government income 
         check   check of equilibrium conditions should be zero 
; 
$load co20 y0 d0 e0 to id0 pi0 ti fd0 pf0 tf 
$load c0 cd0 pc0 tc fs0 inv0 g0 gd0 pg0 tg bop ctax 
$load a0 m0 mad0 md0 tm te pm0 ma0 mae0 pma0 
 
*------------------------------ Scale Values ----------------------------------- 
scalar   scale   scaling coefficient for values  /%scale%/; 
y0(i,r)       = y0(i,r)*scale; 
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d0(i,r)       = d0(i,r)*scale; 
e0(i,r)       = e0(i,r)*scale; 
id0(i,j,r)    = id0(i,j,r)*scale; 
fd0(f,i,r)    = fd0(f,i,r)*scale; 
c0(r)         = c0(r)*scale; 
cd0(i,r)      = cd0(i,r)*scale; 
fs0(f,r)      = fs0(f,r)*scale; 
inv0(i,r)     = inv0(i,r)*scale; 
g0(r)         = g0(r)*scale; 
gd0(i,r)      = gd0(i,r)*scale; 
bop(r)        = bop(r)*scale; 
ctax(r)       = ctax(r)*scale; 
a0(i,r)       = a0(i,r)*scale; 
m0(i,r)       = m0(i,r)*scale; 
mad0(i,j,r,s) = mad0(i,j,r,s)*scale; 
md0(i,r,s)    = md0(i,r,s)*scale; 
ma0(i)        = ma0(i)*scale; 
mae0(i,r)     = mae0(i,r)*scale; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                        (2)     DEFINE NESTING SETS 
*############################################################################### 
set 
         nhtrn(i)        only household transport 
         /htrn/ 
         ntrn(i)         transport sectors 
         /trn/ 
         next(i)         extraction industries 
         /coa, gas, oil/ 
         nene(i)         all energy commodities 
         /coa, gas, p_c, ely/ 
         nfof(i)         nesting set fossil fuels 
         /coa, gas, p_c/ 
         nely(i)         nesting set electricity 
         /ely/ 
         ncoa(i)         nesting set only coal 
         /coa/ 
         nlqd(i)         nesting set liquid fossil fuels 
         /gas, p_c/ 
         nc(i)           nesting set normal = non-energy consumption commodities 
; 
nc(i)$(not nene(i) and not nhtrn(i)) = yes; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                 (3)     DEFINE AND ASSIGN ELASTICITIES 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         ysub_top(i,r)   substitution elasticity top level production 
         ysub_vae(i,r)   substitution elasticity value added and energy aggregate 
         ysub_va(i,r)    substitution elasticity value added 
         ysub_ene(i,r)   substitution elasticity electricity and fossil fuel aggregate 
         ysub_fof(i,r)   substitution elasticity coal and liquid fossil fuels 
         ysub_lqd(i,r)   substitution elasticity liquid fossil fuels 
         ysub_out(i,r)   output transformation elasticity 
         ysub_pur(i,r)   substitution elasticity purchased transport in household transport                
         ysub_otc(i,r)   substitution elasticity other transport cost in household transport           
         ysub_own(i,r)   substitution elasticity cars and other cost in household transport 
         csub_top(r)     substitution elasticity top level private consumption 
         csub_ce(r)      substitution elasticity top level "normal" and energy commodities 
         csub_c(r)       substitution elasticity top level "normal" commodities 
         csub_e(r)       substitution elasticity top level energy commodities 
         gsub_top(r)     top level elasticity public consumption 
         msub(i,r)       elasticity for imports from different countries 
         dmsub(i,r)      Armington elasticity 
         tsub(i)         elasticity for transport margins from different countries 
         sfsub(f,r)      sector specific resource transformation elasticity 
; 
 
scalar 
         PEtrn           price elasticity for private fuel demand               /%PEtrn%/ 
         sub_htop        substitution elasticity consumption transport          /%esub_htop%/ 
         sub_htrn        substitution elasticity purchased own transport        /%esub_htrn%/ 
         sub_hotc        substitution elasticity other transport cost           /%esub_hotc%/ 
; 
 
* Production 
ysub_top(i,r)    = 0; 
ysub_vae(i,r)    = 0.8; 
ysub_va(i,r)     = 1; 
ysub_ene(i,r)    = 0.3; 
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ysub_fof(i,r)    = 0.5; 
ysub_lqd(i,r)    = 1; 
ysub_out(i,r)    = 2; 
ysub_vae(next,r) = 0; 
ysub_va(next,r)  = 1; 
 
* Household transport 
ysub_top(nhtrn,r)    = sub_htop; 
ysub_pur(nhtrn,r)    = sub_htrn; 
ysub_otc(nhtrn,r)    = sub_hotc; 
ysub_own(nhtrn,r)    = PEtrn/(1-(id0("p_c","htrn",r)/sum(i$(not ntrn(i)), id0(i,"htrn",r)))); 
 
* Consumption 
csub_top(r)      = 0.5; 
csub_ce(r)       = 0.25; 
csub_c(r)        = 0.5; 
csub_e(r)        = 0.4; 
 
* Other 
gsub_top(r)      = 0; 
msub(i,r)        = 5; 
msub(nfof,r)     = 4; 
msub("p_c",r)    = 6; 
msub("ely",r)    = 0.5; 
dmsub(i,r)       = 2.5; 
dmsub("ely",r)   = 0.3; 
tsub(i)          = 1; 
sfsub(f,r)       = 0.0001; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*        (4)     ADDITIONAL CALIBRATION OF SECTOR SPECIFIC RESOURCES 
*############################################################################### 
* Define sector Specific Resource 
mf(f) = yes; sf(f) = no; 
mf("res") = no; sf("res") = yes; 
 
parameter temptax         temporary tax parameter; 
 
scalar         moveLR  share moved to resources        /0.5/; 
 
loop((next,r)$(not fd0("res",next,r) and y0(next,r)), 
         tf("res",next,r)  = 0; 
         fd0("res",next,r) = fd0("lab",next,r)*moveLR; 
tf("lab",next,r)  = fd0("lab",next,r)*tf("lab",next,r)/((1-moveLR)                       
              *fd0("lab",next,r)); 
         pf0("lab",next,r) = 1 + tf("lab",next,r); 
         fs0("lab",r)      = fs0("lab",r) - fd0("lab",next,r)*moveLR; 
         fs0("res",r)      = fs0("res",r) + fd0("lab",next,r)*moveLR; 
         fd0("lab",next,r)       = fd0("lab",next,r) - fd0("lab",next,r)*moveLR; 
); 
 
loop(i$(not next(i)), 
         temptax(r)      = tf("cap",i,r)*fd0("cap",i,r)  + tf("res",i,r)*fd0("res",i,r); 
         fd0("cap",i,r)  = fd0("cap",i,r) + fd0("res",i,r); 
         tf("cap",i,r)$fd0("cap",i,r)   = (temptax(r))/fd0("cap",i,r); 
         pf0("cap",i,r)  = 1 + tf("cap",i,r); 
         fd0("res",i,r)  = 0; 
); 
fs0(f,r) = sum(i, fd0(f,i,r)); 
 
* Calibrate extractive industries first level elasticity to supply elasticity 
parameter 
         eta             supply elasticity of fossil fuel supply 
         extshare        share of sector specific resources in extractive industries 
; 
 
eta("gas") = %etagas%; 
eta("oil") = %etaoil%; 
eta("coa") = %etacoa%; 
 
extshare(next,r)$y0(next,r) = sum(sf, fd0(sf,next,r)*pf0(sf,next,r))/y0(next,r); 
ysub_top(next,r)$y0(next,r) = eta(next) * sum(sf, fd0(sf,next,r)*pf0(sf,next,r))/y0(next,r); 
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*############################################################################### 
*                        (5)     DEFINE REPORT PARAMETER 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         activity        report parameter for activities 
         price           report variable for prices 
         carbon          report variable for carbon 
         carbonlim       report of carbon limit 
         reduction       report of carbon reduction 
         report          other reports 
         abatement       report of abatement costs 
         carbontrade     report carbon trade 
         intermediates   report on intermediate demand 
         trntax          report on tax income from transport sectors 
         tot             report on terms of trade changes 
         expo            exports 
         impo            imports 
; 
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MPSGE code 
$title International GTAP Model Including Household Transport 
option solprint=off, limrow=0, limcol=0; 
$ontext 
$model:trnet 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                ECONOMY DEFINITION 
*############################################################################### 
$sectors: 
         Y(i,r)$y0(i,r)                                   ! Production activity 
         C(r)                                             ! Private consumption 
         G(r)                                             ! Government consumption 
         M(i,r)$m0(i,r)                                   ! Imports 
         A(i,r)$a0(i,r)                                   ! Armington aggregations 
         YT(i)$ma0(i)                                     ! International transport services 
         E(i,j,r)$(a0(i,r) and id0(i,j,r) and nfof(i))    ! Energy commodity with carbon 
         EC(i,r)$(cd0(i,r) and nfof(i))                   ! Household energy commodities 
         FT(f,r)$(sf(f) and fs0(f,r))                     ! Sluggish factor transformation 
         INV(r)$keynes                                    ! Investment sector 
         EMIT(i,r)$co20("total",i,r)                      ! Emission in industries 
         EMITH(r)                                         ! Household emissions 
         EXEMPT(i,r)$(exempted(i,r) and co20("total",i,r))! Carbon exemption 
         EXEMPTH(r)$exempted("hh",r)                      ! Household carbon exemption 
 
$commodities: 
         PY(i,r)$y0(i,r)                                  ! Domestic commodity price 
         PX(i,r)$e0(i,r)                                  ! Export price 
         PC(r)                                            ! Private consumption price 
         PG(r)                                            ! Public consumption price 
         PM(i,r)$m0(i,r)                                  ! Import price 
         PA(i,r)$a0(i,r)                                  ! Armington price 
         PT(i)$ma0(i)                                     ! Transport margin price 
         PF(f,r)$fs0(f,r)                                 ! Factor supply 
         PFT(f,i,r)$(fd0(f,i,r) and sf(f))                ! Price of sector specific factors 
         PE(i,j,r)$(a0(i,r) and id0(i,j,r) and nfof(i))   ! Price energy commodity with carbon 
         PEC(i,r)$(cd0(i,r) and nfof(i))                  ! Price household energy goods 
         PINV(r)$keynes                                   ! Price aggregated investments 
 
         Pcarbon(i,r)$co20("total",i,r)                     ! emission price in sectors 
         Ecarbon(i,r)$(co20("total",i,r) and exempted(i,r)) ! Carbon Price exempted sectors 
         EcarbonH(r)$exempted("hh",r)                       ! Carbon Price exempted household 
         PcarbonH(r)                                        ! Emission price for household 
         PcarbI(r)$(carblimI(r) and not intI(r))            ! Permit price trading system I 
         PcarbII(r)$(carblimII(r) and not intII(r))         ! Permit price trading system II 
         PcarbIII(r)$(carblimIII(r) and not intIII(r))      ! Permit price trading system III 
         WcarbI$(sum(r, carblimI(r)) and card(intI))        ! International permit price I 
         WcarbII$(sum(r, carblimII(r)) and card(intII))     ! International permit price II 
         WcarbIII$(sum(r, carblimIII(r)) and card(intIII))  ! International permit price III 
         PcarbS(i,r)$carblimS(i,r)                          ! Sectoral carbon price 
         PcarbH(r)$carblimS("hh",r)                         ! Household carbon price  
 
$consumers: 
         RA(r)     ! Representative Agent 
         GOV(r)    ! Government 
 
$auxiliary: 
         LS(r)     ! Multiplier constraint for lumpsum revenue recycling 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                EMISSION SYSTEM 
*############################################################################### 
$prod:exempt(i,r)$(exempted(i,r) and co20("total",i,r)) 
         O:Ecarbon(i,r)          Q:1 
         I:Pcarbon(i,r)          Q:1 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:(-0.99999999) 
 
$prod:exemptH(r)$exempted("hh",r) 
         O:EcarbonH(r)          Q:1 
         I:PcarbonH(r)          Q:1 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:(-0.99999999) 
 
$prod:emit(i,r)$co20("total",i,r) 
         O:Pcarbon(i,r)                                                  Q:1 
         I:PcarbI(r)$(etsI(i,r) and carblimI(r) and not intI(r))         Q:1 
         I:PcarbII(r)$(etsII(i,r) and carblimII(r) and not intII(r))     Q:1 
         I:PcarbIII(r)$(etsIII(i,r) and carblimII(r) and not intIII(r))  Q:1 
         I:WcarbI$(etsI(i,r) and carblimI(r) and intI(r))                Q:1 
         I:WcarbII$(etsII(i,r) and carblimII(r) and intII(r))            Q:1 
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         I:WcarbIII$(etsIII(i,r) and carblimIII(r) and intIII(r))        Q:1 
         I:PcarbS(i,r)$carblimS(i,r)                                     Q:1 
 
$prod:emitH(r) 
         O:PcarbonH(r)                                                      Q:1 
         I:PcarbI(r)$(etsI("hh",r) and carblimI(r) and not intI(r))         Q:1 
         I:PcarbII(r)$(etsII("hh",r) and carblimII(r) and not intII(r))     Q:1 
         I:PcarbIII(r)$(etsIII("hh",r) and carblimIII(r) and not intIII(r)) Q:1 
         I:WcarbI$(etsI("hh",r) and carblimI(r) and intI(r))                Q:1 
         I:WcarbII$(etsII("hh",r) and carblimII(r) and intII(r))            Q:1 
         I:WcarbIII$(etsIII("hh",r) and carblimIII(r) and intIII(r))        Q:1 
         I:PcarbH(r)$carblimS("hh",r)                                       Q:1 
 
$prod:E(nfof,i,r)$(a0(nfof,r) and id0(nfof,i,r))    s:0 
         O:PE(nfof,i,r)                  Q:(id0(nfof,i,r)*pi0(nfof,i,r)) 
         I:PA(nfof,r)                    Q:id0(nfof,i,r)         P:pi0(nfof,i,r) 
+                                        A:GOV(r)                T:ti(nfof,i,r) 
         I:Pcarbon(i,r)$(co20("total",i,r) and not exempted(i,r)) 
+                                        Q:co20(nfof,i,r)        P:1e-6 
         I:Ecarbon(i,r)$(co20("total",i,r) and exempted(i,r)) 
+                                        Q:co20(nfof,i,r)        P:1e-6 
 
$prod:EC(nfof,r)$cd0(nfof,r)     s:0 
         O:PEC(nfof,r)                   Q:(cd0(nfof,r)*pc0(nfof,r)) 
         I:PA(nfof,r)                    Q:cd0(nfof,r)           P:pc0(nfof,r) 
+                                        A:GOV(r)                T:tc(nfof,r) 
         I:PcarbonH(r)$(not exempted("hh",r)) 
+                                        Q:co20(nfof,"hh",r)     P:1e-6 
         I:EcarbonH(r)$exempted("hh",r) 
+                                        Q:co20(nfof,"hh",r)     P:1e-6 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                PRODUCTION 
*############################################################################### 
$prod:Y(i,r)$(y0(i,r) and not next(i) and not nhtrn(i))     s:ysub_top(i,r)    t:ysub_out(i,r) 
+                        vae(s):ysub_vae(i,r) 
+                        va(vae):ysub_va(i,r)    ene(vae):ysub_ene(i,r) 
+                        fof(ene):ysub_fof(i,r) 
+                        lqd(fof):ysub_lqd(i,r) 
         O:PY(i,r)               Q:d0(i,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:to(i,r) 
         O:PX(i,r)               Q:e0(i,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:to(i,r) 
         I:PF(mf,r)              Q:fd0(mf,i,r)   P:pf0(mf,i,r)    va: 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:tf(mf,i,r) 
         I:PFT(sf,i,r)           Q:fd0(sf,i,r)   P:pf0(sf,i,r)    va: 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:tf(sf,i,r) 
         I:PA(j,r)$(not nfof(j)) Q:id0(j,i,r)    P:pi0(j,i,r)    ene:$nely(j) 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:ti(j,i,r) 
         I:PE(nfof,i,r)          Q:(id0(nfof,i,r)*pi0(nfof,i,r)) fof:$ncoa(nfof) 
+                                                                lqd:$nlqd(nfof) 
 
$prod:Y(nhtrn,r)$y0(nhtrn,r)     s:ysub_top(nhtrn,r) 
+                                pur(s):ysub_pur(nhtrn,r) own(s):ysub_own(nhtrn,r) 
+                                otc(own):ysub_otc(nhtrn,r) 
         O:PY(nhtrn,r)           Q:y0(nhtrn,r) 
         I:PA(i,r)$(not nfof(i)) Q:id0(i,nhtrn,r) P:pi0(i,nhtrn,r)       pur:$ntrn(i) 
+                                                                        otc:$(not ntrn(i)) 
+                                A:GOV(r)         T:ti(i,nhtrn,r) 
         I:PE(nfof,nhtrn,r)      Q:(id0(nfof,nhtrn,r)*pi0(nfof,nhtrn,r)) own: 
 
 
$prod:Y(next,r)$y0(next,r)       s:ysub_top(next,r)      t:ysub_out(next,r) 
+                        vae(s):ysub_vae(next,r) 
+                        va(vae):ysub_va(next,r) 
         O:PY(next,r)            Q:d0(next,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)                T:to(next,r) 
         O:PX(next,r)            Q:e0(next,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)                T:to(next,r) 
         I:PF(mf,r)              Q:fd0(mf,next,r)        P:pf0(mf,next,r) va: 
+                                A:GOV(r)                T:tf(mf,next,r) 
         I:PFT(sf,next,r)        Q:fd0(sf,next,r)        P:pf0(sf,next,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)                T:tf(sf,next,r) 
         I:PA(j,r)$(not nfof(j)) Q:id0(j,next,r)         P:pi0(j,next,r) vae: 
+                                A:GOV(r)                T:ti(j,next,r) 
         I:PE(nfof,next,r)       Q:(id0(nfof,next,r)*pi0(nfof,next,r))   vae: 
 
 
$prod:FT(sf,r)$(fs0(sf,r))    t:sfsub(sf,r) 
         O:PFT(sf,i,r)           Q:fd0(sf,i,r) 
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         I:PF(sf,r)              Q:fs0(sf,r) 
 
$report: 
         V:exports(i,r)                  O:PX(i,r)       Prod:Y(i,r) 
         V:intdem(i,j,r)$(not nfof(i))   I:PA(i,r)       Prod:Y(j,r) 
         V:intdem(i,j,r)$nfof(i)         I:PA(i,r)       Prod:E(i,j,r) 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                  TRADE 
*############################################################################### 
$prod:YT(i)$ma0(i)       s:tsub(i) 
         O:PT(i)         Q:ma0(i) 
         I:PX(i,r)       Q:mae0(i,r) 
 
$prod:M(i,r)$m0(i,r)     s:msub(i,r)      s.tl:0 
         O:PM(i,r)               Q:m0(i,r) 
         I:PX(i,s)               Q:md0(i,s,r)    P:pm0(i,s,r)    s.tl: 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:(tm(i,s,r)*(1+te(i,s,r))) 
+                                A:GOV(s)        T:te(i,s,r) 
         I:PT(j)#(s)             Q:mad0(j,i,s,r) P:pma0(i,s,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:tm(i,s,r) 
 
$prod:A(i,r)$a0(i,r)     s:dmsub(i,r) 
         O:PA(i,r)               Q:a0(i,r) 
         I:PY(i,r)               Q:d0(i,r) 
         I:PM(i,r)               Q:m0(i,r) 
 
$report: 
         V:Imports(i,s,r)        I:PX(i,s)       PROD:M(i,r) 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                 FINAL DEMAND 
*############################################################################### 
$prod:C(r)               s:csub_top(r) 
+                        ce:csub_ce(r) 
+                        c(ce):csub_c(r)         e(ce):csub_e(r) 
         O:PC(r)                 Q:c0(r) 
         I:PA(i,r)$(not nfof(i)) Q:cd0(i,r)      P:pc0(i,r)      c:$nc(i) 
+                                                                e:$nene(i) 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:tc(i,r) 
         I:PEC(nfof,r)           Q:(cd0(nfof,r)*pc0(nfof,r))     e: 
 
 
$prod:G(r)               s:gsub_top(r) 
         O:PG(r)                 Q:g0(r) 
         I:PA(i,r)               Q:gd0(i,r)      P:pg0(i,r) 
+                                A:GOV(r)        T:tg(i,r) 
 
$prod:INV(r)$keynes     s:0 
         O:PINV(r)               Q:(sum(i, inv0(i,r))) 
         I:PA(i,r)               Q:inv0(i,r) 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                 ENDOWMENTS 
*############################################################################### 
$demand:RA(r)    s:1 
         D:PC(r)                 Q:c0(r) 
         E:PF(f,r)               Q:fs0(f,r) 
         E:PC(r)                 Q:(-ctax(r))            R:LS(r) 
         D:PINV(r)$keynes        Q:(sum(i, inv0(i,r))) 
         E:PA(i,r)$(not keynes)  Q:(-inv0(i,r)) 
 
$demand:GOV(r) 
         D:PG(r)                         Q:g0(r) 
         E:PC(r)                         Q:(ctax(r))             R:LS(r) 
         E:PC(rnum)                      Q:bop(r) 
         E:PcarbI(r)$(not intI(r))       Q:carblimI(r) 
         E:PcarbII(r)$(not intII(r))     Q:carblimII(r) 
         E:PcarbIII(r)$(not intIII(r))   Q:carblimIII(r) 
         E:WcarbI$intI(r)                Q:carblimI(r) 
         E:WcarbII$intII(r)              Q:carblimII(r) 
         E:WcarbIII$intIII(r)            Q:carblimIII(r) 
         E:PcarbS(i,r)                   Q:carblimS(i,r) 
         E:PcarbH(r)                     Q:carblimS("hh",r) 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                              ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
*############################################################################### 
$constraint:LS(r) 
         G(r)            =E=     1; 
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$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset trnet 
trnet.workspace = 15; 
trnet.reslim    = 8000; 
PC.FX(rnum)      = 1; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                REPLICATION CHECK 
*############################################################################### 
LS.L(r)          = 1; 
LS.LO(r)         = - inf; 
Pcarbon.L(i,r)   = 0; 
PcarbonH.L(r)    = 0; 
PcarbI.L(r)      = 0; 
PcarbII.L(r)     = 0; 
PcarbIII.L(r)    = 0; 
WcarbI.L         = 0; 
WcarbII.L        = 0; 
WcarbIII.L       = 0; 
PcarbS.L(i,r)    = 0; 
PcarbH.L(r)      = 0; 
emit.L(i,r)      = co20("total",i,r); 
emitH.L(r)       = co20("total","hh",r); 
 
trnet.iterlim = 0; 
$include trnet.gen 
solve trnet using MCP; 
trnet.iterlim = 100000; 
 
display "precision of benchmark: ", trnet.objval; 
abort$(trnet.objval ge 1e-4) "Model does not replicate"; 
 
* Save benchmark income values 
ra0(r) = RA.L(r); 
gov0(r)= GOV.L(r); 
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Appendix C Additional tables for Chapter 5 
Table 46: Private transport by trip purpose [billion pkm] 
 Leisure Work 
 
Bench-
mark ETS 
ETS 
AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Bench-
mark ETS 
ETS 
AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Bus 80.309 80.367 80.370 80.237 79.688 84.463 11.347 11.361 11.361 11.352 11.319 11.554 
Car 596.620 596.495 596.516 595.997 593.758 596.233 327.229 327.344 327.352 327.279 326.979 318.421 
Metro/tram 8.759 8.767 8.768 8.741 8.626 9.437 3.342 3.347 3.348 3.339 3.305 3.496 
Plane 41.091 41.094 40.966 41.126 41.271 40.942 2.830 2.832 2.820 2.838 2.863 2.737 
Slow 38.495 38.278 38.281 38.336 38.598 51.880 28.834 28.691 28.693 28.751 29.021 37.586 
Train 46.931 46.944 46.942 47.006 47.286 46.992 8.397 8.404 8.404 8.420 8.491 8.184 
Total 812.205 811.944 811.843 811.442 809.228 829.945 381.979 381.979 381.979 381.979 381.979 381.979 
 
 
Table 47: Private transport by trip distance [billion pkm] 
 Short Long 
 
Bench-
mark ETS ETS AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX ETS SUB 
Bench-
mark ETS 
ETS 
AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Bus 90.495 90.566 90.569 90.428 89.845 94.837 1.161 1.161 1.162 1.161 1.161 1.180 
Car 892.322 892.315 892.314 891.788 889.410 883.303 31.528 31.524 31.555 31.488 31.327 31.350 
Metro/tram 12.101 12.115 12.115 12.080 11.931 12.933 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Plane 0.111 0.111 0.110 0.111 0.112 0.108 43.811 43.815 43.676 43.853 44.023 43.571 
Slow 65.760 65.409 65.413 65.525 66.049 87.369 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Train 55.328 55.348 55.346 55.426 55.777 55.175 1.568 1.560 1.561 1.562 1.571 2.097 
Total 1116.117 1115.864 1115.868 1115.358 1113.124 1133.726 78.067 78.059 77.954 78.064 78.083 78.198 
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Table 48: Private transport by travel period [billion pkm] 
 Peak Off-Peak 
 
Bench-
mark ETS 
ETS 
AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Bench-
mark ETS 
ETS 
AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Bus 18.072 18.085 18.086 18.061 17.959 18.762 73.584 73.642 73.646 73.528 73.048 77.255 
Car 165.283 165.303 165.307 165.230 164.902 162.680 758.566 758.537 758.562 758.046 755.836 751.974 
Metro/tram 2.802 2.805 2.805 2.798 2.767 2.951 9.300 9.310 9.311 9.282 9.164 9.982 
Plane 5.643 5.643 5.628 5.647 5.662 5.612 38.279 38.283 38.158 38.317 38.473 38.067 
Slow 14.912 14.843 14.844 14.867 14.974 19.077 52.416 52.125 52.130 52.220 52.645 70.389 
Train 9.257 9.260 9.260 9.272 9.324 9.182 46.072 46.087 46.086 46.154 46.453 45.993 
Total 215.968 215.938 215.929 215.874 215.589 218.264 978.216 977.985 977.893 977.548 975.618 993.660 
 
 
 
Table 49: Effects on domestic production [% vs benchmark] 
 ETS ETS AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
 ETS ETS AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX 
ETS 
SUB 
Agriculture -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.51 -0.05 Mining -0.12 -0.12 -0.28 -0.97 -1.19 
Air transport 0.09 -0.37 0.58 2.70 -0.20 Motor vehicles -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.19 
Coal -33.29 -33.30 -33.08 -31.81 -33.08 Other transport  -2.00 -2.00 -2.01 -2.04 -2.00 
Energy intensives  -0.13 -0.11 -1.24 -5.40 -0.18 Refined oils 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.18 -1.23 
Electricity -3.04 -3.03 -3.06 -3.13 -3.11 Rail transport -0.03 -0.01 0.40 2.16 0.99 
Natural gas -4.60 -4.60 -4.60 -4.59 -4.42 Services -0.86 -0.91 -1.18 -2.41 -1.20 
Manufacture -4.26 -4.27 -4.18 -3.77 -4.11 Water transport -0.67 -0.67 -0.55 -0.02 21.75 
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Table 50: Trade effects [% vs benchmark] 
 Exports Imports 
 ETS ETS AIR ETS FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX ETS SUB ETS ETS AIR 
ETS 
FUEL 
FUEL 
TAX ETS SUB 
Agriculture 0.23 0.24 -0.03 -1.18 0.29 -0.31 -0.31 -0.20 0.28 -0.43 
Air transport 0.32 -0.51 0.82 3.01 0.08 -0.30 -0.13 0.17 2.19 -0.69 
Coal -33.79 -33.79 -33.56 -32.22 -33.56 -32.75 -32.75 -32.55 -31.35 -32.55 
Crude oil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.85 -0.90 -1.18 -2.40 -1.19 
Energy intensives  -4.69 -4.69 -4.72 -4.80 -4.70 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.39 0.25 
Electricity -17.27 -17.26 -17.22 -17.01 -17.04 -0.93 -0.93 -0.95 -1.00 -0.76 
Natural gas -4.04 -4.06 -3.94 -3.40 -3.81 -4.74 -4.74 -4.72 -4.58 -4.79 
Nuclear fuel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manufacture -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.32 -0.47 
Mining -2.40 -2.40 -2.40 -2.37 -2.33 -1.48 -1.48 -1.51 -1.61 -1.56 
Motor vehicles 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.33 -1.02 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.26 -1.84 
Other transport  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.14 1.38 -0.46 -0.44 0.50 4.70 0.52 
Refined oils -1.75 -1.80 -2.07 -3.28 -2.06 0.53 0.48 0.19 -1.08 0.15 
Rail transport -0.95 -0.94 -0.81 -0.19 21.45 -0.33 -0.33 -0.23 0.20 22.11 
Services 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.53 -0.59 -0.59 -0.58 -0.55 -0.68 
Water transport 7.18 7.25 8.02 11.75 8.51 -1.03 -1.02 -0.55 1.50 -1.30 
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Appendix D GAMS codes for the Small Open Economy model 
 
Calibration procedure 
The codes for the calibration are run in the order as they are stated. 
 
Extract the social accounting matrix from the German input-output table 
$title Extract IO table from XLS and save as GDX 
$ontext 
(1)      EXTRACT BASE DATA 
(2)      EXTRACT PARAMETER 
(3)      LOAD ENERGY DATA 
(4)      SPLIT CRUDE OIL SECTOR 
(5)      ENERGY AND EMISSION FLOWS 
(6)      SAVE PARAMETERS 
 
Options: 
         - iot           name of excel sheet containing data 
         - pio:          name of excel sheet containing physical energy data 
         - datadir       name of directory containing data 
         - resdir        name of directory for dumping results 
$offtext 
 
 
$if not set iot $set iot IO_2004_simple 
$if not set piot $set piot PIOT_2004 
$if not set result $set result "%iot%_extracted" 
 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set resdir $set resdir "%datadir%" 
$if not set iot $abort "########## IO TABLE NOT SPECIFIED ###########" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                       (1) EXTRACT BASE DATA 
*############################################################################### 
 
*--------------------------- EXTRACT DATA TO GDX ------------------------------- 
$onecho >temp.tmp 
o=%datadir%%iot%.gdx 
par=domIO        rng=IO_domestic!D13     rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=impIO        rng=IO_import!D13       rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=Ouse         rng=Use!D13             rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=Omake        rng=Make!D13            rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=consumption  rng=Consumption!D6      rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=labor        rng=Labor!D8            rdim=1  cdim=1 
dset=i           rng=MAP!D2              rdim=1 
set=mapCPA       rng=MAP!C2              rdim=2 
set=c            rng=MAP!H2              rdim=1 
set=mapc         rng=MAP!G2              rdim=2 
$offecho 
$call "gdxxrw %datadir%\%iot%.xls @temp.tmp" 
 
*---------------------------- LOAD DATA TO GAMS -------------------------------- 
set 
         n       numbers 
         /1*200/ 
         i       set of commodities 
         c       set of consumption classes 
         mapCPA  map for commodities in CPA 
         mapC    mapping for consumption transition matrix 
         adjK    sectors for which capital payments are negative and  are adjusted 
; 
alias(i,j,k), (n,nn); 
parameter 
         domIO           domestic IO table (basic prices) 
         impIO           import IO table (basic prices) 
         Ouse            original use matrix (market prices) 
         Omake           original make matrix (basic plus transition to market prices) 
         consumption     consumption transition matrix 
         labor           employment per sector 
; 
 
$gdxin %datadir%\%iot%.gdx 
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$load i c mapCPA mapC 
$load domIO impIO Ouse Omake consumption labor 
$gdxin 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                       (2) EXTRACT PARAMETER 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         y0              benchmark total [million €] 
         d0              benchmark output to domestic market [million €] 
         e0              benchmark exports [million €] 
         id0             benchmark intermediate input [million €] 
         kd0             benchmark capital demand 
         ld0             benchmark labor demand 
         otax            benchmark output tax [million €] 
         utax            benchmark tax for commodity use [million €] 
         a0              benchmark Armington demand [million €] 
         m0              benchmark imports [million €] 
         cd0             benchmark private consumption demand [million €] 
         c0              benchmark total consumption [million €] 
         ks0             benchmark capital supply [million €] 
         ls0             benchmark labor supply [million €] 
         gd0             benchmark public consumption demand [million €] 
         g0              benchmark total public consumption [million €] 
         inv0            benchmark investment demand [million €] 
         bop             balance of payment 
         cons            consumption matrix 
         lab             labor force 
; 
 
id0(i,j)         = sum((n,nn)$(mapCPA(n,i) and mapCPA(nn,j)), domIO(n,nn) + impIO(n,nn)); 
cd0(i)           = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO(n,"73") + domIO(n,"78") + impIO(n,"73") +    
    impIO(n,"78")); 
c0               = sum(i, cd0(i)); 
gd0(i)           = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO(n,"74") + domIO(n,"75") 
                                  + impIO(n,"74") + impIO(n,"75")); 
g0               = sum(i, gd0(i)); 
inv0(i)          = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO(n,"76") + domIO(n,"77") 
                                  + impIO(n,"76") + impIO(n,"77") ); 
e0(i)            = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO(n,"79")); 
m0(i)            = sum(mapCPA(n,i), impIO(n,"82") - impIO(n,"79")); 
kd0(i)           = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO("78",n) + domIO("79",n)); 
ld0(i)           = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO("76",n)); 
adjK(i)$(kd0(i) lt 0)    = yes; 
ld0(i)           = ld0(i) + min(kd0(i),0); 
kd0(i)           = max(kd0(i),0); 
ks0              = sum(i, kd0(i)); 
ls0              = sum(i, ld0(i)); 
utax(i)          = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO("74",n)); 
otax(i)          = sum(mapCPA(n,i), domIO("77",n)); 
y0(i)            = sum(j, id0(j,i)) + ld0(i) + kd0(i) + otax(i) + utax(i); 
d0(i)            = y0(i) - e0(i); 
a0(i)            = m0(i) + d0(i); 
bop              = sum(i, m0(i) - e0(i)); 
cons(i,c)        = sum((n,nn)$(mapCPA(n,i) and mapc(nn,c)), consumption(n,nn)); 
lab(i,"total")   = sum(mapCPA(n,i), labor(n,"1")); 
lab(i,"employed")= sum(mapCPA(n,i), labor(n,"2")); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                     (3) LOAD ENERGY DATA 
*############################################################################### 
$onecho >temp1.tmp 
o=%datadir%%piot%.gdx 
set=e            rng=MAP!B2              rdim=1 
set=mape         rng=MAP!A2              rdim=2 
par=eiot         rng=energy!C3           rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=eriot        rng=eenergy!C3          rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=emissions    rng=emissions!C1        rdim=1  cdim=0 
par=prices       rng=prices!A1           rdim=1  cdim=0 
$offecho 
$call "gdxxrw %datadir%%piot%.xls @temp1.tmp" 
 
set 
         e               energy commodities 
         mape            map numerical accounts to energy commodities 
; 
 
parameter 
         eiot            original energy flows in TJ 
         eriot           original emission relevant energy flows in TJ 
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         emissions       original emission in 1000 t 
         prices          price of energy carriers 
; 
 
$gdxin "%datadir%%piot%" 
$load e mape 
$load eiot eriot emissions prices 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                     (4) SPLIT CRUDE OIL SECTOR 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         ene0            total energy flow (with double counting) 
         shareC          crude oil share in total demand by sector 
; 
 
i("gas") = yes; 
ene0(e,i)        = sum((n,nn)$(mapCPA(n,i) and mape(nn,e)), eiot(n,nn)); 
ene0(e,"HH")     = sum(mape(n,e), eiot("72",n)); 
ene0(e,"imp")    = sum(mape(n,e), eiot("73",n)); 
ene0(e,"exp")    = sum(mape(n,e), eiot("74",n)); 
ene0(e,"prod")   = sum(mape(n,e), eiot("75",n)); 
shareC(i)$(prices("cru")*ene0("cru",i) + prices("gas")*ene0("gas",i)) 
                 =  prices("cru")*ene0("cru",i)/(prices("cru")*ene0("cru",i) 
                    + prices("gas")*ene0("gas",i)); 
id0("gas",i)     = id0("cru",i)*(1-shareC(i)); 
id0("cru",i)     = id0("cru",i)*shareC(i); 
cd0("gas")       = cd0("cru"); 
cd0("cru")       = 0; 
gd0("gas")       = gd0("cru"); 
gd0("cru")       = 0; 
cons("gas",c)    = cons("cru",c); 
cons("cru",c)    = 0; 
y0("gas")        = y0("cru"); 
y0("cru")        = 0; 
e0("gas")        = e0("cru"); 
e0("cru")        = 0; 
id0(i,"gas")     = id0(i,"cru"); 
id0(i,"cru")     = 0; 
kd0("gas")       = kd0("cru"); 
kd0("cru")       = 0; 
ld0("gas")       = ld0("cru"); 
ld0("cru")       = 0; 
m0("gas")        = m0("cru") - sum(i, id0("cru",i)) - inv0("cru"); 
m0("cru")        = sum(i, id0("cru",i)) + inv0("cru"); 
d0(i)            = y0(i) - e0(i); 
a0(i)            = d0(i) + m0(i); 
otax("gas")      = otax("cru"); 
otax("cru")      = 0; 
utax("gas")      = utax("cru"); 
utax("cru")      = 0; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                     (5) ENERGY AND EMISSION FLOWS 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         evf             emission relevant energy from i used in sector j 
         evh             emission relevant energy from i used in household consumption 
         eevf            emission relevant energy from energy commodity e used in sector j 
         eevh            emission relevant energy from energy commodity e used in consumption 
         co20            benchmark co2 emission in 1000t 
; 
 
eevf(e,i)                = sum((n,nn)$(mapCPA(n,i) and mape(nn,e)), eriot(n,nn)); 
eevh(e)                  = sum(mape(n,e),eriot("72",n)); 
evf("coa",i)             = sum(mapCPA(n,i), eriot(n,"2") + eriot(n,"3")); 
evh("coa")               = eriot("72","2") + eriot("72","3"); 
evf("coa","gas")         = evf("coa","cru"); 
evf("coa","cru")         = 0; 
evf("gas",i)             = sum(mapCPA(n,i), eriot(n,"12")); 
evh("gas")               = eriot("72","12"); 
evf("gas","gas")         = evf("gas","cru"); 
evf("gas","cru")         = 0; 
evf("p_c",i)             = sum(mapCPA(n,i), eriot(n,"4")); 
evh("p_c")               = eriot("72","4"); 
evf("p_c","gas")         = evf("p_c","cru"); 
evf("p_c","cru")         = 0; 
co20("total",i)          = sum(mapCPA(n,i), emissions(n)); 
co20("total","gas")      = co20("total","cru"); 
co20("total","cru")      = 0; 
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co20("total","hh")       = emissions("72"); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                     (6)   SAVE DATA 
*############################################################################### 
execute_unload "%resdir%%result%" i, c, e, 
                         y0, d0, e0, id0, kd0, ld0, otax, utax, m0, a0, 
                         cd0, gd0, inv0, bop, c0, g0, 
                         cons, lab 
                         evf, eevf, evh, eevh, co20, ene0 
                         mapCPA, mapC 
; 
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Calibrate discrete electricity generation technologies 
 
$title Calibrates Electricity Sector Generation Technologies 
$ontext 
(1)      LOAD DATA 
(2)      CALIBRATION MODEL 
(3)      CREATE NUCLEAR INPUT 
(4)      ADJUST ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
(5)      SAVE RESULTS 
 
OPTIONS: 
         -iot            name of gdx file containing basic sam 
         -sam            name of file containing extracted sam 
         -datadir        name of directory containing data 
         -bu             name of xls file providing bottom up electricity generation data 
         -ele            label of electricity sector 
         -out            name of output gdx 
$offtext 
 
$set iot IO_2004_simple 
$if not set sam $set sam "%iot%_extracted" 
$set bu Technologies_DISS_v04_27042009 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set out $set out "%iot%_Bottom_up" 
$if not set iot $abort "####### SPECIFY DATA SOURCE ########" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%iot%.gdx" $abort "######## DATA SOURCE MISSING ########" 
$if not set bu $abort"####### SPECIFY BOTTOM UP DATA #######" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%bu%.xls" $abort "BOTTOM UP DATA MISSING #######" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (1) LOAD  DATA 
*############################################################################### 
 
*----------------------------- TOP DOWN DATA ---------------------------------- 
set 
         i       commodity set 
         e       energy commodity set 
         c       consumption classes 
         mapCPA  map for commodities in CPA 
         mapC    mapping for consumption transition matrix 
; 
alias(i,j); 
parameter 
         d0      domestic output [million €] 
         e0      exports [million €] 
         y0      total output [million €] 
         id0     intermediate inputs [million €] 
         kd0     capital demand [million €] 
         ld0     labor demand [million €] 
         otax    output and production taxes [million €] 
         utax    commodity use taxes [million €] 
         c0      total private consumption [million €] 
         cd0     private consumption demand [million €] 
         inv0    investment demand [million €] 
         g0      total public consumption [million €] 
         gd0     public consumption demand [million €] 
         bop     balance of payment [million €] 
         m0      imports [million €] 
         a0      armington supply [million €] 
         cons    consumption transition matrix [million €] 
         lab     labor force [1000 people] 
         ene0    total energy flow (with double counting)[TJ] 
         evf     emission relevant energy from commodity i used in sector j  [TJ] 
         evh     emission relevant energy from commodity i used in household consumption [TJ] 
         eevf    emission relevant energy from energy commodity e used in sector j [TJ] 
         eevh    emission relevant energy from energy commodity e used in consumption [TJ] 
         co20    emissions [1000 t] 
; 
 
$gdxin "%datadir%%sam%" 
$load i e c 
$load d0 e0 y0 id0 kd0 ld0 otax utax 
$load c0 cd0 inv0 g0 gd0 bop 
$load m0 a0 cons lab 
$load ene0 evf evh eevf eevh co20 
$load mapCPA mapC 
$gdxin 
 
parameter 
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         ekd             capital demand of electricity sector 
         eld             labor demand of electricity sector 
         eid             commodity demand electricity sector 
         eout            output electricity sector 
         etax            output tax electricity sector 
         eene            energy flows to electricity sector 
; 
 
ekd      = kd0("ele"); 
eld      = ld0("ele"); 
eid(i)   = id0(i,"ele"); 
eout     = y0("ele"); 
etax     = otax("ele") + utax("ele"); 
eene(e)  = eevf(e,"ele"); 
 
*----------------------------- BOTTOM UP DATA ---------------------------------- 
set 
         g               set of technologies 
         ga(g)           set of active technologies 
         gn(g)           set of non-active technologies 
         l               set of load segments 
         r               set of renewables 
         mapL            mapping technology to load 
         mapF            mapping technology to fuel 
; 
alias(ga,gaa); 
 
parameter 
         techn           technology data 
         gener           generation by technology in TWh 
         minmaxOI        minimum maximum share of other activity 
; 
 
$onecho >temp.tmp 
set=g            rng=Cost_Shares_CGE!B2          rdim=1  cdim=0 
dset=l           rng=Cost_Shares_CGE!A2          rdim=1  cdim=0 
set=mapL         rng=Cost_Shares_CGE!A2          rdim=2  cdim=0 
set=mapF         rng=Cost_Shares_CGE!I2          rdim=2  cdim=0 
par=techn        rng=Cost_Shares_CGE!B1:H16      rdim=1  cdim=1 
par=gener        rng=Generation!A2               rdim=1  cdim=0 
par=minmaxOI     rng=Other!A1 
$offecho 
$call "gdxxrw %datadir%%bu%.xls @temp.tmp" 
$gdxin "%bu%" 
$load g l mapl mapf techn gener minmaxOI 
$gdxin 
 
parameter 
         eff             plant efficiency 
         pfuel           fuel prices 
         pgen            generation prices 
         share           cost shares in generation 
; 
eff(g)                   = techn(g,"efficiency"); 
pgen(g)                  = techn(g,"pgen"); 
pfuel(g)                 = techn(g,"pfuel"); 
share("cap",g)           = techn(g,"capital"); 
share("lab",g)           = techn(g,"labor"); 
share("fuel",g)          = techn(g,"fuel"); 
share("gener","total")   = sum(g, gener(g)*pgen(g))/eout; 
ga(g)$gener(g) = yes; gn(g)$(not gener(g)) = yes; 
r(g)$(share("fuel",g) eq 0) = yes; 
share("outVal",g)        = pgen(g)*gener(g)/sum(ga, pgen(ga)*gener(ga)); 
share("outPhy",g)        = gener(g)/sum(ga, gener(ga)); 
 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                            (2) CALIBRATION MODEL 
*############################################################################### 
scalar 
         wK              weight on capital share         /1/ 
         wL              weight on labor share           /1/ 
         wI              weight on fuel share            /1/ 
         wO              weight on output share          /1/ 
         wEFF            weight on efficiency            /1/ 
         wGEN            weight on total generation      /0/ 
; 
 
Variable 
 143
         DEV             sum of fractional deviation 
         devGK           deviation generation capital share 
         devGL           deviation generation labor share 
         devGI           deviation generation fuel share 
         devEFF          deviation efficiency 
         devOUT          deviation generation output share 
         devG            deviation generation 
; 
 
Positive Variable 
         OI              material input non-generation 
         OK              capital input non-generation 
         OL              labor input non-generation 
         GI              fuel inputs to technologies 
         GK              capital input to technologies 
         GL              labor input to technologies 
         GO              output technologies 
         GEFF            efficiency of technologies 
         SK              capital share 
         SL              labor share 
         SI              fuel share 
         SO              output share 
         SG              generation share 
; 
 
equation 
         obj             objective function 
         zpf             total zero profits 
         mkt_i           market clearing material 
         mkt_k           market clearing capital 
         mkt_l           market clearing labor 
         zpf_G           technology zero profits 
         effiec          efficiency definition 
         def_devGK       Definition deviation generation capital share 
         def_devGL       Definition deviation generation labor share 
         def_devGI       Definition deviation generation fuel share 
         def_devEFF      Definition deviation efficiency 
         def_devOUT      Definition deviation generation output share 
         def_devG        Definition deviation generation share 
         def_SK          Definition capital share 
         def_SI          Definition fuel share 
         def_SL          Definition labor share 
         def_SO          Definition output share 
         def_SG          Definition generation share 
; 
 
*------------------------------ OBJECTIVE -------------------------------------- 
obj.. 
         DEV             =E=     100*sum(ga, wK*sqr(devGK(ga)) 
                                         + wL*sqr(devGL(ga)) 
                                         + wI*sqr(devGI(ga)) 
                                         + wO*sqr(devOUT(ga)) 
                                         + wEFF*sqr(devEFF(ga)) 
                                         + wGEN*devG 
                                 ) 
; 
 
*-------------------------- DEFINTION OF DEVIATIONS ---------------------------- 
def_devGK(ga).. 
         devGK(ga)       =E=     SK(ga)/share("cap",ga) - 1 
; 
 
def_devGL(ga).. 
         devGL(ga)       =E=     SL(ga)/share("lab",ga) - 1 
; 
 
 
def_devGI(ga)$pfuel(ga).. 
         devGI(ga)       =E=     SI(ga)/share("fuel",ga) - 1 
; 
 
def_devOUT(ga).. 
         devOUT(ga)      =E=     SO(ga)/share("outVAL",ga) - 1 
; 
 
def_devEFF(ga)$pfuel(ga).. 
         devEFF(ga)      =E=     GEFF(ga)/eff(ga) - 1 
; 
 
def_devG.. 
 144
         devG            =E=     SG/share("gener","total") - 1 
; 
 
*------------------------------- OVERALL LEVEL --------------------------------- 
zpf.. 
         eout            =E=    sum(ga, GK(ga)) + OK + sum(i, sum(ga, GI(i,ga)) + OI(i)) 
                                + sum(ga, GL(ga)) + OL + etax 
; 
 
mkt_i(i).. 
         eid(i)          =E=     sum(ga, GI(i,ga)) + OI(i) 
; 
 
mkt_k.. 
         ekd             =E=     sum(ga, GK(ga)) + OK 
; 
 
mkt_l.. 
         eld             =E=     sum(ga, GL(ga)) + OL 
; 
 
*------------------------------- GENERATION LEVEL ------------------------------ 
zpf_G(ga).. 
         GO(ga)          =E=     sum(i, GI(i,ga)) + GK(ga) + GL(ga) 
; 
 
effiec(ga)$pfuel(ga).. 
         GEFF(ga)        =E=     GO(ga)*pfuel(ga)/(sum(i,GI(i,ga))*pgen(ga)) 
; 
 
*------------------------ SHARE DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------ 
def_SK(ga).. 
         SK(ga)          =E=     GK(ga)/GO(ga) 
; 
 
def_SL(ga).. 
         SL(ga)          =E=     GL(ga)/GO(GA) 
; 
 
def_SI(ga)$pfuel(ga).. 
         SI(ga)          =E=     sum(i, GI(i,ga))/GO(ga) 
; 
 
def_SO(ga).. 
         SO(ga)          =E=     GO(ga)/sum(gaa, GO(gaa)) 
; 
 
def_SG.. 
         SG              =E=     sum(ga, GO(ga))/eout 
; 
 
*----------------------- MODEL ASSIGNEMENT AND BOUNDS -------------------------- 
model calib /all/; 
 
* Install lower bound to avoid domain errors 
GK.LO(ga)                = 0.001; 
GL.LO(ga)                = 0.00001; 
GI.LO(i,ga)$(pfuel(ga) and mapF(i,ga)) = 0.00001; 
GEFF.LO(ga)$pfuel(ga)    = 0.00001; 
GO.LO(ga)                = 0.00001; 
OK.LO                    = 0.00001; 
OL.LO                    = 0.00001; 
 
* Fix fuel share and efficiency for technologies with no fuel input 
GI.FX(i,ga)$(not pfuel(ga)) = 0; 
GEFF.FX(ga)$(not pfuel(ga)) = 0; 
GI.FX(i,ga)$(not mapF(i,ga))= 0; 
 
* Assing intital values 
GK.L(ga)                 = share("cap",ga) * gener(ga) * pgen(ga); 
GL.L(ga)                 = share("lab",ga) * gener(ga) * pgen(ga); 
GI.L(i,ga)$mapF(i,ga)    = share("fuel",ga) * gener(ga) * pgen(ga); 
GEFF.L(ga)               = eff(ga); 
GO.L(ga)                 = gener(ga) * pgen(ga); 
 
* Additional bounds on consumption of other activities 
OI.UP(i)$minmaxOI(i,"max") = minmaxOI(i,"max")*eid(i); 
OI.LO(i)$minmaxOI(i,"min") = minmaxOI(i,"min")*eid(i); 
 
* Coal is only used in electricity generation 
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OI.FX("coa") = 0; 
 
* Setting lower and upper bound for fractional deviation 
scalar 
         maxdev  maximum deviation       /1/ 
         mindev  maximum deviation       /-1/ 
; 
 
devGK.UP(ga)         = maxdev; 
devGL.UP(ga)         = maxdev; 
devGI.UP(ga)         = maxdev; 
devEFF.UP(ga)        = maxdev; 
devOUT.UP(ga)        = maxdev; 
 
devGK.LO(ga)         = mindev; 
devGL.LO(ga)         = mindev; 
devGI.LO(ga)         = mindev; 
devEFF.LO(ga)        = mindev; 
devOUT.LO(ga)        = mindev; 
 
solve calib minimizing dev using NLP; 
 
parameter 
         quality         quality report 
; 
 
quality("K_share",ga,"predicted") = share("cap",ga)*100; 
quality("K_share",ga,"actual")    = SK.L(ga)*100; 
quality("K_share",ga,"deviation") = devGK.L(ga)*100; 
quality("L_share",ga,"predicted") = share("lab",ga)*100; 
quality("L_share",ga,"actual")    = SL.L(ga)*100; 
quality("L_share",ga,"deviation") = devGL.L(ga)*100; 
quality("F_share",ga,"predicted") = share("fuel",ga)*100; 
quality("F_share",ga,"actual")    = SI.L(ga)*100; 
quality("F_share",ga,"deviation") = devGI.L(ga)*100; 
quality("eff",ga,"predicted")     = eff(ga)*100; 
quality("eff",ga,"actual")        = GEFF.L(ga)*100; 
quality("eff",ga,"deviation")     = devEFF.L(ga)*100; 
quality("Pgen",ga,"predicted")    = pgen(ga); 
quality("Pgen",ga,"actual")       = GO.L(ga)/gener(ga); 
quality("Pgen",ga,"deviation")    = (quality("Pgen",ga,"actual") 
/quality("Pgen",ga,"predicted") - 1)*100; 
quality("Value_Share",ga,"predicted") = share("outVAL",ga); 
quality("Value_Share",ga,"actual")    = SO.L(ga); 
quality("Value_Share",ga,"deviation") = devOUT.L(ga)*100; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                         (3) ASSIGN TECHNOLOGY DATA 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         unit    technology coefficients 
; 
 
*------------------------ active technologies ---------------------------------- 
unit("cap",ga)   = SK.L(ga); 
unit("lab",ga)   = SL.L(ga); 
unit(i,ga)$mapF(i,ga) = SI.L(ga); 
unit("eff",ga)   = GEFF.L(ga); 
unit("out",ga)   = GO.L(ga); 
unit("TWh",ga)   = gener(ga); 
unit("Pgen",ga)  = GO.L(ga)/gener(ga); 
 
*------------------------ inactive technologies -------------------------------- 
unit("cap",gn)           = share("cap",gn); 
unit("lab",gn)           = share("lab",gn); 
unit(i,gn)$mapF(i,gn)    = share("fuel",gn); 
unit("Pgen",gn)          = pgen(gn); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                         (3) ADJUST ELECTRICITY SECOTR 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         lod0    generation demand by load 
; 
 
id0(i,"ele")     = id0(i,"ele") - sum(ga, unit(i,ga)*unit("out",ga)); 
kd0("ele")       = kd0("ele") - sum(ga, unit("cap",ga)*unit("out",ga)); 
ld0("ele")       = ld0("ele") - sum(ga, unit("lab",ga)*unit("out",ga)); 
lod0(l,"ele")    = sum(ga$mapl(l,ga), unit("out",ga)); 
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*############################################################################### 
*                         (4) CREATE NUCLEAR INPUT 
*############################################################################### 
i("nuc") = yes; 
y0("nuc") = 0; e0("nuc") = 0; id0(j,"nuc") = 0; 
mapF("p_c","nuclear") = no; mapf("nuc","nuclear") = yes; 
unit("nuc","nuclear") 
          = unit("p_c","nuclear"); unit("p_c","nuclear") = 0; 
m0("nuc") = unit("out","nuclear") * unit("nuc","nuclear"); 
a0("nuc") = m0("nuc"); 
a0("p_c") = a0("p_c") - a0("nuc"); 
m0("p_c") = m0("p_c") - m0("nuc"); 
d0(i)     = y0(i) - e0(i); 
a0(i)     = d0(i) + m0(i); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                         (5) SAVE RESULTS 
*############################################################################### 
execute_unload "%datadir%%out%" i, c, e, g, ga, gn, mapF, mapL, l, 
                         y0, d0, e0, id0, kd0, ld0, otax, utax, m0, a0, lod0, 
                         cd0, gd0, inv0, bop, c0, g0, 
                         cons, lab 
                         evf, eevf, evh, eevh, co20, ene0, 
                         unit, quality, 
                         mapCPA, mapC 
; 
 
*------------------ Dump quality results to XLS -------------------------------- 
$if exist "%datadir%Quality.xls" $call "rm %datadir%Quality.xls" 
set 
         labels 
         /Variab, Technology, Status, Value/ 
; 
 
execute_unload "temp.gdx" labels, quality; 
$onecho >temp.tmp 
o=%datadir%Quality.xls 
set=labels       rng=Quality!A1          cdim=1 
par=quality      rng=Quality!A2          cdim=0 
$offecho 
execute "gdxxrw temp.gdx @temp.tmp"; 
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Impose private transport data 
 
$title Calibration routine to calibrate transport sectors 
$ontext 
(1)      LOAD SAM DATA 
(2)      LOAD BOTTOM UP DATA 
(3)      SPECIFY CAR TECHNOLOGIES 
(4)      LOAD AND AGGREGATE TREMOVE DATA 
(5)      ASSING VALUES FOR TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 
(6)      SAVE DATA 
 
options: 
         -iot            name of gdx file containing basic sam 
         -sam            nema of file containing exttracted sam 
         -datadir        name of directory containing data 
         -car            name of xls file providing bottom up electricity generation data 
         -out            name of output gdx 
         -tbu            name of xls file containing transport data 
$offtext 
 
$set iot IO_2004_simple 
$set tbu transport_one 
$set out "%iot%_transport_one" 
$if not set sam $set sam "%iot%_Bottom_up" 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set out $set out "%iot%_Bottom_up_Car" 
$if not set iot $abort "####### SPECIFY DATA SOURCE ########" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%iot%.gdx" $abort "######## DATA SOURCE MISSING ########" 
$if not set tbu $abort"####### SPECIFY BOTTOM UP DATA #######" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%tbu%.xls" $abort "BOTTOM UP DATA MISSING #######" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (1) LOAD SAM DATA 
*############################################################################### 
 
*---------------------------- TOP DOWN DATA ------------------------------------ 
set 
         i       commodity set 
         e       energy commodity set 
         c       consumption classes 
         g       electricity technologies 
         ga      active generation technologies 
         gn      inactive technologies 
         l       load segments 
         mapF    mapping fuels to technologies 
         mapL    mapping technology to load 
         mapCPA  map for commodities in CPA 
         mapC    mapping for consumption transition matrix 
         ptrn    public transport modes in sam 
         /otp, atp, rail/ 
; 
alias(i,j); 
parameter 
         d0      domestic output [million €] 
         e0      exports [million €] 
         y0      total production [million €] 
         id0     intermediate inputs [million €] 
         kd0     capital demand [million €] 
         ld0     labor demand [million €] 
         otax    output and production taxes [million €] 
         utax    commodity use taxes [million €] 
         c0      total private consumption [million €] 
         cd0     private consumption demand [million €] 
         inv0    investment demand [million €] 
         g0      total public consumption [million €] 
         gd0     public consumption demand [million €] 
         bop     balance of payment [million €] 
         m0      imports [million €] 
         a0      armington supply [million €] 
         cons    consumption transition matrix [million €] 
         lab     labor force [1000 people] 
         ene0    total energy flow (with double counting)[TJ] 
         evf     emission relevant energy from commodity i used in sector j  [TJ] 
         evh     emission relevant energy from commodity i used in household consumption [TJ] 
         eevf    emission relevant energy from energy commodity e used in sector j [TJ] 
         eevh    emission relevant energy from energy commodity e used in consumption [TJ] 
         co20    emissions [1000 t] 
         unit    unit input vector of generation technologies 
         lod0    electricity demand by load 
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         quality quality report of generation technology calibration 
; 
$gdxin "%datadir%%sam%" 
$load i e c g ga gn l mapF mapL 
$load y0 d0 e0 id0 kd0 ld0 otax utax 
$load c0 cd0 inv0 g0 gd0 bop 
$load m0 a0 cons lab 
$load ene0 evf evh eevf eevh co20 
$load unit lod0 quality 
$load mapCPA mapC 
$gdxin 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (2) LOAD BOTTOM UP DATA 
*############################################################################### 
set 
         ct      car classes 
         cf      car fuels 
         sc      stock classes 
         re      reference cars 
         om      original transport modes 
         m       aggregated transport modes 
         oa      original transport aims 
         a       aggregated transport aims 
         maprt   mapping reference car to car class 
         mapm    mode mapping 
         mapa    aim mapping 
         nn      aggregated TREMOVE networks 
         nv      aggregated TREMOVE vehicle classes 
         np      aggregated TREMOVE trip purposes 
         nd      aggregated TREMOVE distance 
         tp      travel period 
         mapn    mapping TRREMOVE networks 
         mapv    mapping TRREMOVE networks 
         mapp    mapping TRREMOVE networks 
         mapd    mapping TRREMOVE networks 
         maptp   mapping TRREMOVE networks 
; 
alias(ct,cct), (cf,ccf), (sc, ssc); 
alias(nn,nnn), (nnp,np), (nnv,nv), (nnd,nd), (ttp,tp); 
 
parameter 
         stockCT         car stock by car classes [million] 
         stockCF         car stock by fuel [million] 
         reference       reference cars 
         addfuel         additional data on fuels 
         opkm            original pkm data by 
; 
 
*------------------------ LOAD DATA FROM SPREADSHEET --------------------------- 
$onecho >temp.tmp 
set=ct           rng=stock!A3            cdim=0  rdim=1 
set=cf           rng=stock!F3            cdim=0  rdim=1 
set=sc           rng=stock!G2            cdim=1  rdim=0 
set=re           rng=reference!B2        cdim=1  rdim=0 
set=maprt        rng=reference!A30       cdim=0  rdim=2 
set=om           rng=pkm!K3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
dset=m           rng=pkm!L3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
set=mapm         rng=pkm!K3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
set=oa           rng=pkm!N3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
dset=a           rng=pkm!O3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
set=mapa         rng=pkm!N3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
dset=nn          rng=map!L3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
dset=nv          rng=map!G3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
dset=np          rng=map!B3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
dset=nd          rng=map!P3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
dset=tp          rng=map!T3              cdim=0  rdim=1 
set=mapn         rng=map!K3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
set=mapv         rng=map!F3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
set=mapp         rng=map!A3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
set=mapd         rng=map!O3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
set=maptp        rng=map!S3              cdim=0  rdim=2 
par=stockCT      rng=stock!A2 
par=stockCF      rng=stock!F2 
par=reference    rng=reference!A2 
par=addfuel      rng=fuel!A2 
par=opkm         rng=pkm!A1 
$offecho 
 
$call "gdxxrw %datadir%%tbu%.xls @temp.tmp" 
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$gdxin "%tbu%" 
$load ct, cf, re, maprt, om, m, mapm, oa, a, mapa, sc 
$load stockCT, stockCF, reference, addfuel, opkm 
$load nn nv np nd tp mapn maptp mapv mapd mapp 
 
*--------------------------- ASSIGN PARAMETERS --------------------------------- 
parameter 
         refprice        reference car price by fuel and class [€] 
         reffuel         reference fuel use by fuel and class [l per 100 km] 
         refccm          reference cubic capacity by fuel and class [100 ccm] 
         reflife         reference lifetime by fuel and class [years] 
         refint          reference interest rate by fuel and technology 
         refco2          reference co2 emissions by fuel and technology [g per km] 
         refother        reference annual other cost by fuel and technology 
; 
 
refprice(cf,ct)    = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference("price",re)); 
reffuel(cf,ct)     = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference(cf,re)); 
refccm(cf,ct)      = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference("ccm",re)); 
reflife(cf,ct)     = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference("lifetime",re)); 
refint(cf,ct)      = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference("interest",re)); 
refco2(cf,ct)      = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference("co2",re)); 
refother(cf,ct)    = sum(re$(maprt(re,ct) and reference(cf,re)), reference("other",re)); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                       (3) SPECIFY CAR TECHNOLOGIES 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         avl             average [liter per km]  from historical values 
         avkm            average kilometer per car [km per car] from historical values 
         accm            average cubic capacity per car implied by mvh tax fitting 
         MUpcar          markup car prices to base car 
         pfuel           implied fuel price 
         cartax          car taxes 
         os              implied share of transport fuel in total refined oil spendings 
         carprice        average car price as implied by SAM 
         mucar           markup of diesel car as implied by reference car 
         muccm           markup of cubic capacity as implied by reference cars 
         prefcar         price of reference gasoline car implied by SAM and markup 
         vat             value added tax in final consumption    /0.16/ 
         rental          rental price of existing stock cars      
         tc              consumption tax rate 
         carshare        cost share of cars 
; 
tc(i) = vat; 
parameter 
         tfueld0         fuel demand by car technology [million €] 
         tcard0          demand for car by technology [million €] 
         totherd0        demand for other inputs [million €] 
         tout0           output of car technologies 
         cartax          motor vehicle tax per car [€ per car] 
         fueltax         fuel taxes 
         pvkm0           implied price per vehicle kilometer [€ per vkm] 
         ecar0           energy consumption of cars 
         snd0            stock demand for new cars [million €] 
         ssd0            stock demand for existing stock [million €] 
         sy0             stock activity output [million €] 
         Pstock0         existing car stock [#] 
         stock0          household endowment of cars 
         ts              stock tax for new car purchases 
; 
 
 
avl(cf)                  = addfuel("liter",cf)/addfuel(„km“,cf); 
avkm(cf,ct)              = addfuel(„km“,cf)/sum(sc, stockCF(cf,sc)); 
fueltax(cf)              = (addfuel("mwst",cf) + addfuel("oiltax",cf)) 
                           /(addfuel(„fuel“,cf) - addfuel("mwst",cf) 
                           - addfuel("oiltax",cf)); 
pfuel(cf)                = addfuel(„fuel“,cf)/addfuel("liter",cf); 
rental(cf)      = addfuel(“rental”,cf) 
*--------------------------------- STOCK ACTIVITY ------------------------------ 
carprice("average","all")= cd0("mvh")/sum(cf, stockCF(cf,"new")); 
mucar(cf,ct)             = refprice(cf,ct)/refprice(„gasoline“,“standard“); 
carprice(cf,ct)          = mucar(cf,ct)*carprice("average","all"); 
snd0("mvh",cf,“standard“)= mucar(cf,“standard“)*stockCF(cf,"new")*cd0("mvh") 
                           /sum(ccf, mucar(ccf,“standard“)*stockCF(cf,"new")); 
cd0("mvh")               = 0; 
ssd0(cf,ct)              = rental(cf)*stockCF(cf,"stock"); 
ts                       = vat; 
sy0(cf,ct)               = (1+vat)*snd0("mvh",cf,ct) + ssd0(cf,ct); 
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tcard0(cf,ct)            = sy0(cf,ct); 
Pstock0("stock",cf,ct)   = stockCF(cf,"stock"); 
Pstock0("new",cf,ct)     = stockCF(cf,"new"); 
Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct)   = stockCF(cf,"stock") + stockCF(cf,"new"); 
stock0(cf,ct)            = ssd0(cf,ct); 
tfueld0(„p_c“,cf,ct)     = addfuel(„fuel“,cf) - addfuel("mwst",cf) - addfuel("oiltax",cf); 
cd0(„p_c“)               = cd0(„p_c“) - sum((cf,ct), tfueld0(„p_c“,cf,ct)); 
os                       = sum((cf,ct), (1+fueltax(cf))*tfueld0(„p_c“,cf,ct)) 
                           /(sum((cf,ct), (1+fueltax(cf))*tfueld0(„p_c“,cf,ct)) 
                           + 1.418*cd0(„p_c“)); 
muccm(cf,ct)             = refccm(cf,ct)/refccm(„gasoline“,“standard“); 
accm(cf,ct)              = refccm(„gasoline“,“standard“)*muccm(cf,ct); 
cartax(cf,ct)            = Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct)*muccm(cf,ct) 
                           *(refccm(„gasoline“,“standard“)/100) 
                           *addfuel(„cartax“,cf); 
accm(cf,ct)              = 100*(cartax(cf,ct)/Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct))/addfuel(„cartax“,cf); 
cartax(cf,ct)      = cartax(cf,ct)*(addfuel(„cartaxtotal“,“gasoline“) 
     /sum((ccf,cct), cartax(ccf,cct))); 
accm(cf,ct)              = (cartax(cf,ct)/Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct))/addfuel(„cartax“,cf)*100; 
cartax(cf,ct)            = cartax(cf,ct)/Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct); 
totherd0(i,cf,ct)$(cons(i,“total“) and not sameas(i,“p_c“)) 
                         = cons(i,"wkfz")/cons(i,“total“)*cd0(i) 
                           *Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct) 
                           /sum( (ccf,cct), Pstock0(„total“,ccf,cct)); 
cd0(i)$(not sameas(i,“p_c“)) = cd0(i) - sum((cf,ct), totherd0(i,cf,ct)); 
*------------------------------ COMPUTE TOTAL OUTPUT --------------------------- 
tout0(cf,ct)             = sum(i, totherd0(i,cf,ct)*(1+vat) 
                           + tfueld0(i,cf,ct)*(1+fueltax(cf))) 
                           + tcard0(cf,ct) + Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct)*cartax(cf,ct); 
pvkm0(cf,ct)             = tout0(cf,ct)/addfuel(„km“,cf); 
carshare("car",cf,ct)    = (tcard0(cf,ct) + Pstock0(„total“,cf,ct)*cartax(cf,ct)) 
                           /tout0(cf,ct); 
carshare("other",cf,ct)  = sum(i, totherd0(i,cf,ct)*(1+vat))/tout0(cf,ct); 
carshare(„fuel“,cf,ct)   = sum(i,tfueld0(i,cf,ct)*(1+fueltax(cf)))/tout0(cf,ct); 
*--------------------------- ASSIGN ENERGY VALUES ------------------------------ 
ecar0(„p_c“,“gasoline“,ct) = eevh(„gasoline“); 
ecar0(„p_c“,“diesel“,ct)   = eevh(„diesel“); 
evh(i)                     = evh(i) - sum((cf,ct), ecar0(i,cf,ct)); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                     (4) LOAD AND AGGREGATE TREMOVE DATA 
*############################################################################### 
$include"%datadir%tremove.inc" 
parameter 
         pkm             person and tonne km [million] 
         vkm             vehicle kilometer [million] 
         vot             value of time  [€ per hour] 
         pce             passenger car equivalents [million] 
         speed           speed on networks [km per hour] 
         duration        length of travel period [hours] 
; 
 
pkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) = sum((p,d,tper,v,n)$(mapn(n,nn) and mapd(d,nd) and mapv(v,nv) 
                                 and mapp(p,np) and maptp(tper,tp)), Tpkm(p,d,tper,v,n)); 
vkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) = sum((p,d,tper,v,n)$(mapn(n,nn) and mapd(d,nd) and mapv(v,nv) 
                                 and mapp(p,np) and maptp(tper,tp)), Tvkm(p,d,tper,v,n)); 
pce(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) = sum((p,d,tper,v,n)$(mapn(n,nn) and mapd(d,nd) and mapv(v,nv) 
and mapp(p,np) and maptp(tper,tp)), Tvkm(p,d,tper,v,n)*Tpcu(v)); 
alias(v,vv), (p,pp), (d,dd); 
speed(nv,tp,nn)$sum((np,nd),vkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn)) 
                    = sum((v,tper,n)$(mapv(v,nv) and maptp(tper,tp) and mapn(n,nn)), 
                          Tspeed(v,tper,n)*sum((pp,dd), Tvkm(pp,dd,tper,v,n))) 
                         /sum((np,nd),vkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn)); 
speed(nv,tp,nn)$(not sum((np,nd),vkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn))) 
                   = sum((v,tper,n)$(mapv(v,nv) and maptp(tper,tp) and mapn(n,nn)), 
                         Tspeed(v,tper,n)); 
vot(np,nd,tp,nv,nn)$pkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) 
                   = sum((p,d,tper,v,n)$(mapn(n,nn) and mapd(d,nd) and mapv(v,nv) 
                                 and mapp(p,np) and maptp(tper,tp)), 
                                 Tvot(p,d,tper,v,n)*Tpkm(p,d,tper,v,n)) 
                                 /pkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn); 
duration(tp)      = sum(maptp(tper,tp), Tduration(tper)); 
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*############################################################################### 
*               (5) ASSING VALUES FOR TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 
*############################################################################### 
*-------------------------------- PHYSICAL VALUES ------------------------------ 
parameter 
         tact0   transport activity physical data 
; 
 
tact0(„pkm“,np,nd,tp,nv,nn)       = pkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn); 
tact0(„vkm“,np,nd,tp,nv,nn)       = vkm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn); 
tact0("pce",np,nd,tp,nv,nn)       = pce(np,nd,tp,nv,nn); 
tact0("speed",np,nd,tp,nv,nn)     = speed(nv,tp,nn); 
tact0("vot",np,nd,tp,nv,nn)       = vot(np,nd,tp,nv,nn); 
tact0("pcu",np,nd,tp,nv,nn)       = sum(mapv(v,nv), Tpcu(v)); 
 
*-------------------------- MONETARY VALUES: CARS ------------------------------ 
set 
         allm(*,*,*,*,*)    set of all modes distances ... 
         aallm(*,*,*,*,*)   set of all modes distances ... 
; 
allm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) = yes; aallm(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) = yes; 
 
parameter 
         vkm0            scaled vehicle kilometers of cars 
         share_pkm       share of pkm by trip class in total pkm of cars 
         tactin0         input vectors to transport activities gross 
         tactcarin0      input vectors to transport activities 
         tay0            output of transport activities 
         occup           occupancy rate 
; 
vkm0(cf,ct)      = addfuel(„km“,cf) 
  *sum((nnp,nnd,ttp,nnn), tact0(„vkm“,nnp,nnd,ttp,"car",nnn)) 
        /sum(ccf, addfuel(„km“,ccf)); 
pvkm0(cf,ct)       = tout0(cf,ct)/vkm0(cf,ct); 
occup(allm)$tact0(„vkm“,allm) = tact0(„pkm“,allm)/tact0(„vkm“,allm); 
tactcarin0(cf,ct,np,nd,tp,"car",nn)  
= pvkm0(cf,ct)*tact0(„vkm“,np,nd,tp,"car",nn) 
                               *vkm0(cf,ct)/sum((ccf,cct),vkm0(ccf,cct)); 
parameter 
         share_vkm      share of cars' vkm in total cars' vkm 
; 
*----------------------------- RAIL TRANSPORT ---------------------------------- 
tactin0("rail",np,nd,tp,"PTRAIN",nn) 
                         = cd0("rail")* 
                           tact0(„pkm“,np,nd,tp,"PTRAIN",nn)/ 
                           sum((nnp,nnd,ttp,nnn), tact0(„pkm“,nnp,nnd,ttp,"PTRAIN",nnn)); 
cd0("rail") = 0; 
*----------------------------- BUS/METRO TRANSPORT ----------------------------- 
set 
         public  sub set of modes which belong to public urban transport 
         /METRAM, BUS/ 
; 
alias(public,ppublic); 
tactin0("otp",np,nd,tp,public,nn) 
                         =  cd0("otp")*tact0(„pkm“,np,nd,tp,public,nn)/ 
                            sum((nnp,nnd,ttp,ppublic,nnn), 
tact0(„pkm“,nnp,nnd,ttp,ppublic,nnn)); 
cd0("otp") = 0; 
*----------------------------- AIR TRANSPORT ----------------------------------- 
tactin0("atp",np,nd,tp,"PLANE",nn) 
                         =  cd0("atp")*tact0(„pkm“,np,nd,tp,"PLANE",nn)/ 
                            sum((nnp,nnd,ttp,nnn), tact0(„pkm“,nnp,nnd,ttp,"PLANE",nnn)); 
cd0("atp") = 0; 
*----------------------------- CREATE MONETARY INPUTS -------------------------- 
tay0(np,nd,tp,nv,nn) = sum(i, tactin0(i,np,nd,tp,nv,nn)) 
                       + sum((cf,ct), tactcarin0(cf,ct,np,nd,tp,nv,nn)); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                            (6) SAVE DATA 
*############################################################################### 
execute_unload "%datadir%%out%" i, c, e, g, ga, gn, mapF, mapL, l, 
                         y0, d0, e0, id0, kd0, ld0, otax, utax, m0, a0, lod0, 
                         cd0, gd0, inv0, bop, c0, g0, 
                         cons, lab 
                         evf, eevf, evh, eevh, co20, ene0, ecar0 
                         unit, quality, 
                         mapCPA, mapC, 
                         tactin0=taid0, tactcarin0=tacard0, tact0, tay0, 
                         tout0=cy0, totherd0=cid0, tcard0=ccd0, tfueld0=cfd0 
                         stock0, snd0, ssd0, sy0=sy0, Pstock0, 
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                         nn=n, nv=m, np=p, nd=d, tp 
                         lavmohr, cf, ct 
                         fueltax=tfuel cartax tc=tother 
                         refco2 tnew ts pvkm0 vkm0; 
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Impose tax system 
$title Program to impose tax system on the transport dataset 
 
$set data IO_2004_simple_transport_one 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set out $set out "%data%_tax" 
$if not set data $abort "###### NO SOURCE FILE SPECIFIED ######" 
$if not exist "%datadir%%data%.gdx" $abort "##### SOURCE FILE DOES NOT EXIST #####" 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                             (1) LOAD DATA 
*############################################################################### 
set 
         i       set of commodities 
         c       set of consumption account in transition matrix 
         g       set of generation technologies 
         e       energy commodities 
         ga      set of active generation technologies 
         gn      set of inactive generation technologies 
         mapF    mapping fuels to technologies 
         mapL    mapping technology to load 
         l       load segments 
         n       set of transport networks 
         m       set of transport modes 
         p       set of transport purposes 
         d       set of transport distances 
         tp      set of travel periods 
         cf      set of car fuels 
         ct      set of car technologies 
; 
allias(i,j); 
 
parameter 
         y0      total production [million €] 
         d0      production for domestic market [million €] 
         e0      production for exports [million €] 
         id0     intermediate demand [million €] 
         kd0     capital demand [million €] 
         ld0     labor demand [million €] 
         otax    output tax [million €] 
         utax    use taxes [million €] 
         lod0    demand by load [million €] 
         m0      imports [million €] 
         a0      armington supply [million €] 
         unit    unit netput vector for generation technologies 
         c0      total private consumption [million €] 
         g0      total public consumption [million €] 
         inv0    investment demand [million €] 
         bop     balance of payment [million €] 
         cd0     private demand [million €] 
         gd0     public demand [million €] 
         ls0     labor supply [million €] 
         ks0     capital supply [million €] 
         cons    consumption matrix 
         taid0   intermediate inputs transport activities [million €] 
         tacard0 car demand by transport activities [million €] 
         tay0    output of transport activities [million €] 
         tact0   physical data on transport activities [pkm vkm pce in million - km per hour] 
         lavmohr average kilometer per trip for public transport [km] 
         cy0     output of car technologies [million €] 
         cid0    input of car technologies [million €] 
         ccd0    car input of car technologies [million €] 
         cfd0    fuel demand by car technology [million €] 
         refco2  reference emissions [g c02 per km] 
         vkm0    of cars by class [million vkm] 
         stock0  stock of car technologies [million €] 
         snd0    demand for new cars [million €] 
         ssd0    demand for car stock [million €] 
         sy0     output of stock activity 
         Pstock0 stock of cars [million] 
         ts      tax on new car purchases 
         evh     energy demand household [TJ] 
         eevh    enery demand household by energy commodities [TJ] 
         evf     energy demand firms [TJ] 
         eevf    energy demand firms by energy commodity [TJ] 
         ecar0   energy demand by cars [TJ] 
         co20    emissions [1000 t] 
         tfuel   fuel tax payments [rate] 
         cartax  car tax payments [million €] 
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         tother  tax on other inputs in car technologies [rate] 
         pvkm0   price per vehicle kilometer 
         kmpercat kilometers per car category [million] 
; 
 
$gdxin "%datadir%%data%" 
$load i c g ga gn mapF mapL l n m p tp cf ct d e 
$load y0 d0 e0 id0 kd0 ld0 otax utax lod0 m0 a0 unit 
$load c0 g0 inv0 bop cd0 gd0 
$load taid0 tay0 tacard0 tact0 lavmohr 
$load cy0 cid0 ccd0 cfd0 
$load stock0 snd0 ssd0 sy0 Pstock0 
$load evh eevh evf eevf ecar0 co20 
$load cartax tfuel tother cons refco2 
$load pvkm0 ts vkm0 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                      (2) TRANSPORT TECHNOLOGY TAXES 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         tcar    tax on cars 
         pcar0   benchmark price of cars 
         pfuel0  benchmark price on fuels 
         pother0 benchmark price of other inputs 
; 
tcar(cf,ct)              = cartax(cf,ct)*Pstock0("total",cf,ct)/ccd0(cf,ct); 
pcar0(cf,ct)             = 1 + tcar(cf,ct); 
pfuel0(i,cf)             = 1 + tfuel(cf); 
pother0(i)               = 1 + tother(i); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                      (3) TRANSPORT ACTIVITY TAXES 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         tta     tax on transport activity inputs 
         pta0    benchmark price for transport activity inputs 
; 
 
parameter 
         costcover       cost coverage of public transport [Source TREMOVE p. 39] 
         /BUS            0.817 
          METRAM         0.817 
          PTRAIN         0.552 
          FTRAIN         1 
          PLANE          1 
          SHIP           1 
          SLOW           1 
          CAR            1/; 
tta(i,m)$(sum((p,d,tp,n), taid0(i,p,d,tp,m,n)))   = (costcover(m) - 1); 
pta0(i,m) = 1 + tta(i,m); 
tay0(p,d,tp,m,n) =  sum(i, pta0(i,m)*taid0(i,p,d,tp,m,n)) 
                    + sum((cf,ct), tacard0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n)); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                      (4) CONSUMPTION TAXES 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         tc      consumption taxes 
         pc0     benchmark consumer prices 
; 
tc(i)$(cd0(i) and cons(i,"total")) = (cons(i,"total") - cd0(i))/cd0(i); 
pc0(i) = 1 + tc(i); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                      (5) PRODUCTION TAXES 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         ty      ouput tax 
         ti      input tax 
         pi0     intermediat input price 
; 
set 
         p_c     set to identify refined oils 
         /p_c/ 
; 
allias(i,jj); 
ti(i,j)$utax(j)  = utax(j)/sum(jj, id0(jj,j)); 
ti(i,"otp")      = 0; 
ti("p_c","otp")  = tfuel("diesel"); 
ti(i,"otp")$(not p_c(i)) = (utax("otp")- id0("p_c","otp")*ti("p_c","otp")) 
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                            /sum(jj$(not p_c(jj)), id0(jj,"otp")); 
pi0(j,i) = 1+ ti(j,i); 
ty(i)$y0(i) = otax(i)/y0(i); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                      (6) INCOME AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
*############################################################################### 
scalar 
*        Source: Source: OECD 2007 Revenue Statistic 
         incometax       tax on household income                 /175558/ 
         hhsov           social insurance contribution household /135280/ 
         unsov           social insurance contribution firms     /152530/ 
; 
parameter 
         tl      tax on labor use 
         pl0     benchmark labor price 
         tw      tax on wage 
         pw0     gross wage 
         timeL0  time supplied to labor 
; 
tl(i)    = unsov/(sum(j, ld0(j)) - unsov); 
pl0(i)   = 1 + tl(i); 
ld0(i)   = ld0(i)/pl0(i); 
ls0      = sum(i, ld0(i)) + sum(ga, unit("lab",ga)*unit("out",ga)); 
ks0      = sum(i, kd0(i)) + sum(ga, unit("cap",ga)*unit("out",ga)); 
tw       = (incometax + hhsov)/(ls0 - incometax - hhsov); 
pw0      = 1 + tw; 
timeL0   = ls0/pw0; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                      (7) DERIVE DIRECT TRANSFER 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         trans0          benchmark direct transfer [million €] 
; 
trans0   = - (ks0 + timeL0 - sum(i, pc0(i)*cd0(i) + inv0(i)) 
                   + sum((cf,ct), + stock0(cf,ct)) 
                   - sum((p,d,tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n))) ; 
c0       = sum(i, cd0(i) + inv0(i)) + sum((p,d,tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
g0       = sum(i, gd0(i)); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                         (8) SAVE DATA TO GDX 
*############################################################################### 
execute_unload "%datadir%%out%" i, g, e, ga, gn, mapF, mapL, l, n, p, m, d, tp, cf, ct, 
         y0, d0, e0, id0, kd0, ld0, lod0, m0, a0, unit, evf, eevf, tl, pl0, ty, ti, pi0, 
         c0, g0, inv0, bop, cd0, gd0, ls0, ks0, evh, eevh, timeL0, trans0, tc, pc0, tw, pw0 
         taid0, tay0, tacard0, tact0, lavmohr, tta, pta0 
         cy0, cid0, ccd0, cfd0, ecar0, tfuel, tcar, tother, pcar0, pfuel0, pother0, refco2, 
         stock0, snd0, ssd0, sy0, Pstock0, 
         co20, otax, utax, ts, pvkm0, vkm0 
; 
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Codes for the simulations 
Files for the simulation are organized in the same manner as in the international model. Since the 
call.gms file is similar to the international model, it is not stated. In the dataload.gms file data are 
loaded, the congestion function is calibrated, and the tax system is additionally manipulated.  
 
dataload.gms 
$ontext 
Programm to load all relevant benchmark data 
Also serves as overview over all parameters, sets, and equilibrium conditions. 
 
(1)      LOAD DATA 
(2)      DATA SCALING 
(3)      CALIBRATION ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGIES 
(4)      SEPARATING FUEL INPUTS 
(5)      CALIBRATION TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 
(6)      CONGESTION FUNCTION 
(6)      CARBON EMISSIONS 
(7)      CONSUMPTION TAXES 
(8)      INITALIZE POLICY PARAMETERS 
OPTIONS: 
------------------------ SCALING AND DATA LOAD --------------------------------- 
         data            name of gdx file containing data 
         datadir         name of data directory 
         scalev          scalinf for monetary units 
         scalet          scaling for emission 
         scalee          scaling of energy values 
         scalepkm        scaling of transport data 
 
------------------------ MARKUPS INACTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ------------------------- 
         muCoalCCS       markup coal ccs technology 
         muGASCCS        markup gas ccs technology 
         muWindOff       markup offshore wind technology 
         muPV            markup pV technology 
         muBhcoaPC       markup hcoa in base 
         muBCCGT         markup CCGT in base 
         muhybrid        markup on hybrid cars 
$offtext 
$eolcom ! 
$if not set data $set data IO_2004_one 
$if not set datadir $set datadir "..\data\" 
$if not set scalev $set scalev 0.001 
$if not set scalet $set scalet 0.000001 
$if not set scalee $set scalee 0.001 
$if not set scalepkm $set scalepkm 0.001 
$if not set muCoalCCS $set muCoalCCS 0.25 
$if not set muGASCCS $set muGASCCS 0.15 
$if not set muWindOff $set muWindOff 0.1 
$if not set muPV $set muPV 1.5 
$if not set muBhcoaPC $set muBhcoaPC 0.19 
$if not set muBCCGT $set muBCCGT 0.19 
$if not set muhybrid $set muhybrid 0.03 
$if not exist "%datadir%%data%.gdx" $abort "###### SOURCE DATA MISSING ######" 
option solprint=silent; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                                (1) LOAD DATA 
*############################################################################### 
set 
         i       set of commodities 
         e       set of energy commodities 
         l       set of load segments 
         mapL    mapping technologies to load 
         g       set of generation technologies 
         ga      set of active generation technologies 
         gn      set of in active generation technologies 
         cf      set of transport fuels 
         ct      set of transport technologies 
         n       set of transport networks 
         m       set of transport modes 
         d       set of transport distances 
         p       set of transport purposes 
         tp      set of travel periods 
         glo     global set 
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         gloe    global set of all energy and fuel inputs 
 
; 
alias(i,j,ii), (g,gg), (ga,gga), (gn,ggn), (n,nn), (d,dd), (p,pp), (m,mm), (tp,ttp), 
         (cf,ccf), (ct,cct), (l,ll); 
 
*------------------------------- NESTING SETS ---------------------------------- 
set 
         ele     electricity sector 
         /ele/ 
         fof     fossil fuels 
         /coa, gas, p_c/ 
         p_c     refined oils 
         /p_c/ 
         coa     only coal 
         /coa/ 
         otp     other transport sector 
         /otp/ 
         work    only work transport 
         /work/ 
         leis    only leisure trips 
         /cons/ 
         pub     set of public transport modes 
         /bus, metram/ 
         ptrain  only private trains 
         /ptrain/ 
         pur     purchased transportation modes 
         /bus, metram, ptrain, plane/ 
         busm    busses and metro 
         /bus, metram/ 
         trpl    train and plane 
         /ptrain, plane/ 
         own     own transportation modes 
         /car, slow/ 
         roadv   road vehicles 
         /bus, car/ 
         busses  only busses 
         /bus/ 
         cars    only car mode 
         /car/ 
         lkws    only lkws 
         /lkw/ 
         slow    only slow mode 
         /slow/ 
         roads   set of road networks 
         /URBAN, NURBAN/ 
         nroad   non road modes in production 
         /atp, wtp/ 
         public  all public transport production sectors 
         /bus, rail, metram/ 
         gaso    only gasoline cars 
         /gasoline/ 
         prodtrn transport production sectors 
         /otp, atp, wtp/ 
; 
 
*----------------------------- SETS FOR POLICIES ------------------------------- 
set 
         exempted       set to indicate if commodity i in j is exempted from carbon regulation 
         tradeI         input i in sector j is part of trading scheme I 
         tradeII        input i in sector j is part of trading scheme II 
         tradeIII       input i in sector j is part of trading scheme III 
         tradeIV        input i in sector j is part of trading scheme IV 
         tradeS         input i in sector j is part of sectoral regulation 
         ets            sector in emission trading scheme 
; 
*-------------------------- BENCHMARK PARAMETERS ------------------------------- 
parameter 
         y0      total production [million €] 
         d0      production for domestic market [million €] 
         e0      production for exports [million €] 
         id0     intermediate inputs [million €] 
         kd0     capital inputs [million €] 
         fd0     benchmark transport fuel demand 
         tf      tax on transport fuel inputs 
         pf0     benchmark price on fuel inputs 
         ld0     labor inputs [million €] 
         lod0    electricity demand by load [million €] 
         ti      intermediate input tax 
         pi0     intermediate inputs reference price 
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         ty      output tax 
         tl      labor tax 
         pl0     reference labor price 
         unit    unit input vector generation technologies 
         phyld0  physical electricity demand by load 
         fuely0  transportation fuel output 
         fuelid0 transportation fuel input 
         a0      armington supply [million €] 
         m0      imports [million €] 
         g0      total government consumption [million €] 
         gd0     public commodity consumption [million €] 
         bop     balance of payments [million €] 
         trans0  direct transfers to household [million €] 
         c0      total private consumption [million €] 
         cd0     private commodity consumption [million €] 
         inv0    investments [million €] 
         ks0     capital endowment [million €] 
         ls0     labor supplied [million €] 
         timeL0  time supplied to labor [million €] 
         tw      tax on labor income 
         pw0     reference household wage 
         stock0  stock of cars [million €] 
         Pstock0 stock of cars [number] 
         tc      tax on private consumption 
         pc0     reference private consumption 
         ts0     supply of travel "speed" 
         timeT0  benchmark travel time budget 
         time0   total consumption and transport time endowment 
         leis0   benchmark leisure consumption 
         tay0    output of transport activity [million €] 
         taid0   intermediate demand transport activity [million €] 
         tacard0 car demand of transport activity [million €] 
         tta     tax on intermediate demand of transport activities 
         pta0    reference price intermediate demand transport activities 
         tat0    time input [million €] 
         tast0   time input for congestion link [million €] 
         speed0  speed of mode on network in travel period 
         duration        duration of travel periods [hours] 
         /opeak        7320 
          peak         1440/ 
         pce0    passenger car equivalents in benchmark [million] 
         pkm0    benchmark person or tone kilometer [million] 
         vkm0    vehicle kilometer in benchmark [million] 
         pcu     passenger car conversion factors 
         /car    1 
          bus    2 
          lkw    2/ 
         occup   occupancy rates [persons per vehicle] 
         bpr     parameters in BRP function 
         shcom   committed value share in total mileage output 
         tacom0  demand committed mileage 
         tasup0  demand supplementary mileage 
         tcirc0  circulation tax in benchmark 
         tcirc   circulation tax in scenario 
         vot0    value of time of trips 
         costcov cost coverage rates for public transport [TREMOVE p. 39] 
         /bus    0.817 
          metram 0.817/ 
         cy0             output of car technologies [million €] 
         cid0            intermediate demand car technologies [million €] 
         cfd0            fuel demand by car technologies [million €] 
         ccd0            car demand [million €] 
         tfuel           transport fuel tax 
         tcar            car tax 
         pfuel0          reference fuel price 
         pcar0           reference car rental price 
         tother          tax on intermediate inputs 
         pother0         reference price car intermediate inputs 
         refco2          reference specific emissions [g per km] 
         kmpercat        kilometer per car category 
         pvkm            price of vehicle km 
         shcomitted      percentage of committed mileage 
         /diesel         0.65 
          gasoline       0.65/ 
         totalvkmcar     total pkm by cars 
         comy0           output of committed millage activity 
         comid0          maintenance input of committed mileage 
         comcar0         car input to committed mileage 
         comfd0          committed fuel input 
         supy0           output of supplementary millage activity 
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         supid0          maintenance input of supplementary inputs 
         supfd0          supplementary fuel input 
         carvkm0         vkm by car class [Million] 
         pvkm0           price per vehicle kilometer by car class [€ per vkm] 
         snd0            demand for new cars [million €] 
         ssd0            demand for car stock [million €] 
         sy0             output of stock activity [million €] 
         stax            tax on new car purchases 
         ps0             reference price new car purchases 
         co20            carbon emission [1000 t] 
         evh             household emission relevant energy [TJ] 
         eevh            household emission relevant energy by energy commodity [TJ] 
         evf             firms emission relevant energy [TJ] 
         eevf            firms emission relevant energy by energy commodity [TJ] 
         ecar            energy demand by cars [TJ] 
         tact0           transport activity data [pkm vkm pce in million - speed:km per hour] 
         carblim0        initial carbon emissions 
; 
 
$gdxin "%datadir%%data%" 
$load i l mapl g ga gn cf ct n m d p tp e 
$load y0 d0 e0 id0 kd0 ld0 lod0 ti pi0 ty tl pl0 unit 
$load a0 m0 
$load g0 gd0 bop trans0 
$load c0 cd0 ks0 ls0 timeL0 tw pw0 stock0 Pstock0 inv0 tc pc0 
$load tay0 taid0 tacard0 tta pta0 
$load cy0 cfd0 cid0 tfuel tcar pfuel0 tother pother0 pcar0 refco2 ccd0 carvkm0 pvkm0 
$load snd0 ssd0 sy0 ps0 stax=ts 
$load co20 evh eevh evf eevf ecar tact0 
*$load pvkm0 
$gdxin 
glo(i) = yes; glo(pub) = yes; glo("hh") = yes; glo(ct) = yes; 
gloe(fof) = yes; gloe(cf) = yes; 
 
*---------------------------- ELECTRICITY PARAMETER ---------------------------- 
parameter 
         markupG  markup of inactive generation technologies 
         /gasCCS         %muGasCCS% 
          windOff        %muWindOff% 
          PV             %muPV% 
          coalCCS        %muCoalCCS% 
          BhcoaPC        %muBhcoaPC% 
          BCCGT          %muBCCGT%/ 
         capacities      estimated capacities in TWh 
*        0       : no capacity expansion possible 
*        +inf    : unlimited capacity possible 
*        Source: BMU erneuraber energien in zahlen p. 44 
         /CCGT           +inf 
          BCCGT          +inf 
          OCOT           +inf 
          OCGT           +inf 
          windOn         68 
          windOff        135 
          PV             105 
          nuclear        0 
          hcoaPC         +inf 
          BhcoaPC        +inf 
          ligniteST      +inf 
          hydro          0 
          other          0 
          gasCCS         +inf 
          coalCCS        +inf/ 
         relgen0         relative generation in % 
         cap             capacity limit for technology g 
         relcap          capacity relative to benchmark output 
         convTWhTJ       conversion factor from TWH to TJ        /3599.99712/ 
         co2gen0         benchmark emission of generation technologies 
         cpr             capture rate for ccs technologies 
         /gasCCS         0.9 
          coalCCS        0.9/ 
; 
 
*---------------------------- TRANSPORT PARAMETER ------------------------------ 
parameter 
         trn_p           total transport by purpose 
         trn_pd          transport by purpose and distance 
         trn_pdtp        transport by period purpose and distance 
         trn_pdtpm       transport by mode period purpose and distance 
         py0             output of public transport modes 
         pid0            intermediate inputs public transport modes 
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         pkd0            capital demand public transport modes 
         pld0            labor demand public transport modes 
         pti             intermediate input tax public transport 
         ppi0            intermediate input reference price public transport 
         ptl             public transport labor tax 
         ppl0            public transport labor price 
         pty             public transport output tax 
         tapubd0         transport activities public transport demand 
         ttapub          tax on public transport inputs 
         ptapub0         reference price public transport inputs 
         co2pub0         carbon emissions public transport 
         ptf             tax on transportation fuel inputs 
         ppf0            reference price transportation fuel inputs 
         pfd0            public transport fuel demand 
         ra0             supply of available road capacity in benchmark 
         tad0(p,d,tp,m,n)        demand for road time aggregate 
         tara0(p,d,tp,m,n)       demand for road availability 
         congpce         million pce per hour of travel period [million pcu] 
         occup           occupancy rates [persons per vehicle] 
         co2car0         carbon emissions by cars 
; 
 
*----------------------------- CARBON EMISSIONS -------------------------------- 
parameter        emicoef emission coefficient in [kg per TJ] [Source IPCC 2006] 
                 /coa            101000 
                  p_c            74100 
                  gas            56100 
                  diesel         74100 
                  gasoline       69300 
                  CCGT           56100 
                  hcoaPC         98300   !Anthracite value 
                  OCGT           56100 
                  OCOT           74100   !gas diesel oil 
                  ligniteST      101000/ 
; 
 
*---------------------------- POLICY PARAMETERS -------------------------------- 
parameter 
         carblimI        carbon limit trading scheme I 
         carblimII       carbon limit trading scheme II 
         carblimIII      carbon limit trading scheme III 
         carblimIV       carbon limit trading scheme IV 
         carblimS        carbon limit sectoral regulation 
         carblimTRN      carbon limit private transportation in circulation tax case 
         redu            reduction level of economy’s emissions                         /0/ 
; 
 
 
* FLAGS 
scalar 
         congestion      one if congestion is used                       /1/ 
         endogL          endogenous labor                                /0/ 
         circulation     endogenous circulation tax on cars              /0/ 
         lump            one if lumpsum recycling                        /1/ 
         keynes          one if marginal propensity to save is one       /0/ 
         pubsub          one if revenues are recycled using public transport subsidy /0/ 
; 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (2) DATA SCALING 
*############################################################################### 
scalar 
         scalev          scaling factor monetary units   /%scalev%/ 
         scalet          scaling factor emission units   /%scalet%/ 
         scalee          scaling factor energy units     /%scalee%/ 
         scalepkm        scaling factor pkm units        /%scalepkm%/ 
         rounding        rounding factor                 /8/ 
; 
 
*-------------------------- SCALE MONETARY UNITS ------------------------------- 
y0(i)            = round(y0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
d0(i)            = round(d0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
e0(i)            = round(e0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
m0(i)            = round(m0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
a0(i)            = round(a0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
kd0(i)           = round(kd0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
ld0(i)           = round(ld0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
id0(j,i)         = round(id0(j,i)*scalev, rounding); 
lod0(l,i)        = round(lod0(l,i)*scalev, rounding); 
cd0(i)           = round(cd0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
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inv0(i)          = round(inv0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
trans0           = round(trans0*scalev, rounding); 
ks0              = round(ks0*scalev, rounding); 
timeL0           = round(timeL0*scalev, rounding); 
ls0              = round(ls0*scalev, rounding); 
stock0(cf,ct)    = round(stock0(cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)         = round(tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)*scalev, rounding); 
taid0(i,p,d,tp,m,n)      = round(taid0(i,p,d,tp,m,n)*scalev, rounding); 
tacard0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n)= round(tacard0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n)*scalev, rounding); 
cy0(cf,ct)       = round(cy0(cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
cid0(i,cf,ct)    = round(cid0(i,cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
cfd0(i,cf,ct)    = round(cfd0(i,cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
ccd0(cf,ct)      = round(ccd0(cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
ssd0(cf,ct)      = round(ssd0(cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
snd0(i,cf,ct)    = round(snd0(i,cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
sy0(cf,ct)       = round(sy0(cf,ct)*scalev, rounding); 
unit("out",g)    = round(unit("out",g)*scalev, rounding); 
unit("pgen",g)   = round(unit("pgen",g)*scalev, rounding); 
gd0(i)           = round(gd0(i)*scalev, rounding); 
g0               = round(g0*scalev, rounding); 
bop              = round(bop*scalev, rounding); 
c0               = sum(i,cd0(i)*pc0(i)) + sum((p,d,tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
 
*--------------------------- SCALE PHYSICAL UNITS ------------------------------ 
co20("total",i)          = round(co20("total",i)*scalet, 3); 
co20("total","hh")       = round(co20("total","hh")*scalet, 3); 
evh(i)                   = round(evh(i)*scalee, 3); 
eevh(e)                  = round(eevh(e)*scalee, 3); 
evf(j,i)                 = round(evf(j,i)*scalee, 3); 
eevf(e,i)                = round(eevf(e,i)*scalee, 3); 
ecar(i,cf,ct)            = round(ecar(i,cf,ct)*scalee, 8); 
tact0("pkm",p,d,tp,m,n)  = round(tact0("pkm",p,d,tp,m,n)*scalepkm, 8); 
tact0("vkm",p,d,tp,m,n)  = round(tact0("vkm",p,d,tp,m,n)*scalepkm, 8); 
tact0("pce",p,d,tp,m,n)  = round(tact0("pce",p,d,tp,m,n)*scalepkm, 8); 
carvkm0(cf,ct)           = round(carvkm0(cf,ct)*scalepkm,8); 
pvkm0(cf,ct)             = round(pvkm0(cf,ct)*scalev/scalepkm, 8); 
unit("TJ",g)             = round(unit("TWh",g)*convTWhTJ*scalee, 8); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                 (3) CALIBRATION ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGIES 
*############################################################################### 
markupG(gn) = 1 + markupG(gn); 
cap(g)$(capacities(g)  and capacities(g) lt +inf) = unit("pgen",g)*capacities(g); 
cap(g)$(not capacities(g))                        = unit("out",g); 
cap(g)$(capacities(g) eq +inf)                    = +inf; 
cap("nuclear")  = unit("pgen","nuclear")*unit("TWh","nuclear"); 
phyld0("TWh",l) = sum(g$mapl(l,g), unit("TWh",g)); 
phyld0("out",l) = sum(g$mapl(l,g), unit("out",g)); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (4) SEPARATING FUEL INPUTS 
*############################################################################### 
* Fuel inputs are separated using the emission relevant energy flows 
* which identify diesel and gasoline consumption in total refined oil consumption 
* In order to convert energy flows to monetary units prices of transportation 
* fuels and the light fuel oil are used which are given in oecd energy prices 
* and taxes 
 
parameter 
         oilprice        prices of refined oils [$ per toe in 2004] 
         /gasoline        1748.7 
          diesel          1155 
          lfo             483.2/ 
         temptax         temporary tax parameter 
         lkwtax          total taxes paid by freight transport [Mio € - DIW p. 274] /37231/ 
; 
 
temptax("old",i)         = sum(j, ti(j,i)*id0(j,i)); 
temptax("out",i)         = ty(i)*y0(i); 
fd0(cf,j)$id0("p_c",j)   = id0("p_c",j)*oilprice(cf)*eevf(cf,j) 
                           /(sum(ccf, oilprice(ccf)*eevf(ccf,j)) 
                           + (eevf("toil",j) - sum(ccf, eevf(ccf,j)))*oilprice("lfo")); 
fd0(cf,"gas")            = id0("p_c","gas")*oilprice(cf)*eevf(cf,"cru") 
                           /(sum(ccf, oilprice(ccf)*eevf(ccf,"cru")) 
                           + (eevf("toil","cru") - sum(ccf, eevf(ccf,"cru"))) 
     *oilprice("lfo")); 
* Industries does not pay the value added tax (16%) on top of eco and mineral 
* oil tax 
tf(cf,i)                 = tfuel(cf)/(1.16); 
* Ships do not pay taxes on diesel 
 162
tf("diesel","wtp")       = 0; 
temptax("fuel",i)        = sum(cf, tf(cf,i)*fd0(cf,i)); 
* Correct intermediate demands 
id0("p_c",i)             = round(id0("p_c",i) - sum(cf, fd0(cf,i)), rounding); 
 
*--------------------------------- Tax system for production ------------------- 
ti(i,j) = 0; 
* according to IEA 2008 tax on refined oil inputs is around 20% 
ti("p_c",i) = 0.2; 
ti("p_c","p_c") = 0; 
ti("p_c","atp") = 0; 
temptax("fuel",i) = temptax("fuel",i) + ti("p_c",i)*id0("p_c",i); 
ti(j,i)$(sum(ii, id0(ii,i)) and not ti(j,i)) 
                 = (temptax("old",i) - temptax("fuel",i)) 
                   /sum(ii$(not ti(ii,i)), id0(ii,i)); 
temptax("new",i)  = sum(j, ti(j,i)*id0(j,i)) + sum(cf, tf(cf,i)*fd0(cf,i)); 
temptax("test",i) = temptax("new",i) - temptax("old",i); 
pf0(cf,i)         = 1 + tf(cf,i); 
pi0(i,j)          = 1 + ti(i,j); 
 
*------------------------ Create transportation fuel activity ------------------ 
fuely0(cf)       = sum(i, fd0(cf,i)) +  sum(ct, cfd0("p_c",cf,ct)); 
fuelid0("p_c",cf)= fuely0(cf); 
 
* Adjust energy flows to faciliate carbon calibration 
evf(cf,i)        = eevf(cf,i); 
evf("p_c",i)     = round(evf("p_c",i) - sum(cf, eevf(cf,i)), 8); 
evf(i,"cru")     = 0; 
evf(cf,"cru")    = 0; 
evf(cf,"gas")    = eevf(cf,"cru"); 
evf("p_c","gas") = max(evf("p_c","gas") - sum(cf, eevf(cf,"cru")), 0); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                 (5) CALIBRATION TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 
*############################################################################### 
trn_p(p)                 = sum((d,tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
trn_pd(p,d)              = sum((tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
trn_pdtp(p,d,tp)         = sum((m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m)      = sum((n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
 
* Adjust total final consumption since work trips are implemented using rationing 
c0 = c0 - trn_p("work"); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (6)   CONGESTION FUNCTION 
*############################################################################### 
 
*--------------------- CALIBRATION CONGESTION FUNCTION (BPR) ------------------- 
speed0(m,n,tp)                            = tact0("speed","cons","short",tp,m,n); 
speed0("METRAM",n,tp)                     = 30.78253; !TREMOVE 
occup(p,d,tp,m,n)$tact0("vkm",p,d,tp,m,n) = tact0("pkm",p,d,tp,m,n)/tact0("vkm",p,d,tp,m,n); 
pkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)                          = tact0("pkm",p,d,tp,m,n); 
vkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)$occup(p,d,tp,m,n)        = pkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)/occup(p,d,tp,m,n); 
pce0(p,d,tp,m,n)                          = vkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)*pcu(m); 
congpce(tp,n)                             = sum((p,d,m), pce0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
                                            /duration(tp); 
Positive Variable 
         freeflow        calibrated free flow speed 
         capacity        calibrated capacity of road net work 
; 
Variable 
         dummy           dummy objective 
; 
Eqaution 
         objII           dummy objective 
         eq_bpr          BPR function to be calibrated 
; 
 
objII.. 
         dummy                   =E=     0 
; 
 
eq_bpr(tp,n)$(roads(n)).. 
         1/speed0("car",n,tp)    =E=     freeflow(n) * 
                                         (1 + 0.15*(congpce(tp,n)/capacity(n))**4) 
; 
 
capacity.LO(n) = 0.0001; 
freeflow.LO(n) = 0.0001; 
capacity.FX(n)$(not sum(tp, congpce(tp,n))) = 0; 
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freeflow.LO(n)$(not sum(tp, congpce(tp,n))) = 0; 
freeflow.L(n)  = sum(tp$(ord(tp) eq card(tp)), speed0("car",tp,n)); 
capacity.L(n)  = sum(tp$(ord(tp) eq card(tp)), congpce(tp,n)); 
model calibcong /objII, eq_bpr/; 
solve calibcong using NLP maximizing dummy; 
 
bpr("free_time",n)       = freeflow.L(n); 
bpr("free_speed",n)$freeflow.L(n) = 1/freeflow.L(n); 
bpr("capacity",n)        = capacity.L(n); 
bpr(tp,n)                = bpr("free_time",n)*(1+0.15* 
                           ((sum((pp,dd,m),pce0(pp,dd,tp,m,n)) 
                           /duration(tp))/bpr("capacity",n))**4); 
 
*--------------------- CALIBRATION CONGESTION FUNCTION (EXP) ------------------- 
*        time = a1*[a2 + a3*exp(a4*Flow/hours)] 
variable 
         A1, A2, A3, A4 
; 
 
eqaution 
         exp1, exp2 
; 
 
exp1(tp,n)$roads(n).. 
         60*(1/speed0("car",n,tp))    =E=     A1(n)*(A2(n) + A3(n)*exp(A4(n) 
                                              *congpce(tp,n))) 
; 
 
exp2(n)$roads(n).. 
         freeflow.L(n)*60           =E=     A1(n)*(A2(n) + A3(n)) 
; 
 
model calibcongIII /objII, exp1,exp2/; 
 
A1.FX(n) = 1; 
A2.L(n) = 1; A3.L(n) = 1; A4.L(n) = 1; 
 
solve calibcongIII maximizing dummy using NLP; 
 
parameter a1bus(n); 
parameter 
         tempt    temporary parameter to store time per km 
         a1bus(n) a1 parameter for busses 
; 
tempt(m,tp,n)$(roadv(m) and speed0(m,n,tp)) = 1/speed0(m,n,tp); 
a1bus(n)$tempt("car","opeak",n) =  tempt("bus","opeak",n)/tempt("car","opeak",n); 
speed0("bus",n,tp)$a1bus(n) = speed0("car",n,tp)/a1bus(n); 
 
*----------------------------- CREATE INPUTS ----------------------------------- 
parameter 
         tempocc         occupancy rates for non-road trips 
         /slow           1 
          ptrain         200 
          plane          100/ 
; 
 
vot0(p,d,tp,m,n) = tact0("vot", p,d,tp,m,n); 
ra0(tp,"car",n)$roads(n) = (1 - 1/speed0("car",n,tp)) 
                           *sum((p,d), vkm0(p,d,tp,"car",n)); 
ra0(tp,"bus",n)$roads(n) = (1 - 1/speed0("bus",n,tp)) 
                           *sum((p,d), vkm0(p,d,tp,"bus",n)); 
tat0(p,d,tp,m,n)$(speed0(m,n,tp) and tempocc(m)) 
                         = tact0("pkm",p,d,tp,m,n)/speed0(m,n,tp); 
tat0(p,d,tp,m,n)$(speed0(m,n,tp) and tempocc(m)) 
                         = tact0("pkm",p,d,tp,m,n)/(tempocc(m)*speed0(m,n,tp)); 
tat0(p,d,tp,m,n)$(speed0(m,n,tp) and vkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
                         = vkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)/speed0(m,n,tp); 
tara0(p,d,tp,"car",n)$speed0("car",n,tp) 
                         = (1 - 1/speed0("car",n,tp))*vkm0(p,d,tp,"car",n); 
tara0(p,d,tp,"bus",n)$speed0("bus",n,tp) 
                         = (1 - 1/speed0("bus",n,tp))*vkm0(p,d,tp,"bus",n); 
timeT0("total")          = sum((p,d,tp,m,n), tat0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
timeT0("share_L")         = timeT0("total")/(timeL0+timeT0("total")); 
 
* Set total time endowment for consumption and transport (labor is inelastically 
* supplied). Destatis 2006: Verkehr in Deutschland p. 28 reports 81 minutes of 
* transportation per day. Assuming 8 hours of work and recreation time (both 
* consistent with DESTATIS time survey) leaves 8 hours for consumption and transport 
* Thus, transportation is around 17% of total available time. 
time0 = timeT0("total")/0.17; 
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leis0 = time0 - timeT0("total"); 
 
*------------------------- CORRECT OUTPUTS AND DEMANDS ------------------------- 
* Correct outputs of transport activities 
tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)$(work(p) or leis(p)) =  tay0(p,d,tp,m,n) + tat0(p,d,tp,m,n) 
                                         + tara0(p,d,tp,m,n); 
trn_p(p)                 = sum((d,tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
trn_pd(p,d)              = sum((tp,m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
trn_pdtp(p,d,tp)         = sum((m,n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m)      = sum((n), tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)); 
* Recompute total consumption 
c0 = sum(i,cd0(i)*pc0(i)) + sum((d,tp,m,n), tay0("cons",d,tp,m,n)) + leis0; 
 
*---------------------- SPECIFY COMIITED AND SUPLEMENTARY MILAGES -------------- 
totalvkmcar      = sum((p,d,tp,n), vkm0(p,d,tp,"car",n)); 
comid0(i,cf,ct)  = shcomitted(cf)*cid0(i,cf,ct); 
supid0(i,cf,ct)  = (1-shcomitted(cf))*cid0(i,cf,ct); 
comfd0(cf,ct)    = shcomitted(cf)*cfd0("p_c",cf,ct); 
supfd0(cf,ct)    = (1-shcomitted(cf))*cfd0("p_c",cf,ct); 
comcar0(cf,ct)   = ccd0(cf,ct)*pcar0(cf,ct); 
comy0(cf,ct)     = sum(i, pother0(i,cf,ct)*comid0(i,cf,ct)) 
                   + comfd0(cf,ct)*pfuel0("p_c",cf) + comcar0(cf,ct); 
supy0(cf,ct)     = sum(i, pother0(i,cf,ct)*supid0(i,cf,ct)) 
                   + supfd0(cf,ct)*pfuel0("p_c",cf); 
shcom(cf,ct)     = comy0(cf,ct)/(supy0(cf,ct)+comy0(cf,ct)); 
tacom0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n) = shcom(cf,ct)*tacard0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n); 
tasup0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n) = (1-shcom(cf,ct))*tacard0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n); 
tcirc0(cf,ct)    = (pcar0(cf,ct)*sy0(cf,ct) -sy0(cf,ct))/(sy0(cf,ct)*pcar0(cf,ct)); 
tcirc(cf,ct)     = tcirc0(cf,ct); 
 
*-------------------------- DETERMINE UNIT INPUT VECTOR FOR CARS --------------- 
parameter 
         cunit   committed mileage unit input vector 
         sunit   supplementary mileage unit input vector 
         carunit total car unit vector 
         newunit new car unit vector 
; 
cunit("out",cf,ct)       = comy0(cf,ct); 
cunit("car",cf,ct)       = comcar0(cf,ct)/cunit("out",cf,ct); 
cunit("fuel",cf,ct)      = (comfd0(cf,ct)*pfuel0("p_c",cf))/cunit("out",cf,ct); 
cunit(i,cf,ct)           = comid0(i,cf,ct)/cunit("out",cf,ct); 
sunit("out",cf,ct)       = supy0(cf,ct); 
sunit("fuel",cf,ct)      = supfd0(cf,ct)*pfuel0("p_c",cf)/sunit("out",cf,ct); 
sunit(i,cf,ct)           = supid0(i,cf,ct)/sunit("out",cf,ct); 
carunit("out",cf,ct)     = comy0(cf,ct) + supy0(cf,ct); 
carunit("vkm",cf,ct)     = carvkm0(cf,ct) ; 
carunit("price",cf,ct)   = carunit("out",cf,ct)/carvkm0(cf,ct); 
carunit("car",cf,ct)     = comcar0(cf,ct)/carunit("out",cf,ct); 
carunit("fuel",cf,ct)    = cfd0("p_c",cf,ct)*pfuel0("p_c",cf)/carunit("out",cf,ct); 
carunit(i,cf,ct)         = cid0(i,cf,ct)*pother0(i,cf,ct)/carunit("out",cf,ct); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                           (6)      CARBON EMISSIONS 
*############################################################################### 
parameter 
         adjemicoef      adjustment of emission coefficients 
         roundco2        rounding factor for emissions           /3/ 
         tempco2         temporary parameter to adjust emissions 
; 
evf(i,"ele") = 0; 
co20(i,j)$id0(i,j)       = round((evf(i,j)/scalee)*(emicoef(i)/10**6)*scalet, 
                           roundco2); 
co20(cf,j)$fd0(cf,j)     = round((evf(cf,j)/scalee)*(emicoef(cf)/10**6)*scalet, 
                           roundco2); 
co20(i,"hh")$cd0(i)      = round((evh(i)/scalee) * (emicoef(i)/10**6)*scalet,roundco2); 
co2pub0(i,pub)           = round((evf(i,pub)/scalee)*(emicoef(i)/10**6)*scalet, roundco2); 
co2pub0(cf,pub)          = round((evf(cf,pub)/scalee)*(emicoef(cf)/10**6)*scalet, roundco2); 
co2car0(cf,ct)           = (ecar("p_c",cf,ct)/scalee)*(emicoef(cf)/10**6)*scalet; 
co2car0(cf,"total")      = sum(ct, co2car0(cf,ct)); 
co2car0("total",ct)      = sum(cf, co2car0(cf,ct)); 
co2car0("total","total") = sum((cf,ct), co2car0(cf,ct)); 
co2gen0(g)$unit("eff",g) = sum(i$unit(i,g), (unit("TJ",g)/unit("eff",g)) 
                           /scalee*(emicoef(g)/10**6)*scalet); 
co2gen0("total")         = sum(g, co2gen0(g)); 
tempco2(i)               = sum(j, co20(j,i)) + sum(cf, co20(cf,i)); 
tempco2(pub)             = sum(j, co2pub0(j,pub)) + sum(cf, co2pub0(cf,pub)); 
tempco2("hh")            = sum(i, co20(i,"hh")) + co2car0("total","total"); 
tempco2("ele")           = tempco2("ele") + co2gen0("total"); 
tempco2("total")         = sum(i, tempco2(i)) + sum(pub, tempco2(pub)) + tempco2("hh"); 
co20("total","total")    = sum(i, co20("total",i)) + co20("total","hh"); 
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* Adjust emissions to meet totals 
adjemicoef(i)$(not ele(i) and not otp(i) and co20("total",i)) 
                         = co20("total",i)/(sum(j, co20(j,i)) + sum(cf, co20(cf,i))); 
adjemicoef("otp")        = co20("total","otp")/(sum(i,sum(pub, co2pub0(i,pub))+co20(i,"otp")) 
                           + sum(cf, sum(pub, co2pub0(cf,pub)) + co20(cf,"otp"))); 
adjemicoef("ele")        = co20("total","ele")/(co2gen0("total") + sum(cf, co20(cf,"ele")) 
                           + sum(i, co20(i,"ele"))); 
adjemicoef("hh")         = ((co20("total","hh")-co2car0("total","total"))1 
     /sum(i,co20(i,"hh"))); 
co20(i,j)                = co20(i,j)*adjemicoef(j); 
co20(cf,j)               = co20(cf,j)*adjemicoef(j); 
co20(i,"hh")             = co20(i,"hh")*adjemicoef("hh"); 
co20(cf,"hh")            = co20(cf,"hh")*adjemicoef("hh"); 
co2pub0(i,pub)           = co2pub0(i,pub)*adjemicoef("otp"); 
co2pub0(cf,pub)          = co2pub0(cf,pub)*adjemicoef("otp"); 
co2pub0("total",pub)     = sum(i, co2pub0(i,pub)) + sum(cf,co2pub0(cf,pub)); 
co2gen0(g)               = co2gen0(g)*adjemicoef("ele"); 
co2gen0("total")         = sum(g, co2gen0(g)); 
tempco2(i)               = sum(j, co20(j,i)) + sum(cf, co20(cf,i)); 
tempco2("otp")           = tempco2("otp") + sum(pub, sum(i, co2pub0(i,pub)) 
                           + sum(cf, co2pub0(cf,pub))); 
tempco2(pub)             = sum(j, co2pub0(j,pub)) + sum(cf, co2pub0(cf,pub)); 
tempco2("hh")            = sum(i, co20(i,"hh")) + co2car0("total","total"); 
tempco2("ele")           = tempco2("ele") + co2gen0("total"); 
tempco2("total")         = sum(i, tempco2(i)) + sum(pub, tempco2(pub)) + tempco2("hh"); 
co20(i,"total")          = sum(j, co20(i,j)) + sum(g$unit(i,g),co2gen0(g)) 
                           + sum(pub, co2pub0(i,pub)) + co20(i,"hh"); 
co20(cf,"total")         = sum(j, co20(cf,j)) + sum(ct, co2car0(cf,ct)) 
                           + sum(pub, co2pub0(cf,pub)) + co20(cf,"hh"); 
unit("co2",g)$unit("out",g)      = co2gen0(g)/unit("out",g); 
unit("co2","coalCCS")            = unit("co2","ligniteST")*(1-cpr("coalCCS")); 
unit("co2","gasCCS")             = unit("co2","CCGT")*(1-cpr("gasCCS")); 
unit("co2","BCCGT")              = unit("co2","CCGT"); 
unit("co2","BhcoaPC")            = unit("co2","hcoaPC"); 
co20("total","total")            = sum(i, co20(i,"total")) 
                                    + sum(cf, co20(cf,"total")); 
co20("total",i)$(not ele(i))     = sum(j, co20(j,i)) + sum(cf, co20(cf,i)); 
carblim0 = co20("total","total"); 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                          (7) CONSUMPTION TAXES 
*############################################################################### 
* generally impose VAT of 16 % 
tc(i) = 0.16; 
* For refined oils IEA 2008 tax rate is taken 
tc("p_c") = 0.418; 
pc0(i) = 1 + tc(i); 
* Correct transfers and final demand values 
trans0 = trans0 + sum(i, tc(i)*cd0(i)); 
c0 = sum(i, pc0(i)*cd0(i)) + sum(p$leis(p),trn_p(p)) + leis0; 
trans0 = c0 + sum(i, inv0(i)) +  sum(p$(not leis(p)),trn_p(p)) 
         - (ks0 + timeL0 + time0 + sum((cf,ct), stock0(cf,ct)) + sum((tp,n,m), ra0(tp,m,n))); 
 
*############################################################################### 
*                     (8) INITALIZE POLICY PARAMETERS 
*############################################################################### 
carblimI = 0; carblimII = 0; carblimIII = 0; carblimIV = 0; 
tradeI(i,j) = no; tradeI(cf,j) = no; tradeI(i,"hh") = no; tradeI(i,pub) = no; 
tradeI(cf,pub) = no; tradeI(cf,ct) = no; tradeI(g,"ele") = no; 
tradeII(i,j) = no; tradeII(cf,j) = no; tradeII(i,"hh") = no; tradeII(i,pub) = no; 
tradeII(cf,pub) = no; tradeII(cf,ct) = no; tradeI(g,"ele") = no; 
tradeIII(i,j) = no; tradeIII(cf,j) = no; tradeIII(i,"hh") = no; tradeIII(i,pub) = no; 
tradeIII(cf,pub) = no; tradeIII(cf,ct) = no; tradeI(g,"ele") = no; 
tradeIV(i,j) = no; tradeIV(cf,j) = no; tradeIV(i,"hh") = no; tradeIV(i,pub) = no; 
tradeIV(cf,pub) = no; tradeIV(cf,ct) = no; tradeI(g,"ele") = no; 
tradeS(i,j) = no; tradeS(cf,j) = no; tradeS(i,"hh") = no; tradeS(i,pub) = no; 
tradeS(cf,pub) = no; tradeS(cf,ct) = no; tradeS(g,"ele") = no; 
carblimS(i) = 0; carblimS("hh") = 0; carblimS(pub) = 0; 
exempted(i,j) = no; 
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MPSGE code for the small open economy model 
$stitle small open economy model with transport 
 
$ontext 
$model:ger_cong 
 
$sectors: 
         Y(i)$y0(i)      ! Production 
         A(i)$a0(i)             ! Armington aggregation 
         GEN(g)                 ! Generation 
         TKG                    ! Capital transformation active generation 
         ELEC                   ! Electricity generation 
         TA(p)$trn_p(p)         ! Transport activities 
         TA_D(p,d)$trn_pd(p,d)               ! Transport activity distance and purpose 
         TA_DTP(p,d,tp)$trn_pdtp(p,d,tp)     ! Transport distance purpose and travel period 
         TA_DTPM(p,d,tp,m)$trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m)  ! Transport by mode distance purpose period 
         TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)$tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)  ! Transport all 
         CAR(cf,ct)                         ! Combines committed and supplementary mileage 
         COMCAR(cf,ct)               ! Committed mileage 
         SUPCAR(cf,ct)                       ! Supplementary mileage 
         STOCK(cf,ct)                        ! Car stock activity 
         YTF(cf)                             ! Transportation fuels 
         GC                               ! Public consumption 
         C                                  ! Private consumption 
         LT                                 ! Labor transformation 
         INV$keynes                         ! Investments 
         EY(i,j)$(fof(i) and a0(i) and id0(i,j)) ! Energy carbon aggregation 
         EC(i)$(fof(i) and cd0(i))                  ! Energy carbon aggregation household 
         YF(cf,i)$fd0(cf,i)                         ! Fuel carbon aggregate 
         FCAR(cf,ct)$cfd0("p_c",cf,ct)              ! Fuel carbon aggregation for cars 
         CARBON(i,j)$co20(i,j)                      ! Carbon emission from i in j 
         FCARBON(cf,j)$co20(cf,j)                   ! Carbon emission from fuel cf in j 
         CARBONH(i)$co20(i,"hh")                    ! Carbon emission from in household 
         CARBONCAR(cf,ct)$co2car0(cf,ct)            ! Carbon emission cars 
 
         EXCARBON(i,j)$(co20(i,j) and exempted(i,j))  ! Exempted carbon emission i in j 
         EXFCARBON(cf,j)$(co20(cf,j) and exempted(cf,j)) ! Exempted carbon emission cf in j 
         EXCARBONH(i)$(co20(i,"hh") and exempted(i,"hh"))  ! Exempted carbon emission in hh 
         EXCARBONCAR(cf,ct)$(co2car0(cf,ct)  and exempted(cf,ct)) ! Exempted emission cars 
 
$commodity: 
         PY(i)$y0(i)                              ! Commodity price 
         PA(i)$a0(i)                              ! Armington composite price 
         PFX                                      ! Foreign currency 
         PLOAD(l)                                 ! Electricity price by load segment 
         PKG(g)$ga(g)                             ! Capital inputs active generation 
         PCAP(g)$(cap(g) lt +inf)                 ! Scarcity price potential 
         PELEC                                    ! Production price electricity 
         PTA(p)$trn_p(p)                          ! Transport activity price by purpose 
         PTA_D(p,d)$trn_pd(p,d)                     ! Transport price by distance and purpose 
         PTA_DTP(p,d,tp)$trn_pdtp(p,d,tp)         ! Transport price by dis pur period 
         PTA_DTPM(p,d,tp,m)$trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m)   ! Transport price by mode dis pur per 
         PTA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)$tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)   ! Transport price by mode dis pur per netw 
         PRENT(cf,ct)                             ! Car rental price 
         PSTOCK(cf,ct)                            ! Car stock price 
         PCAR(cf,ct)                              ! Car resource cost 
         PCOM(cf,ct)                              ! Price committed mileage 
         PSUP(cf,ct)                               ! Price supplementary mileage 
         PYTF(cf)                                  ! Price transportation fuels 
         PG                              ! Public consumption expenditure 
         PC                              ! Private consumption expenditure 
         PK                              ! Capital price 
         PL                              ! Firm wage 
         PLS                             ! Labor supply price 
         PT$timeT0("total")              ! Time price 
         PRA(tp,m,n)$ra0(tp,m,n)         ! Price for road availability 
         PINV$keynes                     ! Investment price 
         PE(i,j)$(fof(i) and a0(i) and id0(i,j))    ! Price energy carbon aggregate 
         PEC(i)$(fof(i) and cd0(i))                 ! Price energy carbon aggregate household 
         PYF(cf,i)$fd0(cf,i)                        ! Price fuel carbon aggregate 
         PFCAR(cf,ct)$cfd0("p_c",cf,ct)             ! Price carbon aggregation for cars 
         PCARBI$carblimI                    ! Carbon price scheme I 
         PCARBII$carblimII                  ! Carbon price scheme I 
         PCARBIII$carblimIII                ! Carbon price scheme I 
         PCARBIV$carblimIV                  ! Carbon price scheme I 
         PCARBS(i)$carblimS(i)              ! Sectoral carbon price 
         PCARBH$carblimS("hh")              ! Sectoral carbon price household 
         PCARBON(i,j)$co20(i,j)             ! Carbon price for input i in j 
         PFCARBON(cf,j)$co20(cf,j)          ! Price carbon from fuel cf in j 
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         PCARBONH(i)$co20(i,"hh")           ! Carbon price for input i in household 
         PCARBONCAR(cf,ct)$co2car0(cf,ct)           ! Price carbon emission cars 
 
         PEXCARBON(i,j)$(co20(i,j) and exempted(i,j)) ! Price exempted emissions i in j 
         PEXFCARBON(cf,j)$(co20(cf,j) and exempted(cf,j))  ! Price exempted emission cf in j 
         PEXCARBONH(i)$(co20(i,"hh") and exempted(i,"hh")) ! Price exempted emission in hh 
         PEXCARBONCAR(cf,ct)$(co2car0(cf,ct)  and exempted(cf,ct)) ! Price exempted  cars 
 
$consumers: 
         RA                   ! Representative agent 
         GOV                                         ! Government 
 
$auxiliary: 
         ADJWT                                           ! Adjustment of work trips 
         LSREC                                           ! Lumpsum revenue recycling multpl 
         ROADAV(tp,m,n)$(ra0(tp,m,n))                    ! road availability 
         VKM(p,d,tp,m,n)$(occup(p,d,tp,m,n) and roads(n)) ! vehicle kiliometers 
         LStta                                           ! multpl for public transport subsi 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                           CARBON ENERGY AGGREGATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:EY(fof,i)$(a0(fof) and id0(fof,i)) 
         O:PE(fof,i)             Q:(id0(fof,i)*pi0(fof,i)) 
         I:PA(fof)               Q:id0(fof,i)            P:pi0(fof,i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ti(fof,i) 
         I:PCARBON(fof,i)$(not exempted(fof,i))          Q:co20(fof,i)           P:1e-6 
         I:PEXCARBON(fof,i)$exempted(fof,i)              Q:co20(fof,i)           P:1e-6 
 
$prod:YF(cf,i)$(fd0(cf,i)) 
         O:PYF(cf,i)             Q:(pf0(cf,i)*fd0(cf,i)) 
         I:PYTF(cf)              Q:fd0(cf,i)             P:pf0(cf,i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tf(cf,i) 
         I:PFCARBON(cf,i)$(not exempted(cf,i))           Q:co20(cf,i)            P:1e-6 
         I:PEXFCARBON(cf,i)$exempted(cf,i)               Q:co20(cf,i)            P:1e-6 
 
$report: 
         V:demYE(fof,i)          I:PA(fof)               Prod:EY(fof,i) 
         V:demYF(cf,i)           I:PYTF(cf)              Prod:YF(cf,i) 
 
$prod:EC(fof)$cd0(fof) 
         O:PEC(fof)              Q:(pc0(fof)*cd0(fof)) 
         I:PA(fof)               Q:cd0(fof)              P:pc0(fof) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tc(fof) 
         I:PCARBONH(fof)$(not exempted(fof,"hh"))        Q:co20(fof,"hh")        P:1e-6 
         I:PEXCARBONH(fof)$exempted(fof,"HH")            Q:co20(fof,"hh")        P:1e-6 
 
 
$prod:FCAR(cf,ct)$cfd0("p_c",cf,ct) 
         O:PFCAR(cf,ct)          Q:(pfuel0("p_c",cf)*cfd0("p_c",cf,ct)) 
         I:PYTF(cf)              Q:cfd0("p_c",cf,ct)     P:pfuel0("p_c",cf) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tfuel(cf) 
         I:PCARBONCAR(cf,ct)$(not exempted(cf,ct))       Q:co2car0(cf,ct)        P:1e-6 
         I:PEXCARBONCAR(cf,ct)$(exempted(cf,ct))         Q:co2car0(cf,ct)        P:1e-6 
 
$report: 
         V:demCE(fof)            I:PA(fof)               Prod:EC(fof) 
         V:demCF(cf,ct)          I:PYTF(cf)              Prod:FCAR(cf,ct) 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                                CARBON SYSTEMS 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:CARBON(i,j)$co20(i,j) 
         O:PCARBON(i,j)                  Q:1 
         I:PCARBI$tradeI(i,j)            Q:1 
         I:PCARBII$tradeII(i,j)          Q:1 
         I:PCARBIII$tradeIII(i,j)        Q:1 
         I:PCARBIV$tradeIV(i,j)          Q:1 
         I:PCARBS(j)$tradeS(i,j)         Q:1 
 
$Prod:EXCARBON(i,j)$(co20(i,j) and exempted(i,j)) 
         O:PEXCARBON(i,j)        Q:1 
         I:PCARBON(i,j)          Q:1 
+                                A:GOV           T:(-0.99999) 
 
$prod:FCARBON(cf,j)$co20(cf,j) 
         O:PFCARBON(cf,j)                Q:1 
         I:PCARBI$tradeI(cf,j)           Q:1 
         I:PCARBII$tradeII(cf,j)         Q:1 
         I:PCARBIII$tradeIII(cf,j)       Q:1 
         I:PCARBIV$tradeIV(cf,j)         Q:1 
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         I:PCARBS(j)$tradeS(cf,j)        Q:1 
 
$prod:EXFCARBON(cf,j)$(co20(cf,j) and exempted(cf,j)) 
         O:PEXFCARBON(cf,j)      Q:1 
         I:PFCARBON(cf,j)        Q:1 
+                                A:gov           T:(-0.99999) 
 
$prod:CARBONH(i)$co20(i,"hh") 
         O:PCARBONH(i)                   Q:1 
         I:PCARBI$tradeI(i,"hh")         Q:1 
         I:PCARBII$tradeII(i,"hh")       Q:1 
         I:PCARBIII$tradeIII(i,"hh")     Q:1 
         I:PCARBIV$tradeIV(i,"hh")       Q:1 
         I:PCARBH$tradeS(i,"hh")         Q:1 
 
$prod:EXCARBONH(i)$(co20(i,"hh") and exempted(i,"hh")) 
         O:PEXCARBONH(i)                 Q:1 
         I:PCARBONH(i)                   Q:1 
+                                        A:GOV           T:(-0.999999) 
 
$prod:CARBONCAR(cf,ct)$co2car0(cf,ct) 
         O:PCARBONCAR(cf,ct)             Q:1 
         I:PCARBI$tradeI(cf,ct)          Q:1 
         I:PCARBII$tradeII(cf,ct)        Q:1 
         I:PCARBIII$tradeIII(cf,ct)      Q:1 
         I:PCARBIV$tradeIV(cf,ct)        Q:1 
         I:PCARBH$tradeS(cf,"hh")        Q:1 
 
$prod:EXCARBONCAR(cf,ct)$(co2car0(cf,ct)  and exempted(cf,ct)) 
         O:PEXCARBONCAR(cf,ct)           Q:1 
         I:PCARBONCAR(cf,ct)             Q:1 
+                                        A:GOV           T:(-0.999999) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                                PRODUCTION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:Y(i)$(y0(i) and not ele(i))        s:0     t:esub_out(i) 
+                                vae:esub_vae(i)         trn:esub_trn(i) 
+                                road(trn):esub_road(i)  fuel(road):esub_fuel(i) 
+                                va(vae):esub_va(i)      ele(vae):esub_ele(i) 
+                                coa(ele):esub_coa(i)    lqd(coa):esub_lqd(i) 
         O:PY(i)                 Q:d0(i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ty(i) 
         O:PFX                   Q:e0(i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ty(i) 
         I:PA(j)$(not fof(j))    Q:id0(j,i)              P:pi0(j,i)       ele:$ele(j) 
+               trn:$nroad(j) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ti(j,i)        road:$otp(j) 
         I:PE(fof,i)             Q:(id0(fof,i)*pi0(fof,i))               coa:$coa(fof) 
+                                                                         lqd:$(not coa(fof)) 
         I:PK                    Q:kd0(i)                                va: 
         I:PL                    Q:ld0(i)                P:pl0(i)         va: 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tl(i) 
         I:PYF(cf,i)             Q:(pf0(cf,i)*fd0(cf,i))                 fuel: 
 
$prod:A(i)$a0(i)         s:esub_dm(i) 
         O:PA(i)         Q:a0(i) 
         I:PFX           Q:m0(i) 
         I:PY(i)         Q:d0(i) 
 
$report: 
         V:Imports(i)            I:PFX           PROD:A(i) 
         V:Exports(i)            O:PFX           PROD:Y(i) 
         V:demY(i,j)             I:PA(i)         PROD:Y(j) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                          ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:Y(i)$ele(i)        s:0     t:esub_out(i) 
+                        va(s):esub_va(i)    load(s):esub_load 
+                        fuel(s):esub_fuel(i) 
         O:PY(i)                 Q:d0(i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ty(i) 
         O:PFX                   Q:e0(i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ty(i) 
         I:PA(j)$(not fof(j))    Q:id0(j,i)              P:pi0(j,i) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:ti(j,i) 
         I:PE(fof,i)             Q:(id0(fof,i)*pi0(fof,i)) 
         I:PK                    Q:kd0(i)                                va: 
         I:PL                    Q:ld0(i)                P:pl0(i)        va: 
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+                                A:GOV                   T:tl(i) 
         I:PYF(cf,i)             Q:(pf0(cf,i)*fd0(cf,i))                 fuel: 
         I:PELEC                 Q:(sum(l, lod0(l,i))) 
 
$prod:ELEC       s:esub_load 
         O:PELEC                 Q:(sum((i,l),lod0(l,i))) 
         I:PLOAD(l)              Q:(sum(i, lod0(l,i))) 
 
$prod:GEN(ga) 
         O:PLOAD(l)$mapL(l,ga)                   Q:1 
         I:PKG(ga)                               Q:unit("cap",ga) 
         I:PL                                    Q:unit("lab",ga) 
         I:PA(i)                                 Q:unit(i,ga) 
         I:PCAP(ga)$(cap(ga) lt + inf)           Q:1                     P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBI$tradeI(ga,"ele")               Q:unit("co2",ga)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBII$tradeII(ga,"ele")             Q:unit("co2",ga)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBIII$tradeIII(ga,"ele")           Q:unit("co2",ga)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBIV$tradeIV(ga,"ele")             Q:unit("co2",ga)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBS("ele")$tradeS(ga,"ele")        Q:unit("co2",ga)        P:1e-6 
 
$prod:GEN(gn) 
         O:PLOAD(l)$mapL(l,gn)                   Q:1 
         I:PK                                    Q:(unit("cap",gn)*markupG(gn)) 
         I:PL                                    Q:(unit("lab",gn)*markupG(gn)) 
         I:PA(i)                                 Q:(unit(i,gn)*markupG(gn)) 
         I:PCAP(gn)$(cap(gn) lt + inf)           Q:1                     P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBI$tradeI(gn,"ele")               Q:unit("co2",gn)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBII$tradeII(gn,"ele")             Q:unit("co2",gn)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBIII$tradeIII(gn,"ele")           Q:unit("co2",gn)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBIV$tradeIV(gn,"ele")             Q:unit("co2",gn)        P:1e-6 
         I:PCARBS("ele")$tradeS(gn,"ele")        Q:unit("co2",gn)        P:1e-6 
 
$prod:TKG        t:esub_kele 
         O:PKG(ga)               Q:(unit("cap",ga)*unit("out",ga)) 
         I:PK                    Q:(sum(ga, unit("cap",ga)*unit("out",ga))) 
 
$report: 
         V:DEMANDLOAD(l)         I:PLOAD(l)      PROD:ELEC 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                             TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:TA(p)$trn_p(p)                     s:tsub_d(p) 
         O:PTA(p)                Q:trn_p(p) 
         I:PTA_D(p,d)            Q:trn_pd(p,d) 
 
$prod:TA_D(p,d)$trn_pd(p,d)              s:tsub_tp(p,d) 
         O:PTA_D(p,d)            Q:trn_pd(p,d) 
         I:PTA_DTP(p,d,tp)       Q:trn_pdtp(p,d,tp) 
 
$prod:TA_DTP(p,d,tp)$trn_pdtp(p,d,tp)    s:tsub_m(p,d,tp) 
         O:PTA_DTP(p,d,tp)       Q:trn_pdtp(p,d,tp) 
         I:PTA_DTPM(p,d,tp,m)    Q:trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m) 
 
$prod:TA_DTPM(p,d,tp,m)$trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m)      s:tsub_n(p,d,tp,m) 
         O:PTA_DTPM(p,d,tp,m)    Q:trn_pdtpm(p,d,tp,m) 
         I:PTA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n) Q:tay0(p,d,tp,m,n) 
 
$prod:TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)$(tay0(p,d,tp,m,n) and not cars(m))    time:sigmaF 
         O:PTA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)         Q:1 
         I:PA(i)                         Q:(taid0(i,p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
+                                        P:pta0(i,m) 
+                                        A:GOV           N:LStta 
+                                                        M:tta(i,m) 
         I:PT                            Q:(tat0(p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
+                                                                        time: 
         I:PRA(tp,m,n)$ra0(tp,m,n)       Q:(tara0(p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
+                                                                        time: 
 
$prod:TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)$(tay0(p,d,tp,m,n) and cars(m))       time:sigmaF     cars:tsub_car 
 O:PTA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)         Q:1 
 I:PA(i)                         Q:(taid0(i,p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
 I:PCAR(cf,ct)  
+         Q:((tacom0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n)+tasup0(cf,ct,p,d,tp,m,n))/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
+                                                                        cars: 
 I:PT                            Q:(tat0(p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
+                                                                        time: 
 I:PRA(tp,m,n)$ra0(tp,m,n)       Q:(tara0(p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n)) 
+                                                                        time: 
 
$report: 
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         V:TTIME(p,d,tp,m,n)             I:PT            PROD:TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n) 
         V:demCT(i,p,d,tp,m,n)           I:PA(i)         PROD:TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n) 
         V:demRA(p,d,tp,m,n)             I:PRA(tp,m,n)   PROD:TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                               CAR TECHNOLOGIES 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:CAR(cf,ct)                 coms(cars):tsub_coms 
         O:PCAR(cf,ct)           Q:(comy0(cf,ct)+supy0(cf,ct)) 
         I:PCOM(cf,ct)           Q:comy0(cf,ct) 
         I:PSUP(cf,ct)           Q:supy0(cf,ct) 
 
$prod:COMCAR(cf,ct) 
         O:PCOM(cf,ct)           Q:1 
         I:PA(i)                 Q:cunit(i,cf,ct)        P:pother0(i,cf,ct) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tother(i,cf,ct) 
         I:PFCAR(cf,ct)          Q:cunit("fuel",cf,ct) 
         I:PRENT(cf,ct)          Q:cunit("car",cf,ct) 
 
$prod:SUPCAR(cf,ct) 
         O:PSUP(cf,ct)           Q:1 
         I:PA(i)                 Q:sunit(i,cf,ct)        P:pother0(i,cf,ct) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tother(i,cf,ct) 
         I:PFCAR(cf,ct)          Q:sunit("fuel",cf,ct) 
+                                A:GOV 
 
$prod:STOCK(cf,ct)           s:1000 
         O:PRENT(cf,ct)          Q:(sy0(cf,ct)*pcar0(cf,ct)) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:tcirc(cf,ct) 
         I:PA(i)                 Q:snd0(i,cf,ct)         P:ps0(i,cf,ct) 
+                                A:GOV                   T:stax(i,cf,ct) 
         I:PSTOCK(cf,ct)         Q:ssd0(cf,ct) 
 
$report: 
         V:NEWCARS(i,cf,ct)      I:PA(i)                 PROD:STOCK(cf,ct) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                             TRANSPORTATION FUELS 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:YTF(cf) 
         O:PYTF(cf)              Q:fuely0(cf) 
         I:PA(i)                 Q:fuelid0(i,cf) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                                GOVERNMENT 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:GC 
         O:PG            Q:g0 
         I:PA(i)         Q:gd0(i) 
 
$demand:GOV 
         D:PG            Q:g0 
         E:PC            Q:(-trans0)             R:LSREC 
         E:PFX           Q:(bop) 
         E:PCARBI        Q:carblimI 
         E:PCARBII       Q:carblimII 
         E:PCARBIII      Q:carblimIII 
         E:PCARBIV       Q:carblimIV 
         E:PCARBS(i)     Q:carblimS(i) 
         E:PCARBH        Q:carblimS("hh") 
 
$report: 
         V:demG(i)       I:PA(i)                 PROD:GC 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                             REPRESENTATIVE AGENT 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$prod:LT 
         O:PL                            Q:ls0 
         I:PLS                           Q:timeL0        P:pw0 
+                                        A:GOV           T:tw 
 
$prod:INV$keynes 
         O:PINV                          Q:(sum(i, inv0(i))) 
         I:PA(i)                         Q:inv0(i) 
 
$prod:C  s:csub_l                ct:csub_l    ce(ct):csub_ce 
+        ene(ce):csub_ce         con(ce):csub_c 
         O:PC                            Q:c0 
         I:PT                            Q:leis0 
         I:PA(i)$(not fof(i))            Q:cd0(i)                P:pc0(i)         
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+              con:$(not ele(i)) 
+                                        A:GOV                   T:tc(i)         ene:$ele(i) 
         I:PEC(fof)                      Q:(cd0(fof)*pc0(fof))                   ene: 
         I:PTA(p)$leis(p)                Q:trn_p(p)                              ct: 
 
$demand:RA       s:1 
         D:PC                                    Q:c0 
         D:PINV$keynes                           Q:(sum(i, inv0(i))) 
         E:PA(i)$(not keynes)                    Q:(-inv0(i)) 
         E:PK                                    Q:ks0 
         E:PLS                                   Q:timeL0 
         E:PSTOCK(cf,ct)                         Q:stock0(cf,ct) 
         E:PCAP(g)$(cap(g) lt + inf)             Q:cap(g) 
         E:PTA(p)$work(p)                        Q:(-trn_p(p))           R:ADJWT 
         E:PC                                    Q:trans0                R:LSREC 
         E:PT                                    Q:time0 
         E:PRA(tp,m,n)$ra0(tp,m,n)               Q:1                     R:ROADAV(tp,m,n) 
 
$report: 
         V:LEISURE       I:PT                    PROD:C 
         V:demC(i)       I:PA(i)                 PROD:C 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*                             CONSTRAINTS 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
$constraint:ADJWT 
sum((d,tp,m,n)$tay0("work",d,tp,m,n), 
TA_DTPMN("work",d,tp,m,n)*(pkm0("work",d,tp,m,n)/tay0("work",d,tp,m,n))) 
                         =E=     sum((d,tp,m,n),pkm0("work",d,tp,m,n))*LT; 
 
$constraint:LSREC$lump 
         GC              =E=     1; 
 
$constraint:LSREC$(not lump) 
         LSREC           =E=     1; 
 
$constraint:LStta$pubsub 
         GC              =E=     1; 
 
$constraint:LStta$(not pubsub) 
         LStta           =E=     1; 
 
$constraint:VKM(p,d,tp,m,n)$(occup(p,d,tp,m,n) and roads(n) and not lkws(m)) 
         VKM(p,d,tp,m,n) =E=     
(pkm0(p,d,tp,m,n)/tay0(p,d,tp,m,n))*TA_DTPMN(p,d,tp,m,n)/occup(p,d,tp,m,n); 
 
$constraint:VKM(p,d,tp,m,n)$(occup(p,d,tp,m,n) and roads(n) and lkws(m)) 
         VKM(p,d,tp,m,n) =E=     vkm0(p,d,tp,m,n); 
 
$constraint:ROADAV(tp,m,n)$(ra0(tp,m,n) and congestion and cars(m)) 
ROADAV(tp,m,n)  =E=    (1- (A2.L(n) + 
A3.L(n)*exp(A4.L(n)*sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n)), 
VKM(p,d,tp,mm,n)*pcu(mm)/duration(tp))))/60) 
*sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n) and cars(mm)), 
VKM(p,d,tp,mm,n)); 
 
$constraint:ROADAV(tp,m,n)$(ra0(tp,m,n) and congestion and busses(m)) 
ROADAV(tp,m,n)  =E=    (1- (a1bus(n)*(A2.L(n) + 
A3.L(n)*exp(A4.L(n)*sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n)), 
VKM(p,d,tp,mm,n)*pcu(mm)/duration(tp))))/60)) 
*sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n) and busses(mm)), 
VKM(p,d,tp,mm,n)); 
 
$constraint:ROADAV(tp,m,n)$(ra0(tp,m,n) and not congestion and cars(m)) 
         ROADAV(tp,m,n)  =E=    ra0(tp,m,n)*sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n) and cars(mm)), 
VKM(p,d,tp,mm,n)) 
/sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n) and cars(mm)), 
vkm0(p,d,tp,mm,n)); 
 
 
$constraint:ROADAV(tp,m,n)$(ra0(tp,m,n) and not congestion and busses(m)) 
         ROADAV(tp,m,n)  =E=    ra0(tp,m,n)*sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n) and busses(mm)), 
VKM(p,d,tp,mm,n)) 
/sum((p,d,mm)$(occup(p,d,tp,mm,n) and busses(mm)), 
vkm0(p,d,tp,mm,n)); 
$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset ger_cong 
 
 
